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INTRODUCTION 
In the years between the world wars, Iowa 's rural law 
enforcement officers shared the majority of their countrymen's 
belief that they faced the threat of an engulfing "crime wave" 
and tried to recast themselves from sedate peacekeepers into 
front-line soldiers engaged in a mortal "war against crime." 
The crime wave was a myth. With the exception of a pervasive 
disregard of the nation's prohibition laws and dramatic but 
very rare bank holdups, jail records of the period show that 
crimes were perpetrated by local young men from the bottom 
rung of their society who preferred to target property rather 
than people for their crimes. 
The crime wave idea took hold in the hinterland shortly 
after it originated in the nation's cities when the press 
replaced sales-generating war stories with equally thrilling 
crime stories. The publication of crime stories reflected 
their profit-getting appeal not the reality of an increase in 
American criminality. 
Despite being the stuff of myth, the idea of a crime wave 
had immense power to alter the people's and the authorities' 
perceptions of crime. Rural crime incidents, once viewed as 
deplorable anomalies, were seen as evidence of the wave. 
Ruralites therefore believed that lawbreakers must be quickly 
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apprehended and face certain punishment to deter the other 
criminals they believed haunted the hinterland. 
The responsibility for rural law enforcement fell to 
Iowa's sheriffs. They responded by gratefully accepting the 
help of the state's newly-emerging police detectives and 
highway patrolmen and by deputizing hundreds of local citizens 
whom the state's bankers had recruited into vigilante bands. 
Equally important, the law officers organized themselves 
behind their own voluntary Iowa State Sheriffs' Association in 
pursuit of police professionalization. When the New Deal's 
leaders usurped the crime wave myth and added their own "war 
against crime" corollary in order to assume national law 
enforcement prominence, Iowa's sheriffs joined the rest of the 
country's police in accepting Washington's leadership. 
A variety of approaches are included in the following 
study of the nature, extent, and beliefs about rural crime in 
Iowa. Each of these approaches presents a different facet of 
either criminal activity itself or responses made to real or 
imagined criminal activity within the state. And, while each 
chapter of the dissertation can stand on its own, it is hoped 
that more general conclusions can be drawn. 
The dissertation begins with a survey of the work of 
others who have thought about, investigated, and written about 
criminal behavior and criminal justice in general and rural 
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crime in particular. The first chapter looks at both 
theoretical considerations and specific studies aimed at 
specific sectors, regions, or types of behavior. The purpose 
of this introductory chapter is to place the present study in 
context and, more particularly, to demonstrate how relatively 
little has been done to investigate rural crime. 
The second chapter sets the scene in another way. To 
analyze how lowans reacted to criminal behavior in the 1920s 
and 1930s, one must understand both what they thought was 
happening and what, in fact, was actually occurring. This 
chapter begins, therefore, with a series of comments that 
define public perceptions about criminal behavior in Iowa, 
with express reference to rural problems. These beliefs and 
assertions are then tested against the factual record of 
criminal behavior that sheriff's dockets in the state's nine 
most rural counties recorded in the interwar years. This 
review of the dockets clearly demonstrates the relatively 
limited scope of the criminal problem in the countryside, 
despite the beliefs that many people held to the contrary. 
That is not to say that crime never occurred. Whereas 
Chapter 2 attempts to quantify rural criminal behavior, 
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at some specific criminal acts. 
Some of these were major capital crimes like murder; others 
are perhaps more typical and unique to the setting such as 
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chicken theft. The descriptive passages give us a sense that 
serious rural crimes were relatively rare and, simultaneously, 
that they attracted a good deal of attention from both 
citizens and law enforcement personnel. 
The personnel who were expected to deal with whatever 
major or minor criminal behavior did occur were the local 
county sheriffs and their deputies. The office of sheriff had 
a long tradition in England before being transplanted in 
America. The fact that these law officers were elected gave 
them political stature within their counties, but it also 
encouraged them to be very responsive to local attitudes and 
conditions. And, because of the sheriff's standing as a 
locally prominent individual, he often became involved in 
issues and activities that expanded beyond the more 
straightforward criminal justice pattern. 
While local conditions and attitudes exerted strong 
influence on the behavior and outlook of rural sheriffs in 
this period, other influences propelled them toward 
professionalization. One key influence was the widespread 
drive toward professionalism that had begun in the late 19th 
century and was still powerful during the Progressive period 
after 1900. A second major component was the widespread, 
though largely unfounded, belief that rural areas were on the 
verge of entering an urban-style crime wave that would require 
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a far better trained and equipped counter force. Chapter 5 
describes how these and other influences encouraged what had 
been a rather naive and untrained group to move confidently 
toward becoming professionals. 
County sheriffs had plenty of local problems facing them, 
and they were happy to consider sharing responsibilities with 
duly authorized state officials. Chapter 6 details the steps 
and missteps along the way to the creation of a professional 
state patrol that would handle the growing problems of highway 
traffic congestion. State troopers could then assist sheriffs 
in other law enforcement endeavors as well. 
Another source of support for rural lawmen were the 
vigilante groups that sprang up throughout the state in this 
period. Bankers in particular were concerned that the 
citizenry help them protect their assets from robbers. 
Chapter 7 describes the origins, organization, and activities 
of these bank-sponsored vigilantes and other irregular forces 
engaged in the "war on crime." 
The final chapter deals with perhaps the only really 
widespread instance of criminal behavior in Iowa in this 
period, the so-called Cornbelt Rebellion of the early 1930s. 
This peripatetic and generally spontaneous outbreak of 
violence was a grim consequence of a dramatic worsening of 
economic conditions after the dreary decade of agricultural 
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depression that followed the Great War. Law enforcement 
groups, both official and unofficial, dealt with this 
fortunately relatively brief period of disturbance. 
A constant theme throughout all of the chapters is the 
distance that lay between belief and reality regarding 
criminal behavior in Iowa. Sheriffs professionalized, a state 
patrol appeared, vigilante groups organized, but the 
anticipated crime wave never materialized. And, when violent 
crime did make a rare appearance, the planning and 
organizational thought that had developed to cope with it 
often proved irrelevant or, worse yet, more costly than the 
effects of the crimes being suppressed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
URBAN BIAS AND RURAL RESEARCH 
The complexity of studying criminology in rural areas 
arises from several scholarly preconceptions. The first is 
that historically the study of criminal behavior has, for a 
variety of reasons, focused almost exclusively on urban 
settings and motivations. Second, the sociologists and 
political scientists who have commented upon the differences 
between rural and urban criminal behavior, police behavior, 
and legal sanctions, have done so without much attention to 
historical development and trends. This chapter describes the 
major criminological theories and direct findings regarding 
American crime in general and fundamental rural/urban 
differences. This information will provide an essential 
reference point from which my own study of rural crime in Iowa 
in the 1920s and 1930s will proceed. 
Crime is among the least understood facets of rural life. 
Indeed, a most conspicuous feature of current criminology is 
its urban focus which rests on the convergence of three 
historical forces. American criminologists looked to the city 
because they had inherited an urban locus from their 
predecessors; they worked within the margins of the 
Progressive Movement of which they were a part; and they 
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reflected the nation's oldest and most venerated self-
definition: the Jeffersonian agrarian bias. What follows is 
a brief account of historical criminological thinking and the 
development of American theory to illustrate how it has come 
to exclude rural criminality. 
Present day American criminologists can draw upon two 
centuries of European thinking about crime. Modern 
criminology can be traced from Cesare Beccaria's eighteenth 
century Classical School of thought. Beccaria's ideas 
emanated from his social contract theory of society. To him, 
"[1]aws are the conditions whereby free and independent men 
unite to form society." Crime's etiology was not his purpose. 
Beccaria wanted to reform a too-often brutal legal system. 
Using a largely metaphysical approach, the Classical School 
tended to overlook the individual criminal in its emphasis on 
abstract ideas about crime.^ 
Auguste Comte's nineteenth century philosophy of 
Positivism also influenced those who thought about crime. 
Although it is a broad and eclectic epistemology, Positivism 
inspired Cesare Lombrosos' use of the scientific method in the 
study of crime and criminals. With the Positive School came 
the embracing of empirical and replicative investigations into 
the causes of and societal responses to crime.% 
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Emile Durkheim's Sociological School directed 
criminological study toward an acceptance of crime as an 
integral part of society. "Crime is normal because a society 
exempt from it is utterly impossible," he wrote.^ These three 
European schools greatly advanced the study of crime by 
placing it within a scientific framework. Together, they 
provided twentieth century American criminologists with an 
indispensable methodological and philosophical legacy. They 
did not, however, equip their heirs to study rural crime. 
Urbanization and its attendant Progressivism reinforced 
the American pioneers' urban focus. During the lifetimes of 
criminology's latter pioneers the United States population 
doubled. More than two-thirds of the immigrants who helped 
swell that population came from southern and eastern Europe 
and settled in American cities. More than 80 percent of all 
Russian, Polish, Italian, and Irish Americans—mostly Jews and 
Roman Catholics—were urbanités. By 1920 the urban portion of 
the American population had passed the symbolic 50 percent 
mark. 
The presence of so many aliens within the burgeoning 
urban areas exacerbated traditional fears that many Americans 
had about cities being the Devil's play-grounds. Many of the 
progressives, who constituted a coalition of middle-class 
Protestant reformers, sprang from this large, alarmed, and 
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amorphous group. Central to Progressivism was a conviction 
that industrialization and urban aliens posed dangers to the 
republic and that these new dangers demanded new measures. 
Interest in criminology and Progressivism were coeval and 
they reinforced one another. Criminology's union with 
progressivism began in universities where social science 
professors in particular adopted the new political 
orientation. They could have hardly done otherwise. It 
offered a snug intellectual berth and a splendid mission; the 
scientific gathering of data to lay the basis for the 
development of social prescriptions. 
The first American social scientists who examined crime 
discovered that official police arrest tallies were 
disproportionately higher in urban areas than in rural areas. 
Viewing cities, therefore, as "criminogenic" places, scholars 
saw them as being worthy of concentrated scrutiny. Assuming 
that rural America, by contrast, was "crime free," they 
neglected to subject it to serious or protracted analyses. 
In this, the social scientists were reflecting a cultural 
agrarian bias as old as the Republic. Its roots lay in the 
literary agrarianism of classical antiquity; it was further 
shaped by the Enlightenment's assumptions of the goodness of 
Nature and of "natural" man. The agrarianism of classic 
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tradition became the political and social agrarianism of the 
Founding Fathers/ 
Thomas Jefferson, always an eloquent spokesman for 
American values, wrote: "Those who labor in the earth are the 
chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose 
breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and 
genuine virtue." 
Jeffersonian agricultural fundamentalism held that rural 
life, and especially farming, produced better people than did 
urban living. Moreover, this belief cherished the notion that 
living close to the soil spawned republican citizens who were 
inherently more democratic, more honest, more virtuous, more 
independent, and much more politically stable than their 
urbanité cousins. This was more than social rhetoric; it was 
also popular belief. It is hardly surprising in a land where, 
until the twentieth century, the majority of the people were 
farmers. 
By the time the social scientists began exploring crime, 
Jeffersonian agrarianism was an established rural social 
creed; a creed whose corollary held that city life was 
inevitably enervating and iniquitous. The fusion of the 
pioneers' vision, the Jeffersonian agrarian bias, 
Progressivism, and the social scientists own findings proved 
an irresistible force. "Crime" and "urban" became so closely 
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associated as nearly to exclude rural crime from 
criminological hypotheses. 
The inception of modern American criminological theory 
with its urban partiality, Jeffersonian bias, and Progressive 
inclinations can be traced from the work of Robert E. Park of 
the University of Chicago. He came to sociology by way of 
muckraking journalism and a period of service as Booker T. 
Washington's secretary. In neither of these earlier positions 
did Park reveal an interest in man as an individual entity. 
It was men in groups that spellbound him in an almost mystical 
way. 
Like any good progressive, Park insisted that society was 
greater than the sum of its people. In sociological terms 
this meant culture was what Park called a social process, one 
that regulated the behavior of its members by imposing a body 
of rules which the individual inherited and had no part in 
making. Parks' key ideas, "symbiosis and socialization," and 
"competition, accommodation, and assimilation," most clearly 
existed, and could better be studied in an urban than in a 
rural environment. The result was a near obsession with the 
city-as-laboratory.5 
Park asserted an ecological and consensual view. He 
believed that crime was stimulated by the emergence of 
immigrant slums within large cities whose occupants were 
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"insulated from the general [i.e. white, Protestant, middle 
class] culture of the society." Underpinning Park's thinking 
was the conviction that there was a recognizable and knowable 
consensus of societal values or "norms." He drew his 
conclusions from his profession's and his country's history. 
Inevitably he chose to examine the city. His theory's concern 
with immigrants, ideas of consensus, and emphasis on the 
environment is thoroughly Progressive in its nature. 
The city certainly offered plenty to interest 
sociologists and criminologists during the 1920s. They were 
years of "wonderful nonsense" sporting a sensationalist press. 
Lucky Lindy, Babe Ruth, Babbittry, jazz, Hollywood, bathtub 
gin, and A1 Capone. On January 15, 1920, the Eighteenth 
Amendment took effect, initiating a new kind of urban crime. 
From a base in bootleg beer, A1 Capone built a larger, better 
organized, and more profitable system of business-by-
intimidation than the country had ever before seen. Within a 
short time Capone's gangsters had expanded into bootlegging 
Canadian whisky, gambling,- prostitution, and extortion. These 
activities motivated criminologists, already moored in the 
city, to increase their urban research. 
Among those who cradled their research in the city were 
Clifford Shaw and H. D. McKay. Writing synchronously with 
Park in the 1920s, they augmented his ecological explanation 
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of urban crime. Shaw and McKay superimposed a series of 
evenly-spaced concentric circles upon a city, radiating 
outward from it's center. Marking official crime statistics 
onto their circular plot, they showed that crime was rampant 
in the deteriorating inner circles but generally decreasing as 
one moved toward the city's fringes. 
Called the "Chicago School," Park, Shaw, and McKay argued 
that as the "inner zone" of downtown businesses moved outward, 
it simultaneously propelled the respectable residential zone 
farther outward. Left behind were culturally unassimilated 
immigrants living in dilapidated houses. As a consequence, 
"natural areas" of crime developed.* 
Rural crime went unexamined. Rural criminality had no 
place in the Chicago School's theories. It lacked "competing 
social units." It did not contain members with inadequate 
"socialization of normative values." As a result, the rural 
community served as the intellectual baseline or standard 
against which urban crime and urban crime rates could be 
judged. 
The Republican party twice nominated Thomas E. Dewey for 
the presidency in the 1940s, but a decade earlier he had 
inadvertently promoted criminology's urban focus. As Special 
Prosecutor in New York City investigating racketeering, Dewey 
succeeded in combatting organized crime. Between 1935 and 
15 
1937 Dewey achieved the most extraordinary prosecution record 
in history. He indicted 73 racketeers and convicted 71 of 
them, including the city's crime tsar, "Lucky" Luciano. Dewey 
showed that urban crime could be beaten. All that appeared to 
be needed was masses of information, and that was the very 
thing that criminologists were furiously assembling. 
Although Edwin Sutherland was among the most active 
criminologists of the 1930s, he did not support the Chicago 
School or its ecological explanation of crime. He began his 
work concurrently with Park, Shaw, and McKay, and continued 
into the 1930s, and he, too, framed his theoretical 
imagination within big-city borders. While studying rural 
crime held no allure for Sutherland, neither did the Chicago 
School's reliance on spatial explanations of "societal 
competition and cooperation." Sutherland postulated a view 
dramatically opposed to the Chicago School's assertion that 
crime resulted from the environment's imbalance of competing 
urban social units. 
Crime was not ecologically motivated, he said. It, 
instead, is learned. Sutherland called it "Differential 
Association," and it contained four elements. He theorized 
that (1) criminal behavior is learned (2) in the company of 
others (3) who have formed close-knit, highly personal groups 
(4) that exchange the attitudes and techniques of criminal 
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acts. Sutherland also subscribed to his predecessors' 
consensual view of society. Most urbanités adhere to socially 
prescribed attitudes and behavior. A minority diverge to form 
a sub-culture of intimate groups that do not, and instead, 
pursue criminal activities.? 
Sutherland's theory of "differential association" 
maintained the urban-focus continuity of criminology itself. 
Jefferson's agrarian bias remains intact and undiminished. 
Sutherland gave urban criminologists another theory completely 
compatible with their metropolitan precepts. 
In 1938 Robert K. Merton, another urban theorist, 
produced a principle of "illicit means," dubbed "Mertonian 
functionalism." Merton's theory is nicely compatible with 
both Sutherland and the Chicago School's ideas. Mertonian 
functionalism explains crime in terms of America's materialist 
indoctrination. He insists that there is a cultural urge in 
America for the social prestige that conspicuous consumption 
creates. The unequal distribution of the means of achieving 
wealth is crime's impetus. Frustration leads some people to 
turn to crime in order to attain affluence and the eminence it 
provides.* 
Writing in 1956, Daniel Glaser charged Sutherland with 
failing to account adequately for the potency of the mass 
media. There is historical support for Classer's objection; 
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at the time Sutherland published his thesis, the nation's 
first electronic mass medium, radio, was in its infancy. 
Glaser reformulated Sutherland's theory while keeping its 
essential nugget. Glaser agreed with Sutherland that 
criminals indeed learned wrongdoing. He called it 
"differential identification." Glaser insisted that learning 
crime intimately was unnecessary. "A person pursues criminal 
behavior to the extent that he identifies himself with real or 
imaginary" criminals, he wrote. It was therefore entirely 
possible for a person to become a criminal by watching 
gangster movies. ' 
Edwin Sutherland's student, Albert Cohen, used both his 
teacher's theory of differential association and Robert 
Merton's idea of functionalism to explain the development of 
urban youth gangs in the 1950s. As Sutherland taught, gang 
members did learn their deviancy, but they chose an inverted 
image of Merton's wealth accumulation-goal when they found 
themselves without the means to attain it. Although they 
inverted the larger society's goal of attaining possessions, 
they retained the goal of social prestige. This, in turn, 
results in gang activity that consists chiefly of petty theft 
and vandalism.^" 
Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin proposed a second 
functionalist approach to urban juvenile delinquency. These 
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scholars integrated Sutherland's, Merton's, and Cohen's ideas 
while remaining within Park's and Shaw's and McKay's urban 
arena to create a theory of their own they called 
"differential opportunity." Cloward and Ohlin disagree with 
Cohen's proposal that the perspectives of urban youth gangs 
are the inverted "norms" of the middle class. They submit 
that Merton's vision of a universally accepted medley of 
cultural attitudes for all Americans is incorrect. It is not 
the attitudes themselves, but rather, the availability of 
their attainment that is novel in "differential opportunity." 
Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin see in America two 
opportunity structures - one legitimate, the other 
illegitimate. That would go against Cohen's analysis of urban 
youth gang acts as being useless and "negativistic." 
Delinquent behavior is, instead, exactly the opposite; it is 
translating a (Mertonian) functional adaptation into specific 
acts including crime, depending on the availability of means. 
Challenging the functionalist approach is a theory of 
cultural pluralism. Writing in 1975, Claude Fisher contested 
the classic functionalist doctrine that the concentration of 
large heterogeneous populations causes crime by destroying 
society's cohesive fabric. Fisher proposes a non-ecological 
explanation for crime. He argues with his functionalist 
predecessors that urbanités are different from their rural 
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cousins in that they are more likely to diverge from 
traditional middle class values. Pluralism causes deviance, 
not the city's size or population density. The presence of 
divers and powerful subcultures, each trying desperately to 
remain distinct as they unintentionally act against the 
central middle class values and "norms," trigger crime. Thus, 
the more urban a place becomes, the greater its social 
conflict, including crime, inevitably becomes as well. 
Claude Fisher shares a binding tie with his predecessors' 
thinking over more than two centuries : the scholarship of 
each, individually and corporately, bears an urban 
predilection. It arises from the pioneers' urban assumptions 
based upon their Progressivism and couched within the 
historical Jeffersonian agrarian bias. 
All of these theories are designed to explain urban 
crime, but they are of limited help in understanding rural 
crime. Even those few who have studied rural crime 
demonstrate an urban proclivity. Their scholarship is often a 
perseverative of urban theories into the rural domain. But 
rural crime is not simply a penumbra of urban events. A more 
thorough explanation of the historical processes of crime in 
the hinterland is essential. 
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Rural crime is distinctive. It has evolved within its 
own historical, cultural, and social milieu into a distinct 
phenomenon. Yet, because of the fusion of criminology's 
pioneers' urban proclivity, the Jeffersonian agrarian bias, 
Progrèssivism, and the social scientists' own findings, the 
words "crime" and "urban" became closely associated. As 
demonstrated above, the result was the virtual exclusion of 
rural crime from criminological hypotheses. Fortunately, 
several scholars are aware that understanding rural crime 
requires more than simply extending urban theories into the 
countryside. The work of twentieth century scholars aware 
that rural crime is not just an extension of urban events 
provides a starting point for an explanation of crime in the 
hinterland. 
A definitional dilemma further complicates the study of 
rural crime. No consensus has arisen on what constitutes 
"rural crime." The difficulty is not the absence of a 
definition but a plethora of different ones. Each scholar 
studying rural crime is free to define that term 
independently. Bruce Smith, in the first American book ever 
written on rural crime, noted the definitional quandary sixty 
years ago; little progress has been made since. 
The first Iowa scholar to examine rural crime used 
population identifiers. Marshall B. Clinard's investigation 
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of Iowa's rural offenders used three parameters: rural 
applied to areas with fewer than fifty inhabitants; a village 
had from 50 to 4,999 inhabitants; and an urban area 
encompassed 5,000 or more people. Others used county-
boundaries, examining those they considered "rural." William 
Lentz defined rural as all open country and rural trading 
centers included within the rural community. Compounding this 
difficulty is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation uses 
the Census Bureau's definition of rural as being all areas 
with less than 2,500 population. 
Another factor snarling examination of rural crime is a 
reporting incongruity. There is an inherent reporting 
inaccuracy of official records. Inaccurate reporting is 
probably more prevalent in rural than in urban areas, leading 
at least one scholar, LeRoy Schultz, to doubt that the urban-
rural differences are as great as they appear.^ 
Jon T. Karr's excellent dissertation takes a position 
similar to but more vigorous than that of Schultz. Karr 
concludes that the differences in reporting incidents of crime 
between rural and urban areas are not the work of differing 
life-styles, family structures, friendship circles, or social 
milieux. His position is that the true frequency of criminal 
behavior is vastly more similar than dissimilar between rural 
and urban populations. 
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Karr does not dispute that the forms of criminal behavior 
may differ markedly. The opportunity to steal farm machinery 
is far greater in rural New Mexico than in the city of 
Chicago. What Karr does emphatically dispute is the 
implication that grand larcenies occur four times more often 
in urban areas than in rural locations. He lays the 
difference in reporting to police strategies; rather than the 
more conventional explanations described above. 
Despite the reporting challenges it is possible to 
determine which misdeeds are rural crimes. G. Howard 
Phillips' comprehensive study of rural Ohio disclosed a great 
difference between urban and rural crimes. Property crimes 
such as vandalism, theft, and automobile and machinery theft 
are overwhelmingly most common in rural areas. 
Other research supports Phillips' findings. Two studies 
of rural Lincoln, Ohio, reveal vandalism and petty theft to 
constitute most of the reported crimes in that area. A third 
study that looked at three rural Oregon counties corroborated 
the other studies by showing that 92 percent of all rural 
arrests were for misdemeanors. Most of the arrests involved 
"booze and boisterousness."This research suggests that 
rural crime is distinct from predatory urban crime. It is 
comparatively petty in character with most criminal activity 
involving minor theft and acts offending the public peace. 
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The characteristics of the offenders also help clarify 
the distinctive nature of rural crime. Several studies of 
rural offenders exist, and among the best of them is Marshall 
B. Clinard's 1944 study of rural Iowa offenders. Clinard 
interviewed sixty Iowa Reformatory inmates who came from farms 
to determine the importance of mobility, "differential 
association" with criminal behavior and "criminal social type 
and conception of self in the lives of rural offenders." His 
interviews disclose farm offenders to be unlike their urban 
counterparts. Farm offenders are unusually mobile even though 
they do not see themselves as being so. Nomadic drifting and 
occupations like truck driving are common in all of their 
backgrounds. They share an impersonal view of the world and 
revel in their "emancipation" from the confines of their farm 
life. Differential association defined as habitual social 
joining with criminals played no part in the lives of these 
farm offenders. Two thirds of them never associated with 
boys' gangs and an equal percentage were alone when first 
arrested. 
Most important, Clinard found that farm offenders "do not 
exhibit the characteristics of a definite criminal social 
type." Their criminal activity started after their teen 
years, long after the time when basic attitudes normally form. 
Their knowledge of criminal activity did not escalate over 
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time, which is to say they did not gain a progressive 
knowledge of crime. Significantly, their crimes were simple. 
Forgery was the most common first offense; robbery was the 
first offense of only one of the sixty inmates interviewed. 
Crime was not their sole means of livelihood and, unlike their 
urban comrades, they did not consider themselves to be 
criminals 
Rural juvenile offenders have been the subject of several 
research efforts. Clinard included delinquents in his 1944 
study. He concluded that rural delinquents, like rural adult 
offenders, do not see themselves as criminals nor were they 
generally hostile toward criminal justice authorities. 
Clinard inferred that delinquency occurred because his 
subjects' lives became increasingly aimless until they drifted 
into crime. 
William Lentz compared rural and urban delinquents in a 
Wisconsin study. His findings reveal a fundamental difference 
between the two groups. Rural boys were less likely than 
urban boys to continue delinquency after confinement, he 
found, but they were more likely to commit serious 
transgressions than urban delinquents if they again broke the 
law. 22 
Joseph C. Lagey made another interesting comparison of 
rural and urban delinquents, finding a close association 
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between urban delinquency and peer groups but no such 
association for rural delinquents. This led Lagey to agree 
with Bordua in his urban delinquency study that rural 
delinquency arises from "anomie," or degenerated social 
relations. 
Theodore N. Ferdinand's Michigan study supports previous 
delinquency interpretations. Here a county is defined as 
rural if less than 15 percent of the population lived in urban 
places, and more than 40 percent lived on farms. Ferdinand 
identified a "clear preference of rural delinquents, both male 
and female, for property offenses." That preference differed 
systematically from the urban offense patterns he noted." 
More recently, Martin G. Miller, Eric 0. Hoiberg, and 
Rodney F. Ganey conducted a self-reporting "Youth Needs 
Assessment Survey" of Iowa's seventh to twelfth graders. In 
this work farm youths, in contrast to others, reported the 
least degree of delinquency. Delinquency is slightly more 
prevalent among non-farm youths and significantly more 
prevalent for urban juveniles." 
Miller did not find, as might be expected, high rates of 
delinquency associated with a perceived lack of recreational 
facilities. Youths who admitted frequent minor infractions 
(such as lying to a teacher) did, however, report a high need 
26 
for improving relations between the police and youth. Most 
interesting is the finding regarding self-perception. It is 
not the youth's perception of himself that relates to 
delinquency, but rather his perception of other people's 
labelling him as delinquent that relates to delinquency. 
Miller noted: 
A tradition in . . . rural society has been the 
passing [of] work skills from father to son through a 
lengthy apprenticeship system. This is less true today 
. . . opportunities for learning within the family 
setting have been sharply reduced. ... No corresponding 
institution within our society has taken over this 
traditional role. " 
Rural courts have received virtually no attention from 
scholars. Indeed, George Prazier Cole may be the first to 
have examined rural courts in his political science doctoral 
dissertation. After studying the offices of prosecuting 
attorney in Kind and Skagit counties, Washington, Cole 
concludes that the prosecutor is chiefly a political office. 
The prosecutors wield great discretionary power that they use 
pervasively to select cases to be prosecuted, what charges 
will be levied, and what bargains will be offered to 
defendants/" 
Kathryn Golden's, 1978 study of rural courts shows no 
interest in the political machinations of these courts. She 
discovered that rural courts use plea bargaining to the same 
degree of frequency that urban courts do. The reason for this 
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behavior, she contends, is that the greater rural familiarity 
coupled with a lighter caseload and its concomitant greater 
time for case preparation by police and prosecutors alike 
result in stronger trial cases. This, in turn, increases the 
willingness of defendants to acquiesce to plea bargaining in 
hopes of avoiding severe punishment.^® 
Several studies bear out the impression that rural courts 
dispense harsher justice than urban courts. Curt Taylor 
Griffiths finds a greater willingness for rural as opposed to 
urban juvenile courts to mete out stern sentences to serve as 
an example to other youth, especially because the police 
requested them. A study of Iowa's rural court system reaches 
conclusions similar to those of Golden and Griffiths. This 
study found a high degree of sentencing disparity between 
urban and rural jurisdictions for adult felony defendants." 
Although little attention has been devoted to the 
mechanisms and operations of rural courts, some tentative 
deductions are possible. Race and sex appear to be 
disproportionately important in rural sentencing practices. 
Rural courts operate a system that resorts to plea bargaining 
every bit as often, though for different reasons, than does 
its urban twin. Finally, rural courts appear to behave more 
informally than do urban courts. This is evidently because 
the close personal interaction and easy familiarity that 
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characterizes the rest of rural life is also present within 
its court system.^" 
Surprisingly, the police forces who "feed" the rural 
court system have received practically no scholarly attention. 
Some work finally did appear during the 1980s. The few 
empirical studies that do exist disclose significant, even 
unique, dissimilarities between urban and rural law enforcing. 
While rural police share many attitudes and concerns with 
their urban comrades, they retain singularly rural attitudes 
and concerns as well. David Kowalweski found the similarities 
to bes generally tense relations with non-white citizens, 
spousal fear for officers' safety, an abhorrence of family 
disputes requiring officer intervention, anger at perceived 
arrogance and condescension from social elites, fear of 
violent attack, and a perception of judicial leniency toward 
criminal suspects.^ 
Establishing a personal reputation as a "tough" officer 
through violence, Kowalweski found, was critical for rural 
officers. This "reputational power" is a deterrent to future 
challenges to the officer's authority. The importance of 
personal reputations in rural policing arises from the unique 
community familiarity found in rural places, combined with the 
high value placed on peace and quiet in the rural setting. In 
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"gérontocratie" rural spheres, personal reputation, not the 
badge itself, commands citizen respect. 
Scott Decker notes the rural officer-villager familiarity 
in his study of the "working personality" of rural police. 
Decker finds the three categories of "integration," 
"commitment," and "perception," to be monumentally different 
for rural police than that reported in Jerome H. Skolnick's 
1966 study of urban police/" 
The difference is integration. It is far easier for 
rural officers to be integrated into their communities than it 
is for urban officers. Rural recruiting is predominately done 
from the immediate vicinity. Officers consequently have an 
easier time learning what their public expects of them as 
police. Being drawn from the community also means that, 
unlike their urban colleagues, rural officers do not view the 
inhabitants as necessarily hostile to them. Similar findings 
relate the commitment to community standards. 
The result is striking. Whereas isolation, authority, 
danger, and solidarity are marks of the urban police working 
personality, the direct opposite holds in rural police 
personalties. Rural officers are more thoroughly incorporated 
into the mainstream of community life. They have favorable 
perceptions of the people they serve and enjoy a reciprocal 
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judgement from them. As a result rural police do not have the 
"working personality" described by Skolnick.^^ 
For Victor H. Sims, integration forms the core of a 
unique rural police philosophy of personal interaction. This 
philosophy is so important that Sims regards rural police to 
be the "quintessence of policing." By matching service to the 
expectations of their community, rural police have established 
an uncommonly effective and successful style of policing. 
Sims asserts, "unencumbered with bureaucratic requirements 
. . . [the] rural police work toward human goals of helping 
people themselves."^" 
August Vollmer and James Q. Wilson's manifold 
innovations, Sims believes, are merely attempts to translate 
to the large department what has historically existed in the 
rural setting. The ideas of community-based policing (also 
called community-oriented policing or "COP"), community 
service, police education, applying management and 
organization principles to police administration, and crime 
prevention are among the ideas that these two men introduced. 
The most consequential is community-based policing; something 
rural police have always practiced. In Sims words; 
Policing is community involvement or it is nothing. It 
always has been and it always will be. Police technology 
changes almost daily . . . law and policy . . . changes 
almost weekly. But . . . one thing about policing that 
never changes [is] the relationship between one officer 
and one person.^" 
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Allen Bristow agrees with Sims' conclusions about the 
integration of rural officers into their communities. Unlike 
urban officers who are vilified as interlopers, the rural 
citizenry take great pride in its police and use them as role 
models. 
Integration has unfavorable consequences. Joan Phillips 
Sandy and Donald A. Devine have identified four stresses 
unique to rural policing. The absence of anonymity is one of 
these. The familiarity that Sims, Bristow, and others find 
beneficial to rural officers during working hours becomes 
detrimental after hours. Their prominent social place and 
lack of police peers prevents the rural officer from enjoying 
the fraternal relationships his urban colleagues do.3? 
Other distinctive stresses are security, working 
conditions, and inactivity. Because rural officers work alone 
at great distances from any help, they are vulnerable to 
attack. Belief that firearms ownership is prevalent in rural 
areas heightens the officer's sense of danger. Working in all 
weather conditions also constitutes a danger for rural 
officers. Both vertical and horizontal movement within a 
department is very unlikely because of the department's small 
size. Inactivity, then, affects the rural officer's ability 
to maintain their alacrity and is detrimental to their self-
esteem.^® 
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Daniel Bell examined the dichotomy that rural areas 
report more but arrest fewer domestic violence offenders. 
This is so, Bell maintains, because of an "active resistance 
[to] intervention in domestic . . . violence [cases]." He 
believes that rural police hesitancy to enforce laws against 
domestic violence stems from their perception that domestic 
violence is not a proper part of their law enforcing role. A 
lack of handy referral agencies and reward to the officers by 
superiors for effective domestic violence intervention 
reinforces their hesitancy.^' 
All of this research supports the contention that rural 
crime is distinctive. It is not a mere reflection of urban 
developments. The rural ethos directs the character, 
perpetrators and opponents of rural crime. Rural criminals 
are disposed to target property, not people. Independent 
persons commit crime, but they do not consider themselves to 
be criminals. Opposing them are personally aggressive police 
and rural courts that enjoy close personal interaction and 
easy familiarity. For rural police this familiarity results 
in a large measure of support from the citizenry that makes 
them willing to use force to achieve their goals of 
maintaining the public peace and apprehending criminals. 
These theoretical considerations and studies of specific 
» 
sectors and types of behavior are only minimally relevant to 
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the story of the nature, extent, and beliefs about crime in 
rural Iowa during the years 1920 to 1941. They do, however, 
provide the necessary background from which a study of the 
popular perceptions and the realities of Iowa's rural crime in 
that period can be made. 
34 
End Notes 
^Steven Seidman, "The Enlightenment and the Origins of 
Modern Social Theory," Journal of the History of Ideas 5 
(Spring 1982): 213; Manheim Hermann, Pioneers in Criminology, 
2nd ed. (Montclair, NJ; Patterson Press, 1972), p. 62. 
^Jerome Hall, Criminology; Twentieth Century Sociology, 
Georges Gurvitch, ed. (New York: Philosophical Press, 1956), 
p. 53; See also: George B. Void, Theoretical Criminology (New 
York: Philosophical Press, 1958), p. 116. 
^Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. G.E.D. 
Catlin, ed. (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1938), p. 12. 
"Seidman, "Enlightenment," p. 217. 
^Robert M. Crunden, From Self to Society; 1919-1941 (New 
York; The Free Press, 1972), p. 36; Also see: Daniel Joseph 
Singal, "The War Within; From Victorian to Modernist Thought 
in the South, 1919-1945," American Sociological Review 48 
(1982): 76. 
^Richard Evans, "Sociological Journals and the 'Decline' 
of Chicago Sociology: 1929-1945," History of Sociology 6 
(Spring 1986): 18; See also: J. Taylor, E. Vargas and M. 
Tseng, "Socialization of Aggression in Low Income Rural 
Children," Proceedings: 81st Annual Convention (Washington, 
D.C.: The American Psychological Association), pp. 687-88. 
^Edwin H. Sutherland and D. R. Cressey, Criminology, 9th 
ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1937), p. 114. 
®Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," 
American Sociological Review 3 (1938): 71. 
'Daniel Glaser, "Criminality Theories and Behavioral 
Images," American Journal of Sociology 61 (1956): 92. 
^"Albert Cohen, Delinguent Bovs (New York; The Free Press, 
1955), p. 57. 
^Claude Fisher, "Toward a Subcultural Theory of 
Urbanism," American Journal of Sociology 80 (1975); 75. 
35 
^^Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American 
History (New York; Henry Hold, 1900); Mabel A. Elliott, "Crime 
and the Frontier Mores," American Sociological Review 9 
(1944): 185. 
"Ibid., p. 188. 
^''Ibid., p. 190. 
^Bruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1933), p. 9. 
^Several scholars discuss this difficulty. For example 
see: Marshall B. Clinard, "Rural Criminal Offenders," The 
American Journal of Sociology 42 (July 1944): 38; Theodore N. 
Ferdinand, "The Offense Patterns and Family Structures of 
Urban, Village, and Rural Delinquents," Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 55 (1964); 87; G. Howard Phillips, "Rural 
Crimes and Rural Offenders," Journal of Criminology 10 (1976): 
10; William P. Lentz, "Rural-Urban Differentials and Juvenile 
Delinquency," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police 
Science 47 (1957); 112. 
^LeRoy Schultz, "The Rural Social Worker and 
Corrections," in Social Work in Rural Counties, Leon Ginsberg, 
ed. (New York: Council of Social Work Education, 1976), p. 73. 
^®Jon T. Karr, "The Rise of Proactive Police Strategies: 
An Alternative Approach to Bureaucratic Rationalization and 
Rural-Urban Crime Differentials" (Ph.D. diss.. University of 
Kansas, 1978), pp. 14-15. 
^^Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
^°G. Howard Phillips, "Vandals and Vandalism in Rural 
Ohio," (A paper presented at the Rural Sociological Society 
Meetings at Burlington, Vermont, August 1976), p. 1. 
^Donald C. Gibbons, "Crime in the Heartland," Criminology 
10 (August 1972): 72. 
"Clinard, "Offenders," pp. 38-40. 
^^Ibid., pp. 42-44. 
2^Ibid. 
"Lentz, "Rural-Urban," p. 121. 
36 
Joseph C. Lagey, "The Ecology of Juvenile Delinquency in 
the Small City and the Rural Hinterland," Rural Sociology 22 
(1957): 233; David J. Bordua, "Juvenile Delinquency and 
'Anomie:' An Attempt at Replication," Social Problems 6 
(Winter 1958-59): 230. 
^^Ferdinand, "Offense Patterns," p. 88. 
G. Miller, Eric 0. Hoiberg, and Rodney F. Ganey, 
"Delinquency Patterns of Farm Youth," in Rural Crime, Timothy 
J. Carter, ed. (Totowa, N.J., 1982), p. 92. 
"Ibid., p. 102. 
^°George Frazier Cole, "Politics of Prosecution: The 
Decision to Prosecute" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Michigan, 
1976), iii; Corroboration is offered in: Sarah J. Cox, 
"Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview," The American 
Criminal Law Review 13 (1976): 385-87. 
^^Kathryn Golden, "Rural Courts; An Illinois Study," 
Criminal Justice Review 6 (Fall 1981): 382, 
Felony Sentencing Practices in Iowa, 1974-1978: An 
Analysis of Sentencing Disparities Among Major Counties and 
Rural Areas in the State's Eight Judicial Districts" (Iowa 
Office for Planning, Statistical Analysis Center, 1980): 
p. 17; See also: Curt Taylor Griffiths, "Law Enforcement-
Juvenile Court Relations; The Impact on Decision-Making," 
Criminal Justice Review 6 (Fall 1981): 6. 
^Several scholars have reached complimentary conclusions. 
See: J. Hagan, "Criminal Justice in Rural and Urban 
Communities: A Study of the Bureaucratization of Justice," 
Social Forces 55 (1977): 609-10; C. E. Pope, "The Influence of 
Social and Legal Factors on Sentencing Dispositions ; A 
Preliminary Analysis of Offender-Based Transaction 
Statistics," Journal of Criminal Justice 4 (1976): 126; Scott 
H. Decker, "The Working Personality of Rural Police," LAE 
Journal of the American Criminal Justice Association 27 (Fall 
1978): 27. 
^'^David Kowalewski, William Hall et al., "Police 
Environments and Operational Codes: A Case Study of Rural 
Settings," Journal of Police Science and Administration 12 
(December 1984): 223. 
^^Ibid. 
37 
^^Decker, Personality," pp. 23-26; Jerome H. Skolnick and 
Thomas C. Gray, Police in America (Boston; Education 
Associates, 1966), pp. 176-79. 
^^In addition to Skolnick and Decker's work see: Allen P. 
Bristow, Rural Law Enforcement (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1982), pp. 134-48; Maureen Cain, "On the Beat: Interactions 
and Relations in Rural and Urban Police Forces," in Images of 
Deviance, Stanley Cohen, ed. (New York; Penguin Books, 1971), 
p. 22; T. C. Esselstyn, "The Social Role of a County Sheriff," 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 44 
(1953): 179-80. 
^®Victor H. Sims, Small Town and Rural Police 
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1988), p. 123. 
^®Ibid. 
^°Joan Phillips Sandy and Donald A. Devine, "Four Stress 
Factors Unique to Rural Patrol," Patrol in Manitoba 5 (Winter 
1979): 8-9. 
^Edward W. Killam, "An Introduction to Terrorism for 
Rural Law Enforcement Officers," Law and Order 28 (April 
1980); 41. 
^^Daniel J. Bell, "Domestic Violence, Domestic Dispute 
Report and Police Disposition Patterns: A Pilot Study," 
Journal of Police Science and Criminal Psychology 1 (March 
1985): 308-9. 
38 
CHAPTER 2 
IOWA'S RURAL CRIME 
Two approaches are used in this chapter to determine what 
was actually occurring. First, the opinions of state leaders 
and criminal justice practitioners are examined in order to 
get a sense of what people believed about crime and rural 
criminality in particular. Second, the validity of these 
popular beliefs are checked with sheriff's jail dockets of the 
period. 
Rural lowans of the 1920s and 1930s who felt themselves 
increasingly under criminal attack found no shortage of people 
who agreed with them and who offered explanations for why it 
was occurring. Governor William L. Harding, for example, told 
lowans in 1921 that the state's crime "wave" stemmed from the 
automobile and from "organized, cunning, high trained 
criminals." Poor home training caused the state's crime 
predicament claimed Lucy M. Sickles, superintendent of the 
Iowa Training School for Girls, Judge B. 0. Tankersley, and 
Edwin H. Sands, superintendent of the Bureau of Child Welfare 
in Des Moines. 
Fort Madison Prison Warden T. P. Powell was equally 
certain that the chief cause was easy availability of 
handguns. Fr. Robert Powers, Chaplain of the Men's 
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Reformatory at Anamosa, cited a number of causes including 
bolshevism, the lure of the cities, the war, prohibition, and 
the automobile. 
Another Anamosa chaplain. Rev. C. L. Gould, disagreed 
with Father Powers. The "crime wave," he asserted, could be 
traced directly to Hollywood. A 1924 survey of 404 films 
found that they had depicted a rash of crimes. 
117 cases of adultery 
38 glorified divorces 
140 drinking episodes 
82 cases of girls smoking cigarettes 
172 incidents of girls in immodest dress 
98 cases of indecent dancing. 
Reverend Gould asserted that, with films condoning this 
type of activity, the movie industry was definitely at fault 
in threatening rural lowans with a degree of criminal activity 
never before seen.^ 
Besides the automobile. Governor John Hamill told the 
voters of Iowa that crime was on the upswing because "machine 
guns . . . firing five hundred missiles of death per minute 
. . . have increased by several thousand per cent the . . . 
power of criminals." Still another Iowa governor, Dan W. 
Turner, blamed the press for romanticizing crime.^ 
J. Edgar Hoover, in his monthly column in the Iowa 
Sheriff, told the state's law enforcement officers that the 
origin of the nation's crime dilemma was the fault of "shyster 
lawyers, sob-sister judges, criminal coddlers," and the 
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parole system. Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation chief 
Glen Schmidt told lowans that the state was a "crime 
thorofare" because of its geographical position and excellent 
road network. The editor of the Iowa Sheriff, the monthly 
magazine of the Iowa State Sheriffs' Association, agreed: "As 
the gangsters are being driven from the city they are taking 
to the country and murdering farm families. 
An Illinois state representative corroborated the state 
sheriffs' opinion, saying, "The hunt for criminals in our 
. . . cities has grown so relentless that organized bands of 
city robbers have been driven out to prey on . . . rural 
sections." Former Des Moines Police chief R. C. Saunders, 
speaking as head of the Illinois State Bureau of Rural Crime 
Prevention, said, "Crime is rapidly moving into the country. 
Burglars, gunmen of all types, and even pick pockets, driven 
from the larger cities by police 'heat' are swarming into the 
rural districts. 
University of Nebraska professor James M. Reinhardt 
concurred; "The small town . . . whose law enforcement 
machinery was originally designed mainly to deal with local 
ruffians . . . suddenly found themselves invaded by a 
specialized type of criminal who . . . had the advantages of 
modernized hook-up to beat the local authorities." C. H. 
Ireland, Warden of the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa, Iowa, 
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summed up the experts' opinions about why rural Iowans--along 
with the rest of the country—were suffering from increased 
criminal activity. His list: 
World War I 
Volstead Act 
Yellow Journalism 
the Movies 
the Automobile 
the lack of education 
the lack of religion 
Family Home Environment.^ 
Everyone knew that rural Iowa was suffering a terrible 
scourge of crime, everyone knew the causes, and most had a 
favorite solution. But was the crime wave real? Neither of 
two contemporary studies of Iowa crime could definitely 
confirm it. As one of the studies' authors noted: 
The frequent conjectures as to whether or not crime is 
increasing justifies reference to this matter here. No 
positive answer is found in this study because increases 
in the number of prosecutions may be due solely to 
greater efficiency in enforcement.® 
Despite the number of commentators and the variety of 
opinions they expressed about their perceptions of rural 
crime, to date no one else has attempted to quantify exactly 
what was occurring. To assess accurately how well or poorly 
Iowa sheriffs were responding to rural criminality, one must 
have a factual basis upon which to build that assessment. The 
present study attempts to establish that factual basis through 
an examination and analysis of jail dockets of nine of Iowa's 
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most rural counties. The nature of jail dockets is such that 
they provide the most complete and the most accurate 
information that can be gathered. 
The first task for making an examination of rural 
criminality was to identify which of Iowa's ninety-nine 
counties were "most rural" during the interwar period. The 
task was greatly simplified by accepting the criteria used by 
Charles N. Burrows in his 1930 study of Iowa's criminal 
conviction rates, entitled "Criminal Statistics in Iowa. 
Barrows used the county population figures appearing in 
the state census of 1925 to rank order Iowa's counties. The 
counties that he considered to be Iowa's twenty-one most rural 
were; Adams, Allamakee, Audubon, Adair, Davis, Monroe, Iowa, 
Winneshiek, Hancock, Madison, Osceola, Kossuth, Shelby, 
Monona, Ringgold, Pocahontas, Van Buren, Worth, Chickasaw, 
Lyon, and Franklin.® 
Once the counties were identified, the next step was to 
obtain permission from the sheriffs of those counties to 
examine their jail dockets. Many of the sheriffs were 
hesitant to grant access to their dockets for the purpose of 
historical inquiry and agreed to make them available to the 
author only after receiving their county attorneys' opinions 
in favor of the request. Several of the sheriffs who were 
willing to open their dockets reported that the dockets 
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pertaining to the interwar period no longer existed. In all, 
nine of the counties identified by Burrows as being "most 
rural" made their jail dockets available for examination. 
Those nine counties were; Adair, Allamakee, Audubon, Iowa, 
Kossuth, Lyon, Pocahontas, Ringgold, and Winneshiek. 
In each case the sheriffs' jail dockets are large, bound 
volumes measuring 40 x 27 x 7 inches with gilded page edges. 
The sheets they contain are scored to provide blank spaces for 
entering each arrestee's name, age, residence, occupation, 
offense, and disposition. The dates of arrest and release can 
also be noted from the dockets. The jail dockets were 
photocopied on-site. In order to provide a more accurate set 
of figures to work with, multiple entries of arrestees for the 
same offense were deleted from the data set. Multiple entries 
occurred when a prisoner was released on bail and later 
readmitted to jail to await trial. The number of docket 
entries following the deletion of the multiple entries 
totalled 5,080. See Table 1. 
The use of complete dockets avoids the under-reporting 
problem which has hampered other studies. An Iowa sheriff was 
reimbursed for each person lodged at his jail, and the jail 
docket was his sole means for obtaining that reimbursement. 
Jail dockets provided legal proof of operating expenses, and 
they were periodically audited by state and county 
44 
authorities. While citizen under-reporting to the sheriff 
remains an unknown factor, the problem of official under­
reporting is escaped. These dockets provide the best picture 
available of the reality of crime in each of the nine 
counties. 
TABLE 1 
THE NUMBER OF ARRESTEES APPEARING IN THE SHERIFF 
JAIL DOCKETS BY COUNTY, 1920-1941 
County Number of Entries County Number of Entries 
Adair 154 Lyon 4 07 
Allamakee 424 Pocahontas 185 
Audubon 454 Ringgold 887 
Iowa 828 Winneshiek 6 87 
Kossuth 1,057 Total 5,080 
Officers recorded the circumstances by which anyone came 
to their attention in the jail docket, recording any activity 
exceeding an officer's oral admonition to a citizen. 
Therefore these dockets contain the only complete record of 
the detention or arrest of every individual brought to the 
notice of local law enforcement officers. 
The dockets reveal circumstances very different from the 
perceived reality of the time. Contrary to the contemporary 
view, rural crime was not the work of " . . . organized. 
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cunning, high trained criminals." Local people perpetrated 92 
percent of crime throughout the interwar period.' 
The sheriffs of Iowa's nine most-rural counties entered a 
total of 5,080 arrestees into their jail dockets between 1920 
and 1941. The nine jail dockets both challenge and support 
the pronouncements of interwar press, rostrum, pulpit, and 
podium. The frequent prohibition arrests in the ostensibly 
"dry" countryside decidedly show that not all was well with 
prohibition compliance. The high number of petty offenses, 
and the correspondingly low number of serious felony crimes, 
also does not support the claim that a rural "crime wave" was 
underway. And, with 92 percent of all offenders being local 
people, Governor Harding's claim that the automobile and 
"organized . . . cunning criminals" were to blame seems highly 
doubtful. 
Rural Iowa's chief interwar criminality involved "booze 
and boisterousness." Violations of prohibition laws, 
misdemeanor theft, and public nuisances account for 23, 20, 
and 17 percent respectively of the total docket entries. 
These very minor offenses, taken together and called Group I, 
comprise 60 percent of all docket entries.^" 
Felony offenses did occur, albeit far less often than did 
minor offenses. The most common serious crimes, felony theft, 
agricultural theft, and rape, accounted for 10, 2, and 2 
46 
percent respectively. Taken together as Group II, these three 
crime categories total 14 percent of the nine sheriffs' jail 
docket entries. 
The dockets also detail an important aspect of rural 
policing rarely examined; the sheriffs' non-enforcement 
activities. Work not immediately associated with crime 
control consumed a small, though significant, amount of a 
sheriff's time. Helping distressed, abandoned, or indigent 
persons, referred to here as welfare incidents, constitute 2 
percent of the dockets' entries. Housing, awaiting 
adjudication, and transport of insane persons to the state's 
mental hospital likewise occupied 2 percent of the sheriffs' 
time. Detaining persons who aroused a sheriff's suspicions 
referred to here as investigation are noted on 3 percent of 
the total dockets' entries. Criminal justice is the category 
label for sheriffs' execution of criminal court process such 
as arrest warrants, and it constitutes 5 percent of the 
dockets' entries. These activities, taken together as Group 
III, appeared on 12 percent of the total jail docket entries. 
Crimes that offend public sensibilities or safety make up 
the remainder of the sheriff's jail docket entries. Traffic 
safety violations, including the absence of tail lights or 
mirrors and the more typical speeding violations, appear in 
the dockets five percent of the time. Liquor nuisances, such 
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as operating a saloon or brothel, account for 4 percent. 
Crimes against the family such as wife or child desertion 
referred to here as family offenses are the subject of 4 
percent of the entries. Sex crimes, such as sodomy or incest 
and wildlife offenses, such as hunting out of season, each 
account for 1 percent of the total docket entries. These 
transgressions, which constitute Group IV, make up 14 percent 
of the dockets' entries. See Table 2. Most of rural Iowa 's 
interwar criminality was very petty. Violations falling 
within Group I and Group IV together constitute 74 percent of 
all criminal activity, and all these crimes are misdemeanor 
infractions. Where felonious activity appears, it is 
overwhelmingly focused on property and not upon people. 
Except for rape at just 2 percent. Group II shows non-violent 
crimes; rural felonies are thefts, not robberies. 
As in the nation generally, young people perpetrated 
crime in interwar rural Iowa. Among those apprehended for 
prohibition violations, men in their twenties were the subject 
of 38 percent of all docket entries. Those in their thirties 
contributed an additional 29 percent. This type of behavior 
appeared to taper off with increasing age. People in their 
forties comprised 15 percent; those between forty-nine and 
fifty-nine years of age added 9 percent and 3 percent 
respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY REFLECTED IN DOCKETS 
Group Activity Percent of Total 
Group I Minor Offenses 60 
Prohibition Violations 23 
Misdemeanor Theft 20 
Public Nuisances 17 
Group II Felony Offenses 14 
Felony Theft 10 
Agricultural Theft 2 
Rape 2 
Group III Non-enforcement Activities 12 
Welfare Incidents 2 
Mental Health Concerns 2 
Detaining Suspicious Persons 3 
Criminal Justice 5 
Group IV Public Sensibilities or Safety 14 
Traffic Safety 5 
Liquor Nuisances 4 
Crimes Against the Family 4 
Other 1 
Young men committed crimes far more often than their 
population percentage would suggest. Census figures show that 
the number of offenders is exactly twice their percentage of 
the population. Those in their thirties show similarly 
lopsided behavior. 
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TABLE 3 
AGE OF OFFENDERS BY CRIMES COMMITTED 
Age Proh Msd Thft Pub Nuce Fny Thft Ag Thft Rape 
Teens 6 16 8 31 39 0 
20s 38 40 53 49 29 67 
30s 29 22 18 6 16 11 
40s 15 15 14 13 10 11 
50s 9 4 7 1 3 11 
60s 3 3 0 0 3 0 
Men under thirty-nine years of age amounted to 22, 40, 
and 16 percent respectively, or a total of 78 percent. Those 
in their forties equalled 15 percent while those in their 
fifties and sixties (at 4 and 3 percent respectively) 
contributed 7 percent. 
Rural Iowa's perpetrators were young. Combinied Groups 
I, II, and IV show offenders under the age of forty 
constituting 79 percent of all offenders. The 21 percent 
remaining are divided among those in their forties, fifties, 
and sixties. Their crimes were minor, focusing on property 
offenses rather than those against people. 
Rural criminals came from the lowest occupational ranks. 
The jail dockets list as laborers half of all offenders whose 
occupations are known. Laborers perpetrated rural crime more 
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often than any other occupational group. This is a genuine 
surprise appearing as it does in the state's nine most-rural 
counties. In none of the counties do laborers account for 
more than 4 percent of the census totals. Conversely, fainners 
comprise an average of 68 percent of the census population. 
The predominance of laborers is remarkable and requires 
explanation. Both economic and social reasons explain the 
laborers' jail docket preponderance. It is well known that 
the rural Midwest, and especially Iowa, entered the Great 
Depression a decade before the rest of the nation. It is not 
surprising that in the face of economic crisis the least 
economically secure committed the greatest number of crimes. 
Farmers saw themselves in positive terms as hard working 
people. In the countryside all men were expected to work, 
having no occupation was socially unacceptable. The frequent 
notation beside an arrestee's name in the jail docket as 
"lazy," "deadbeat," or "lay about" proves that the sheriffs 
shared this social attitude and used the occupational label 
laborer euphemistically for men chronically unemployed. 
Agricultural workers are almost invariably the second 
most frequent law violators. This corresponds to their 
demographics and to the nature of rural crime already 
discussed. The large number of prohibition violations. 
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especially the manufacture of liquor, points to agricultural 
perpetrators. They had the ingredients of opportunity, 
isolation, and basic component (corn), necessary for making 
bootleg liquor. 
TABLE 4 
OCCUPATION OF GROUP II OFFENDERS 
Occupation Percent 
Skilled 13 
Laborers 52 
Tradesmen 11 
Agriculture 24 
Taken together as Group II, rural arrestees for felony 
theft, agricultural theft, and rape show a strong tendency to 
emerge from one of two occupational categories. Laborers 
account for 52 percent of Group II. Agricultural workers 
constitute 24 percent. The remaining 24 percent of rural 
felony arrestees is split among skilled workers at 13 percent 
and tradesmen at 11 percent. Iowa's rural lawbreakers were 
overwhelmingly local, male, young, laborers. Half of all 
arrestees, regardless of misdeed, were laborers. Over one 
fourth (28 percent), however, were agricultural workers. 
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Skilled workers contributed a relatively minor 13 percent as 
did tradesmen at 10 percent. 
TABLE 5 
OCCUPATION OF OFFENDERS, GROUPS I, II, AND IV 
Punishment, expressed in terms of time served or fines 
levied, also appears in the jail dockets. Age appears as an 
important feature among Group I arrestees. Generally, the 
older the accused, the stricter was their punishment. Those 
in their teens averaged ten days jail time for Group I 
offenses; those in their fifties averaged forty-two days or 
420 percent longer for the same crime. Men in their twenties 
or their forties received nearly equal penalties at thirty-
three and thirty-two days respectively, but arrestees in their 
thirties received an average of forty-one days—one day less 
than those in their fifties. 
A felon's age was also an important factor in punishment. 
Men in their forties received an average four-year sentence, 
only half the punishment of those in their fifties. Except 
Occupation Percent 
Skilled 
Laborers 
Tradesmen 
Agriculture 
13 
50 
10 
28 
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for those in their forties, each rising age bracket accrued an 
additional year's sentence among Group II offenders: those in 
their teens received five-year sentences, those in their 
twenties were given six-years, and those in their thirties 
averaged a sentence of seven years. 
TABLE 6 
AGE AS A FACTOR IN PUNISHMENT FOR GROUP I 
Occupation Days Served Fines Levied (in dollars) 
Skilled 140 180 
Laborers 122 320 
Tradesmen 120 220 
Agriculture 110 140 
Among Group IV arrestees, age again is an influence, but 
not as predictably. Those in their twenties were given sixty-
nine days in jail. Those in their thirties received forty-
seven days. Teenagers received the third most severe 
punishment at sixteen days, but those Group IV violators in 
their forties or fifties received lighter punishment at twelve 
and seven days respectively. 
Groups I and IV, taken together, show the results of 
miscreants' age upon punishment. Teenagers received thirteen 
days. Those in their twenties served fifty-one days; those in 
their thirties served forty-four days for the same crimes. 
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Men in their forties and their fifties were punished at only 
roughly half the severity as those in their twenties and 
thirties. Those in their fifties served twenty-four. In each 
case these age brackets totaled but half the penalty of 
younger men. 
TABLE 7 
AGE AS A FACTOR IN PUNISHMENT FOR GROUP IV 
Age Days Served 
Teens 16 
20s 69 
30s 47 
40s 12 
50s 7 
TABLE 8 
AGE AS A FACTOR IN PUNISHMENT FOR GROUPS I 
AND IV COMBINED 
Age Days Served 
Teens 13 
20s 51 
30s 44 
40s 22 
50s 24 
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One's occupation also affected one's punishment. In 
cases of prohibition violations, the greatest number of all 
interwar offenses, occupation type seems to be a nearly 
neutral factor in determining the penalty imposed. All four 
of the occupational groups rest quite close to the average 
jail term of seventy-four days. When the punishment involved 
fines, however, an occupational disparity emerges. Laborers 
paid an average fine of $275 for prohibition violations. 
Tradesmen paid less at $225. Skilled workers were fined an 
average of $155; agriculturalists only $145. 
Occupation emerges as a significant ingredient among men 
convicted of misdemeanor theft. Laborers, at thirty-nine 
days, are the most severely punished, followed by skilled 
workers at thirty days. Tradesmen served the fewest days in 
jail at twenty-one; agricultural workers served twenty-six. 
The tendency toward occupational favoritism is also apparent 
in terms of dollars paid in fines for misdemeanor theft. 
Agricultural workers and tradesmen were assessed no fines at 
all. Laborers paid $43 while skilled workers paid $19, less 
than half the laborers' fines. 
Skilled workers guilty of public nuisances were 
disproportionately punished. Skilled workers served an 
average of thirty days; agriculturalists served, by contrast, 
half that time at fifteen days. Laborers served eighteen days 
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while tradesmen were the second most harshly treated at twenty 
days. Among those assessed fines as punishment for public 
nuisances, agricultural workers paid the severest penalties at 
$11.50. Laborers were close, at $10.75. Skilled workers paid 
fines of $7.50 while tradesmen paid no fines at all. 
TABLE 9 
OCCUPATION AS A FACTOR IN PUNISHMENT FOR GROUPS I AND IV 
(EXPRESSED IN DAYS SENTENCED AND FINES ASSESSED) 
Prohibition Msd Theft Public Nuisance 
Occupation Days\Fines Days\Fines Days\Fines 
Skilled 80\155 30\19 30\7.50 
Laborers 70\275 39\43 18\10.75 
Tradesmen 80\225 2l\0 20\0 
Agriculture 75\145 26\0 15\ll.50 
Taken together as Group I, those convicted of 
prohibition, misdemeanor theft or public nuisances show 
variation among occupational groups. Of these, skilled 
workers were the most harshly punished in terms of jail 
sentences imposed. They served 140 days. Laborers and 
tradesmen served 121 and 120 days respectively. Agricultural 
workers, at 110 days, received slightly less punishment. 
Skilled workers, who served the greatest number of jail days, 
paid the next to least fines for Group I crimes at $180. 
Laborers fared the worst, paying $330.50 in fines. Tradesmen 
57 
paid $230.50 or $100 less than did the laborers. 
Agriculturalists paid the smallest fines at $140. There is a 
marked general tendency for agricultural workers to receive 
punishment at significantly lower levels then the other three 
occupational groups for the same offenses. 
TABLE 10 
OCCUPATION AS A FACTOR IN PUNISHMENT FOR GROUP I 
(EXPRESSED IN DAYS SENTENCED AND FINES LEVIED) 
Punishment 
Occupation Days\Fines 
Skilled 140\180 
Laborers 121\330.50 
Tradesmen 120\230.50 
Agriculture 110\140 
The pattern of unequal penalties among occupations for 
identical crimes is clearly seen for those convicted of Group 
II offenses such as felony and agricultural theft. Skilled 
workers served three times the number of years in prison for 
felony theft as did agricultural workers. Laborers served 
seven years while tradesmen served five years. Skilled 
workers or tradesmen were never convicted of agricultural 
theft. This is probably due to their town rather than farm 
residence. Laborers and agricultural workers received two-
year terms each. 
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Occupational favoritism is apparent among rural rapists 
as well as among rural felony thieves. Laborers served nine 
years in prison or more than twice the average penalty paid by 
agricultural workers at four years. Tradesmen served five 
years. No skilled workers were arrested for rape. 
Rural felons, taken together as Group II, show a marked 
occupational favoritism. A "stair-step" effect from most to 
least severe penalties based on occupation is apparent. 
Skilled workers of Group II served nine years. Laborers, 
tradesmen and agricultural workers followed at six, five, and 
three years respectively. 
The data does not support the idea of a rural "crime 
wave." Strong evidence exists, however, of a steady if slow 
rise in rural criminal apprehensions during the interwar 
period. This is especially pronounced for the period 1920 to 
1931. The following analysis is based on the tables included 
in the Appendix. 
A generally rising pattern in the number of prohibition 
cases emerges from the jail dockets. The climax year is 1931, 
with ninety incidents. After 1931 the trend rapidly declines, 
gravitating toward a yearly number of forty-five. The same is 
true for the yearly totals of misdemeanor arrests. The 1920s 
experienced a gradual yearly rise in incidents peaking in the 
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year 1931 at ninety arrests. The remainder of the 1930s 
tended to stabilize at a lower rate, though one higher than 
the mid-range of the preceding 1920s. 
The same formation of gradually rising incidents peaking 
in the early 1930s and stabilizing at lower, but raised levels 
as compared to the 1920s obtains for public nuisance arrests. 
The number of public nuisance arrests, while few in the 1920s, 
rises to a prominence of fifty-six cases in 1934. The number 
drops dramatically to twenty-seven the following year, 
thereafter centering amid the mid-twenties for the remainder 
of the period. 
As Group I, these three categories show a constant rise 
throughout the 1920s. The Group I offenses peak in 1931 at 
210 occurrences, drop to 145 in 1932 and center between 100 
and 130 throughout the remainder of the interwar period. 
Felonies follow a comparable pattern as Group I, albeit 
at a reduced incidence rate. The number of felony thefts 
generally increased throughout the 1920s, climaxing at forty-
one in 1933. During the balance of the years, the numbers 
decline in frequency at levels equal to those of the mid-
1920s. The number of agricultural thefts fluctuates wildly 
throughout the period. The year of the highest number of 
arrests, 1928, had thirteen arrests. In 1927 there were only 
two and in 1929 only seven. An identical pattern of see-saw 
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highs and lows continues throughout the interwar period. The 
incidence of rural rape remains at fewer than six cases per 
year during the 1920s. From 1929 to 1934 there is a slight 
rise to roughly six cases each year. That number drops to 
pre-1929 levels thereafter for the remainder of the period. 
Combining the three felony categories as Group II, shows 
steady growth in number through the 1920s and into the early 
1930s. In 1933 the number of Group II offenses apexes at 
forty-eight; thereafter the yearly totals fall to pre-1928 
levels. 
The number of persons arrested for investigative purposes 
generally increased during the 1920s. In 1930 and 1931 they 
reached a pinnacle at twelve cases each year. The year 
following only one arrest for investigation occurred. The 
numbers of investigation arrests continued to rise and fall. 
The number of welfare cases attained and held at six each year 
from 1932 to 1937. The rest of the interwar years saw a 
decreased in number until 1941's two cases matched the 1923 to 
19 31 levels. Criminal justice activities, as with all others, 
increased steadily in number until the peak year of 1931 at 
nineteen cases. The rest of the period remained steady in 
number. The number of insane persons housed awaiting hospital 
transportation fluctuated between three and seven cases yearly 
throughout the period. Combined as Group III, the number of 
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cases generally increased between 1920 and 1940. From a 1920 
low of five, the number increased to a high of forty in 1940. 
Yet, in 1941, that number declined again to the 1920 number of 
five. 
The now familiar pattern of steady incline to the early 
1930s, followed by equally steady decline thereafter continued 
to the end of the interwar period among Group IV crimes. The 
number of incidents of crimes against the family rose 
generally to reach a peak of fifteen in 1931. Following 1931 
the number of family crimes hovered between five and seven 
cases yearly. 
Liquor nuisances began low in 1920 at four. The number 
jumped greatly in 1923 to nineteen cases where the numbers 
attained their interwar high of twenty-one in 1925. From then 
on the number of liquor nuisance incidents steadily declined; 
between 1937 and 1941 there were no cases at all. 
The number of traffic cases remained nearly constant at 
fewer than six cases per year until 1935. That year the 
number of traffic cases rose to twenty-one; it stayed at that 
level each year except one throughout the interwar period. 
Fish and Game violations occurred between two and six times in 
each of the interwar years. 
Sex crimes are the only violations to peak before the 
early 1930s. The number of sex crimes multiplied from a 
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single case in 1922 to a high of eight in 1926. After 1926 
the number of sex crimes decreased until it reached a single 
case again in 1940. The Group IV offenses taken together 
show a pattern of development over time very similar to the 
other groups. Beginning at a low point of four in 1920 the 
number of occurrences increased yearly until, in 1931, there 
were forty-four. After 1931 the number subsided again, rising 
sharply in each of the final three years of the interwar 
period. 
The nine sheriffs' jail dockets do not support the idea 
of a rural interwar years' "crime wave." What they do 
present, however, is the picture of steadily rising and 
falling rates of crime centering on the year 1931. 
Furthermore, the dockets describe a milieu of criminality in 
the countryside that is at odds with the beliefs of many 
leading lowans of the period. What they do suggest is a 
strong correlation between the area's falling and rising 
economic fortunes and the incidence of rural crime. The 
arrival of tangible farm relief by way of the New Deal's 
Triple A farm assistance programs meant that Iowa's rural 
economy began to improve. The coming and the effects of the 
Second World War also added to the levelling off result 
evident in the jail dockets. 
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Rural interwar crime in Iowa was not the work of 
"organized, cunning, high trained criminals," as Governor 
William L. Harding thought. Most often rural crime was the 
work of local, laboring-class men in their twenties who 
responded to easy opportunity or succumbed to "booze and 
boisterousness." The targets of serious felony offenses that 
occurred were only rarely people; Iowa's rural criminals 
preferred property. It was theft, not robbery, that attracted 
rural criminals. 
Occasionally, of course, dramatic, well-reported crimes 
did occur, albeit usually perpetrated by the same "criminal 
class." While these dramatic events may have nurtured the 
crime-wave myth for contemporaries, when viewed through 
historical objectivity, they seem far less frightening. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK 
The crime wave myth changed the perception and the 
responses of rural authorities on the few occasions when 
serious felonies occurred in their midst. Crimes such as 
murder, burglary and livestock theft, once viewed as 
deplorable anonymities, were now seen as proof of the crisis 
they faced. Despite being local events involving local 
people, the serious crimes examined in this chapter as case 
studies were seen as proof of the crime crisis that threatened 
the hinterland. Authorities acted quickly to punish serious 
law breakers as a warning to the other criminals whom they 
believed were watching. 
Examining rural crime case studies is a useful way of 
better understanding those perceptions and responses. While 
serious crimes occurred less often in the country than in the 
city, passion or greed sparked murder and theft just the same 
there as in the city. 
For Cecil Kersten, a 20-year-old county coquette, it was 
passion that caused her murder. On the late October night in 
1921 that she died, Cecil Kersten had, for more than two 
years, been dating ("keeping company with" she would have 
said) Peter Kleinow, a farmer neighbor fifteen years her 
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senior. Cecil and Peter were a scandal. With fewer than 100 
girls her age in her tiny town of McGregor the gossips 
concentrated on Cecil.^ They had even been engaged. But 
Cecil liked dating and she broke off her engagement. Peter 
thus had no exclusive claim on her time. Possibly she was 
weary of gossip. Possibly Peter's liabilities; his age, his 
being divorced, his little girl, and worst, his alcoholism, 
had proven too much. 
Peter did not accept her decision to end their engagement 
graceully. Peter threatened Cecil when she broke up with him 
on October 20. He said he would shoot her and any man he 
caught with her. A few nights later he saw Harvey Sass, an 
old boyfriend, visiting Cecil at her home across the road from 
his farm. Peter was drunk. As he told the court later, 
I . . . got four shotgun shells. Then I went into the 
kitchen and got the shotgun. I went over to the Kersten 
house with the intention of shooting Harvey Sass. I saw 
them sitting on the couch together, and I aimed at Harvey 
Sass, shooting through the window. Then someone came out 
of the house and I fired . . . believing it was Harvey 
Sass.2 
It was not Harvey. Cecil fell back into the house screaming: 
"He shot me. He said he was going to do it. Oh, I know I am 
going to die." Peter ran into the house shouting, "I told you 
I would do it, and now, by God, I have." Cecil died eighteen 
hours later in her home. At his trial Peter Kleinow pled 
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guilty to murder in the first degree and received a life 
sentence.3 
Greed, not passion, caused the period's most notorious, 
prolonged, and costly murder case. It began two months after 
Cecil Kersten's death, two weeks before Christmas, 1921, at 
Frank Kneeskern's tenant farmer's log cabin in Winneshiek 
County. Frank Kneeskern was rich, at least by rural Iowa's 
standards. He owned a current model Buick Roadster and a new 
Cadillac. He lived in Castilia's biggest house and owned his 
own cattle-buying business. He also rented a 300-acre farm to 
Charlie and Irene Van Brocklin.* 
He was angry with the Van Brocklins, and he had been 
angry with them since the fall harvest three months earlier. 
Charlie Van Brocklin was a cheat, Kneeskern told anyone who 
would listen. He had cheated him out of his proper share of 
the corn harvest. On Sunday, December 11, Kneeskern, still 
unable to get satisfaction from Van Brocklin, left his office 
to confront his tenant over the corn. He expected trouble and 
took with him a loaded shotgun. 
Frank Kneeskern was a greedy man, fighting with his 
tenant over very little money. Corn prices had declined that 
year by 53 percent and were still falling. His share of Van 
Brocklin's corn could not have brought him much money. 
Because the roads were bad and he did not want to risk marring 
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either of his new cars, Kneeskern borrowed a car from his 
brother-in-law, Charles Van Horn, to make the drive to his 
tenant's log cabin. As he left his office an old friend and 
customer, John Fisher, noting Kneeskern's shotgun, begged him 
not to go armed to see Van Brocklin. Kneeskern ignored his 
friend's advice and arrived at the Van Brocklin's cabin about 
1:15 that afternoon.^ 
Carrying his shotgun, Kneeskern parked the borrowed car 
on the road adjacent to Van Brocklin's place and walked to the 
cabin. There he found Charlie Van Brocklin grooming the nag 
Frank supplied for field work. Irene was entertaining company 
inside the cabin. Van Brocklin told Kneeskern he was readying 
the horse for a neighbor who had offered him $12 for it. With 
that Van Brocklin led the horse away leaving Kneeskern at the 
cabin. From the window of the cabin Irene saw her husband 
leave, and she told her guests she was afraid of Kneeskern. 
She asked 13-year-old Robert Schoomnaker, his grandfather 
George Moore, Will Cook, and Charlie's brother Elmer to stay 
with her until Charlie returned. Kneeskern waited in the yard 
outside. When Van Brocklin returned to the cabin Irene's 
guests left.® 
Precisely what occurred then between the Van Brocklins 
and Kneeskern is unknown. Kneeskern always maintained that he 
heard an argument from inside the cabin followed by the sound 
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of several shotgun blasts. Elmer Van Brocklin swore under 
oath that he saw Kneeskern fire his shotgun into the cabin. 
When the visitors ran back to the cabin they found both of the 
Van Brocklins dead with large holes in their chests, and 
Kneeskern gone.' 
Elmer Van Brocklin was the first suspect. Witnesses 
claimed they had overheard an argument, including death 
threats, among the Van Brocklins several hours before 
Kneeskern arrived at the cabin. But a Winneshiek County Grand 
Jury composed of local farmers indicted Kneeskern on the 
testimony of the Van Brocklins' visitors and that of Elmer who 
swore Kneeskern fired into the cabin.® 
A sensational trial began in Waukon before District Judge 
H. E. Taylor on April 19, 1922. Frank spent his money 
lavishly on his defense. Included in his defense team was 
William S. Hart, a well-known Iowa attorney. Kneeskern hired 
a total of four lawyers to plead his case. The prosecution 
was led by Winneshiek County Attorney J. A. Nelson who was 
newly admitted to the bar, aided by Judge C. N. Hauck, and a 
private attorney from Decorah, Frank Sayre. Following a trial 
of only five days, brief for a capital crime, Kneeskern was 
convicted on two counts of murder in the first degree. The 
jury deliberated for six hours and forty minutes before 
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reaching the required unanimity. They recommended life 
imprisonment rather than the death sentence.® 
Their verdict and sentencing decision did not stand. 
Before the year was out Kneeskern again faced trial for the 
Van Brocklins' murder. Elmer Van Brocklin's testimony was the 
cause for granting a retrial. Elmer's had been the most 
damning testimony because he claimed to be an eyewitness, but 
his testimony was flawed. Kneeskern's attorneys proved that 
Van Brocklin's account of seeing Kneeskern shoot through the 
cabin door was insupportable; from where he placed himself 
Elmer could not have seen the door. Also damaging was the 
fact that Elmer had been the original suspect in the case. 
The appeal court doubted Van Brocklin's veracity and ordered a 
new trial. 
Judge H. E. Taylor granted a change of venue from 
Winneshiek County to Floyd County. He thought it was no 
longer possible for Kneeskern to receive a fair and impartial 
hearing in Winneshiek County. A measure of local hostility 
toward Frank Kneeskern is apparent in the public reaction to 
his participation in the 1922 general election. Winneshiek 
County Sheriff 0. 0. Ellingson permitted Kneeskern to cast a 
ballot, seeing no just reason to exclude him from voting. 
When Ellingson's action became known a group of women in the 
county were furious. They sent a delegation to County 
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Attorney J. A. Nelson loudly demanding Sheriff Ellingson's 
impeachment. Ellingson avoided dealing with the women's ire 
only because Nelson advised them that impeachment proceedings 
would likely fail and that the sheriff's tenure would expire 
before a hearing could be scheduled.^ 
The women remained angry after dropping the matter. The 
prosecutors did not object to Kneeskern's change of venue to 
Floyd County's seat at Charles City. If even the women of 
Winneshiek County were prejudiced against Kneeskern, they 
reasoned, a change of venue was unavoidable. The court 
granted Kneeskern one additional request before the second 
trial began. It let him out of jail.^^ 
After more than a year's confinement Kneeskern's 
attorneys got him released from Winneshiek County Jail under a 
writ of habeas corpus, plus a $40,000 appearance bond. Even 
Kneeskern did not have that much money, but his father and 
seven other local farmers, all friends, jointly guaranteed the 
bond and Frank's appearance for trial. Kneeskern quietly went 
home to spend Christmas with his family at Castalia.^ 
Kneeskern was not the only one behaving quietly that 
Christmas season. The newspapers covering the case were 
remarkably placid throughout the protracted proceedings. 
While the rest of the nation's press, including the Pes Moines 
Register ballyhooed crime stories to sell their papers, the 
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rural press in Iowa treated the Van Brocklin murder case with 
decorum and restraint. The crowds at Charles City to see the 
trial, despite being described as "immense," were quiet and 
orderly. They never exhibited the boisterousness and 
disorderly abandon evident in other trials of the period such 
as the 1925 Scopes "Monkey" trial in Dayton Tennessee.^ 
The second trial included the same cast of characters and 
reached an identical result. One new wrinkle came about when 
Kneeskern took the witness stand to tell his version of the 
events surrounding the Van Brocklins' murders. Kneeskern 
carefully placed himself far away from the cabin at the moment 
shotgun blasts sounded. The Floyd County jury of eleven 
farmers and one blacksmith did not believe him. On the 
jurors' second ballot Kneeskern was again convicted. They too 
recommended that Frank serve life imprisonment instead of 
being hanged. 
At the end of the second trial Kneeskern was no longer a 
wealthy man. The combined cost of his trials included more 
than $25,000 in attorney fees. It was all the money he had. 
At the last he had to deed over to his lawyers the 300-acre 
farm and the corn that had cost the Van Brocklins their lives. 
Following a brief hotel room visit with his wife Frank went to 
the Fort Madison Men's Prison to begin serving his life 
sentence. 
75 
Kneeskern's trials stayed news worthy throughout the two 
years of their adjudication. Why? The murders were not 
especially gruesome; the victims were anything but glamorous. 
Kneeskern was not famous before the trials. The trial issues 
themselves were straightforward, they offered nothing new: 
guilt or innocence. What then ignited rural lowan's interest 
in the otherwise unremarkable affair? The country folks' 
sharp interest emerged naturally from the setting and the 
people involved. 
The Kneeskern case concerned typical rural people in an 
atypical episode. Their fellows sympathized, even empathized, 
with the victims. Some ruralites even sympathized with the 
killer. This drama was theirs. It did not happen in Des 
Moines or distant Chicago. Like 40 percent of their fellow 
Iowa farm families, Charles and Irene Van Brocklin were 
tenants. They died over the common enough squabble, shared by 
many tenant farmers, of dividing a harvest. This type of 
economic struggle struck a fundamental chord among farmers, 
half of whom were burdened by farm debt with mortgages that 
had risen from $54 to $100 per acre during the past decade. 
Few Iowa farmers felt secure on their land. It was as easy 
for them to identify with the Van Brocklins as it was to 
vituperate the man who murdered them over a share of nearly 
worthless corn. It was the circumstances of the crime more 
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than the crime itself that inflamed the people of the 
countryside. The twice-reached guilty verdict is not 
surprising under the circumstances. The recommendation of 
life imprisonment rather than death, coming as it did from 
farmer juries, is surprising. 
The only other murder of the time to receive as much 
attention was very unlike the Kneeskern case. For one thing 
there were no surprises. Unlike Frank Kneeskern, Earle Throst 
was not wealthy. The only thing in which Earl was rich was in 
imagination. Big, oafish, and uneducated, Throst lived with 
his parents on their Allamakee County farm. In his mid-30s, 
some said he should have struck out on his own long before, 
but Earl had no intention of leaving. Everything he wanted in 
life was close by at the Bergen School House. It was an 
unadorned place, a typical one-room country school house. 
Inside, though, worked Inga Magnusson, a thin, very pretty 
woman in her early 20s; she taught all eight of the Bergen 
School ' s grades. 
Earl concocted an elaborate fantasy featuring Inga. They 
had met somewhere in the usual rural fashion of casual 
greeting. He could have meant nothing to Inga Magnusson with 
his poor speech, bad grooming, and crude clothes. To him, 
however, she was marvelous. Earl adored her. He was always 
polite to her on the rare occasions when they met, often to 
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the point of obsequiousness. In his fantasy, Inga and he were 
engaged to be married. During the second week of December, 
the day after the Van Brocklins were killed. Earl chose to 
tell Inga of their impending marriage and to demand from her 
the sexual privileges his imagined conjugality allowed.^' 
Earl went to the Bergen School's vicinity the afternoon 
of the 12th. As there children were still present, he went to 
wait at Jacob S. Quandahl's general store, a few miles south 
of the school. Quandahl noticed Earl had a hatchet handle 
protruding from his overcoat pocket, but he thought nothing of 
it at the time. After an hour or so Earl left the store and 
returned to Inga's school.^ 
He found Inga alone in the basement. Class was over for 
the day, and Inga was damping the furnace for the night. When 
she turned from the furnace door she was startled to find Earl 
Throst standing close beside her. He began babbling to Inga 
of his fantasy, stepping toward her as he spoke. When he was 
close enough he touched her on the shoulders with both his 
hands. Out of fear or disgust, Inga hit his right forearm 
hard with the small brass coal scuttle she still held from 
tending the furnace. It was a fatal move. A black rage 
engulfed Earl. Forgetting entirely his plan to rape Inga, he 
instead used the oak hatchet handle repeatedly to bludgeon her 
head. Inga died, her brains splashed on the furnace, wall. 
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and floor. Earl carried her corpse to a corner refuse pile 
and left the school to go home to his parents' farm. 
Because punctuality was one of Inga Magnusson's virtues, 
her rooming house friends immediately noted her absence. A 
quick check at the Bergen School House by Allamakee County 
Sheriff Ben Davis set off a murder investigation. Identifying 
Inga's murderer occurred just as soon as Jacob Quandahl heard 
of it a few minutes later at his general store. Sheriff Davis 
arrested Earl Throst that same evening and before daybreak 
Earl confessed in his Allamakee County Jail cell. Before the 
week was over Judge H. E. Taylor bound Throst over for trial 
on a charge of murder in the first degree.^ 
Events continued to move swiftly. Judge Taylor suspended 
the traditional Christmas-week recess to proceed with Throst's 
trial. L. L. Duxbury of Caledonia, Minnesota, agreed to 
represent Throst when no local attorneys could be hired. 
Allamakee County Attorney E. F. Pieper prosecuted Throst. 
Precisely two weeks to the hour of the murder Earl Throst was 
found guilty of murder in the first degree by a jury of local 
farmers who made no leniency recommendation. On December 26, 
1921, Judge H. E. Taylor sentenced Earl Throst to death by 
hanging for the murder of Inga Magnusson.^^ 
Earl Throst waited on death row for a year while his 
attorney fought to get his death sentence commuted to life 
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imprisonment. It was not to be. Inga Magnusson had been too 
young, too pretty, and too well-liked for any mercy to be 
given her murderer. Governor N, E. Kendall brusquely rejected 
Earl's leniency plea saying Throst was "stupid, lazy, 
thriftless, untruthful, obstinate and irritable," his whole 
life long; he would waste no clemency on one such as he. It 
is interesting to note that Kendall's reason for withholding 
his compassion. He did not emphasize Throst's heinous crime 
but instead his abominable reputation. 
The state supreme court already had ruled against Throst 
saying that he was guilty of the murder, and adding, "the 
horrors of which will never be fully known or realized, when 
this beautiful innocent girl was beaten to death with a club 
in the hands of an arch fiend." On March 9, 1923, at 7:30 in 
the morning, Allamakee County Sheriff Ben Davis hanged Earl 
Throst in the yard at Fort Madison Men's Prison before a small 
gallery of witnesses consisting of prison officials and 
newspaper reporters. Earl Throst died forgiving his 
executioner and quickly slipped into obscurity.^" 
Other murderers of the time received even less notoriety 
than Throst. Three other murders occurred in the counties 
under investigation during the interwar years, but none of 
them received much attention from country folk. In 1932 Iowa 
County's John McElroy shot and killed the boss who had fired 
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him, Iowa Electric Company manager Fred Berry, with a .44 
calibre single action revolver. McElroy immediately blew his 
own brains out. There was very little notice of the event. 
Mrs. F. M. Hopkins of Casey in Adair County poisoned her 
retarded 17-year-old daughter Elma by lacing a piece of her 
birthday fried chicken with strychnine on July 23, 1934. Elma 
was on furlough from the Woodward State Mental Hospital at 
that point because her mother could no longer afford her share 
of Elma's housing costs. Mrs. Hopkins received a life 
sentence in the Women's Prison at Rockwell City and was 
promptly forgotten. In 1935 Arthur Cayton of near Waukon met 
fellow farmer A. J. Kosbau in Kosbau's chicken hatchery and 
shot him in the head before turning the gun on himself over 
some farm deal gone awry. Only Cayton died. These were 
tragic deaths, but pedestrian also in their way. None of the 
three generated much excitement among rural people. They 
lacked the attention getting elements of the Kneeskern and the 
Throst cases.25 
Other felony crimes failed also to excite anyone. 
Burglaries, among the more frequent of serious crimes, never 
seemed to get anyone very upset. Forty burglaries in all were 
reported in the county press between 1921-1940. None of them 
were procedurally sophisticated; and the "take" from each 
averaged just under $70. Rural burglars preferred businesses 
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to private homes so much that only two home burglaries 
occurred. In all but three cases—each the work of a single 
individual burglar—entry was gained by prying, smashing, or 
forcing a door or window. None of the burglaries happened 
during the daylight hours, and fewer than half of the 
perpetrators were apprehended. Gas stations were the favorite 
target, with eight instances. Six grocery stores were burgled 
but the remainder were single or double case burglaries of 
small shops such as clothing stores and cafes. 
The most unpopular felony committed in the countryside 
involved the stealing of farm stock. Rural lowans hated 
chicken thieves as they hated no other criminals. Boundless 
hostility was heaped upon a chicken thief. Said one rural 
editor, "no Hell is hot enough to justly punish [a chicken 
thief]."2^ So angry did a district court judge become that in 
sentencing a chicken thief to the five-year maximum sentence 
he said: 
It has been truly said that on the farm the steer 
pays the mortgage, the hog pays the rent, but the humble 
old hen plays a much more important part in the 
upbuilding of a home and the training of the citizens of 
a community than either the steer or the hog. When I 
stop to think of the enormous amount of work and drudgery 
that must be performed by the dear old farm wife, working 
day and night, in season and out of season, wet and dry, 
heat and cold, to care for her flock of chickens, I am 
inclined to think that on her brow should rest one of the 
most beautiful and enduring crowns ever placed on the 
human brow. . . . You stole from people to whom this 
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little thievery possibly might mean life and the 
production and training of the better class of American 
citizens.^ 
An editor of the normally staid sheriff's association summed 
up in 1936 rural lowan's feelings aptly, writing of the many 
kinds of disreputable skunks in this world there are none 
so despicable as a chicken thief. In 99 cases out of a 
hundred he's stealing from a woman something on which she 
does more work in one season than the average chicken 
thief could be hired to do at any price in ten years. 
Pugnacity inevitably marked the tenor of any discussion of 
chicken theft. Wallaces' Farmer chided the state's sheriffs 
saying, "Maybe it's politics and maybe it isn't, but many farm 
communities found a complaint about a dozen chickens that had 
been stolen was a good joke to law officers."^' Angst and 
anger over stolen poultry was not misplaced. The state's 
sheriffs' magazine described the concerns nicely, saying that 
chicken stealing is 
one of the most contemptible crimes on the statute book. 
It generally means that a man is stealing from a woman, 
for it is generally the farmer's wife who must look after 
the chickens. It often means depriving the farm family 
of the income depended upon to meet current necessary 
living expenses.^" 
In the fall of 1923 one rural paper warned area farmers that 
the "annual appearance of chicken thieves" had returned to the 
county. Farmers felt that poultry theft perpetrators were 
exclusively members of well organized gangs. In part they 
were right. There were gangs specializing in agricultural 
theft, including chicken theft at the time. Some of the gangs 
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showed sophistication, using trucks and regular "fences," 
businessmen who bought with no questions asked. 
Just as often, though, the perpetrators were neighboring 
farmers. When Adair County farmer Jack Flynn found his wife's 
flock of 140 White Wyandotte chickens missing he reported the 
theft to Sheriff Sprague. Acting on an anonymous telephone 
tip, Sprague, his two sons, and Deputy H. J. Harbour raided Ed 
and Phil Shaefer's farm 3 miles south of Stuart. Search 
warrant in hand, the posse found the purloined poultry in a 
hidden pen in the brother's barn.^z 
Sheriff Sprague apprehended William McDonald, a 
Greenfield area farmer, for chicken theft in 1922. McDonald 
had raided several neighboring farms and then sold his loot to 
a poultry buyer in nearby Orient. By cross checking the 
birds' brands the sheriff managed to identify their owners. 
McDonald pled guilty to chicken larceny and received a two-
year sentence at Fort Madison/" 
An Allamakee County couple turned felony theft into a 
family outing. Ira Patterson and his wife brought along their 
five young children on their raids. At one of their 
neighbor's farms, 107 chickens were taken when the children 
formed into a "bucket brigade" to fill the family truck with 
chickens quickly. Unhappily for the Patterson family their 
victim recognized them. After their conviction state welfare 
84 
workers divided the Patterson children among several 
orphanages. 3* 
Chicken theft investigations demanded tenacity on a local 
sheriff's part. Few farmers took the time to mark their 
flocks for identification despite regular reminders to do so 
in the state's agricultural press. Without identification 
markings there was little incentive for a sheriff to pursue a 
chicken thief. Legally binding proof of ownership was 
impossible without it because same-breed chickens are 
indistinguishable. In the spring of 1930, Adair County 
suffered a series of chicken thefts amounting to several 
hundred stolen birds. Sheriff W. F. Sachau began an 
investigation that lasted three months and consumed his time 
almost exclusively until resolved. More than a dozen area 
farmers reported losing flocks. Sachau began with meticulous 
lists of the stolen birds including their age, breed, and the 
number stolen per victim. Knowing the rapid metabolism of 
chickens would force the thief to dispose of the stolen birds 
as quickly as possible, Sachau started checking the four 
poultry buyers in his county closest to the theft sites. The 
sheriff suspected a local farmer and justice of the peace 
named Arthur Moyer because his production of birds and their 
breed variety jumped suddenly. It took several weeks before 
Sachau could conclusively prove that Moyer's chicken sales to 
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local buyers did not tally with the kinds of chickens Moyer 
raised. Next Sachau had to prove that the chickens Moyer sold 
matched the sheriff's painstaking lists of stolen chickens. 
By the end of April the sheriff could prove that Moyer sold 
sixteen batches of chickens to the four local buyers that did 
not match his own flocks but that did match those his farmer 
neighbors reported as stolen. When confronted with the 
sheriff's evidence Arthur Moyer pled guilty to four of the 
sixteen counts of chicken theft before District Court Judge W. 
S. Cooper who gave Moyer the maximum possible sentence of five 
years at Fort Madison Men's Prison. 
Sheriff Sachau deservedly received praise for the 
apprehension of Moyer. But he himself must have known solving 
the case depended on circumstances that he could not routinely 
depend on. How often would he, or any Iowa sheriff, have 
several uninterrupted weeks to compile lengthy lists of stolen 
chickens? How often could a sheriff stand to cross reference 
interminable lists before exhaustion forced him to abandon the 
work? An illustration of the sheriff's problems came the 
following spring when a new series of chicken thefts started 
in Adair County. Pete Eggon of Fontenelle surprised the thief 
at his farm and was severely beaten by him as he made his 
escape. Roy James' wife lost her entire flock of more than 
100 full-grown chickens from their farm south of Greenfield to 
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a thief using a truck. Sachau solved neither of the crimes; 
he did not have the time. 
Facing the same difficulties as Sheriff Sachau, rural 
sheriffs occasionally banded together in common cause to 
suppress chicken thieving. At the crest of a great increase 
in the number of chicken thefts in 1936, seventeen county-
sheriffs gathered in Denison to plan a cooperative strategy 
combat the thieves. There is no indication that they enjoyed 
any success. The sheriffs best enforcement tools were 
combining Section 3112-b4 of the 1935 Code of Iowa requiring 
poultry dealers to maintain detailed records of their 
suppliers and encouraging their farmers to use any one of 
several commercially available poultry marking kits. Farmers 
did a better job of protecting their belongings against the 
gangs that operated against them.^' 
Several conspicuous rural criminal gangs specialized in 
targeting agricultural goods. One particularly successful 
group of thieves called the Butter Ring operated in 1936. 
During the spring and summer the ring assembled more than 
60,000 pounds of sweet cream butter from Iowa's small 
independent dairies in the northern tier of counties. The 
seven ring members lived in Omaha, Sioux City, LeMars, and 
Rock Rapids and gathered together to perform highly 
sophisticated dairy burglaries.^® 
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Using trucks, lookouts, and carefully timed schedules the 
ring avoided leaving clues at any of the thirty-two dairies 
they burgled. When the dairies at tiny Palmer and Fenton, 
Iowa, proved uncommonly lucrative in early April, the ring 
returned for second hauls later. The Palmer dairy raid netted 
the gang 2,172 pounds of butter on April 3. On July 7 they 
carted away 4,260 pounds, doubling their previous take. 
Fenton lost 3,510 pounds on April 8; on May 15 the thieves 
returned for an additional 2,800 pounds. The ring's best 
night's work came on July 3 when the dairy at Hubbard lost 
7,484 pounds of butter.3* 
Officers approached the investigation from an unusual 
premise. Since there were no clues at the scenes: tire 
tracks, foot or finger prints, or identifiable method of 
operation, they ignored the crime scenes. The sheriffs 
concentrated instead on locating the Ring's "fence," who 
disposed of their stolen butter for them. The properties of 
butter, particularly butter in the dozens of tons, required 
huge refrigeration facilities both for trucks used during the 
burglary and for collection and storage. At Omaha, Nebraska, 
the officers found the facilities and with them the stolen 
butter and the fence. The ring had allied with a legitimate 
Omaha butter packer who handled the purloined butter, saw to 
its remarking, storage, and resale to other legitimate butter 
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packers, and then split the proceeds, exceeding $30,000, among 
the gang members. By year's end the ring members and their 
fence stood in the dock."® 
While the northern officers were prosecuting the Butter 
Ring, officers in southern Iowa investigated a safe-cracking 
gang. Responsible for fifteen of the state's thirty-eight 
rural "safe jobs," the gang became a priority among the 
sheriffs. A raid on an Albia house disclosed enough evidence, 
including fuses, dynamite, and criminal correspondence to 
cause the arrest of four of the gang's five members. Laredo, 
Texas, officers arrested Glen Brown, 24, and Bob Robinson, 44, 
both of Albia, on Iowa arrest warrants. Rock Island, 
Illinois, authorities apprehended Audrey Avilla, 23, and Frank 
Cervantes, 44, both of that city. Before returning to Iowa 
for trial the four faced Illinois charges of attempted murder 
stemming from a Peoria robbery. The fifth gang member, 
Porfino Rocha, alias Jesus Acosta, escaped to Mexico City. 
The gang's apprehension resulted from the cooperative work of 
several Iowa sheriffs, plus the Albia, Burlington, and Ottumwa 
police, the Rock Island, Illinois, police, the Iowa Bureau of 
Criminal Investigation, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
Although a few rural criminal gangs did operate in 
interwar Iowa they did not represent the nature of crime in 
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the hinterland. Rural felony thieves preferred to work alone, 
favoring, after chickens, livestock to steal.Hogs offered 
tempting targets for thieves. Unlike chickens, hogs are hardy 
creatures and generally quiet ones. There are no special 
prerequisites for hog rustling beyond those of any felony 
theftÎ motive, opportunity, and transportation. Their 
liability of weight (200 pounds plus each) and bulk is 
compensated by their ability to walk to transport. Simon 
Blegen, owner of two prize-winning Allamakee County hogs lost 
them one January night to a thief clever enough to use a 
horse-drawn sleigh to get closer to the hog pen than could a 
truck. Blegen never recovered the pair. Andy Thiele, an 
Adair County farmer, saw his hired hand, Louie Peachy, 25, 
receive a five-year sentence to Fort Madison Men's Prison for 
stealing a 220-pound hog left in his care while Thiele went to 
town. Sheriff Sachau, who would work so laboriously to 
capture Arthur Moyer for chicken theft the year following, 
arrested two men in early 1929 for stealing and butchering two 
of farmer John James' hogs south of Stuart. 
In the 1930s some hog rustling investigations started to 
reflect the enlarged training increasingly available to rural 
sheriffs. Some rural sheriffs began using crime scene 
investigation techniques in search of hog rustlers in the 
1930s. When Page County hog farmer Frank Annan reported the 
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theft of thirty-five hogs to Sheriff C. M. Crawford, the 
sheriff collected plaster of paris tire track impressions he 
found near Annan's hog lot. The sheriff suspected Annan's 
hired hand. Warren Grubb, when he unaccountably began spending 
large sums of money in town. A check of Grubb's tire tracks 
with those taken at the hog pen by Sheriff Crawford confirmed 
the sheriff's suspicions; Grubb confessed to stealing his 
employer ' s hogs. 
The solution to a 1938 case of rustled hogs depended upon 
physical evidence gathered during a crime scene search. 
Dallas County hog farmer J. E. Cave awoke May 5, 1938, to 
discover that someone had stolen twenty of his 225-pound hogs 
during the night. The thief was bold, driving them from the 
hog pen across more than a mile of open fields to a waiting 
truck. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff E. A. Burger investigated 
the theft. At Cave's farm the deputy found truck tire tracks 
and footprints of which he made plaster of paris impressions. 
Beside the tire tracks he spotted a pair of truck sideboards 
that the thief had used as a chute to load the hogs. On the 
wooden sideboards could be seen the name "John Dack" written 
in pencil. Dallas County printed crime report circulars and 
sent them to Iowa and neighboring state sheriffs where the 
hogs would most likely sell. Officers investigating a similar 
hog rustling case at Sidney, Iowa, contacted Deputy Burger, 
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telling him that they had recovered a piece of wood broken 
from what appeared to be the Cave rustling as described in the 
circular. The officers found that the broken piece fitted the 
sideboard. On May 18 Sheriff Wood Adams of Stansbury, 
Missouri, notified Deputy Burger that a man named Jack Dack 
lived in his vicinity, and the deputy and Dallas County 
Sheriff Knee met the Missouri sheriff at Stansbury. There 
they learned that Dack's friend, Jesse Cunningham, had a truck 
whose missing sideboards matched those found by Berger at the 
Cave rustling site. Cunningham had left the area; the Iowa 
officers obtained an arrest warrant and sent out more 
circulars, this time calling for Jesse Cunningham's arrest and 
offering a $100 reward for his capture for hog rustling. 
When officers learned that Cunningham had a brother-in-
law living in Kansas City, a stake-out was set up to watch the 
house. Within a few days Cunningham appeared at his brother-
in-law's home and was arrested by Kansas City police. Deputy 
Burger accompanied by Sheriff Knee and County Attorney Charles 
Joy extradited Cunningham, meeting Missouri officers at the 
border town of Marysville, Missouri, to take custody of their 
prisoner. Further investigation uncovered a bill of sale from 
the Krey Packing Company of Kansas City, made out in the name 
of Jack Dack, in the amount of $286 for twenty hogs 
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While such elaborate crime scene investigation was still 
the exception and not the rule in the 1930s, the Cave hog 
rustling case does illustrate the direction in which Iowa's 
rural sheriffs were quickly heading. Crime scene technology 
was still largely an urban police activity, but as the 
perception of agricultural crime's importance increased during 
the interwar years, so too did the efforts of the sheriffs to 
combat it scientifically. 
Also vexing the sheriffs at the time was the appearance 
of a new type of felony theft, called grand theft of 
automobiles. lowans, including rural lowans, rushed to buy 
automobiles in remarkable numbers. Passenger cars increased 
from 18,870 to 716,304 between 1910 and 19 30, and the total 
motor vehicle registration reached 790,231 in 1929. This 
amounted to one automobile for every three lowans giving Iowa 
the rank of the third highest automobile owning state in the 
Union. For rural lowans the automobile had a mixed impact. 
While cars reduced rural isolation, getting greater access to 
town more often heightened the contrast between country and 
city living standards . 
For sheriffs, too, came the additional burdens of 
enforcing a multitude of traffic safety laws and the nuisance 
of trying to recover vehicles that were, by their very nature, 
unmanageably mobile. On September 17, 1925, farmer George 
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Handley's new Hudson automobile, parked at the Adair County 
Fair, disappeared. It turned up two months later at Concord, 
Massachusetts, having been stolen by an army deserter who 
attended the fair. Tom McGivern of Marengo had his Ford 
Roadster stolen while vacationing the summer of 1926 in 
Chicago. It was located later that summer in Cedar Rapids. 
Eddie Wilson of Seattle, Washington, stole a Chevrolet while 
passing through Cedar Rapids, wrecked it near the Amana 
Colonies and hitched a ride from a passing motorist into 
Grinnell where he was arrested. A one-legged fifteen-year-old 
boy managed to steal three cars in Marengo, losing them all 
and fleeing on foot to the railroad depot where he escaped. 
J. W. Killpatrick lost his new Chevrolet, even though it was 
locked in his garage in Adair. It went unrecovered. Floyd 
Dady of rural Monroe Township near Mount Ayr found himself 
facing federal officers after his arrest by Adair County 
Sheriff H. W. Terrell for the theft of an automobile in Iowa 
that eventually surfaced in Minnesota under the new National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act. William Johnson's Ford sedan, stolen 
on September 30 from his farm near Adair, turned up abandoned 
at Emerson, Nebraska, on October 2, 1931." 
On and on it went until most rural sheriffs threw up 
their hands in despair. Automobiles were expensive, but there 
were too many of them being stolen, they could travel too far 
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from the scene of the loss, and there was nothing approaching 
a central record system that the sheriffs could use to keep 
track of missing automobiles. In the final analysis the 
sheriffs simply did the best they could, when they could do 
anything. 
The crime wave myth, as the case studies show, altered 
the way rural authorities reacted to crime. A murder was no 
longer seen as an isolated incident, but as something 
indicative of a larger phenomenon. The murderers of Cecil 
Kersten, the Van Brocklins, and Inga Magnusson were treated by 
the authorities, despite being local people, as 
representatives of the crime crisis that was sweeping the 
countryside. Quick punishment was the rule as the authorities 
rushed to show the other criminals, whom they believed were 
watching, the swiftness and certainty of their justice. 
Not just swift punishment, but changes in investigative 
procedures developed because of the myth. Elaborate 
investigations such as Sheriff W. F. Sachau's three-month 
probe of chicken theft, and Sheriff C. M. Crawford's use of 
plaster of paris impressions to catch hog thieves meant that 
the sheriffs were turning increasingly to more sophisticated 
techniques to stem the criminal wave they believed threatened 
their communities. 
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Despite their belief, the expected crime wave never came. 
Rural law enforcement officers therefore devoted virtually all 
of their efforts to relatively minor public offenses involving 
local people. Dealing effectively and compassionately with 
such offenses and offenders required common practices 
expertise that had traditionally been part of sheriffdom since 
the Middle Ages. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RURAL POLICING 
The sheriffs who were primarily responsible for law 
enforcement at the county level occupied offices that had a 
long history. Originating in the Middle Ages and then 
transplanted to rural America, the office underwent changes in 
nature and expectations. By 1920 this evolutionary process 
had led to an elected official with a broad array of 
responsibilities. The need to win election influenced 
candidates' and incumbents' behavior, often making them 
especially sensitive to local mores and beliefs. Whether they 
were deporting gypsies from their jurisdictions, enforcing 
traffic regulations, handling prisoners, or arresting 
bootleggers, Iowa's rural sheriffs were inextricably involved 
on a daily basis with people of all sorts. And, in each of 
these activities, the sheriffs had to accommodate to the 
inevitable tension between law and common practice. 
Many of Iowa's sheriffs were distressed in the 1920s and 
1930s when new technology and an unpopular new law combined 
with their biennial election ordeals to increase the 
complexity of accomplishing their inherited ancient English 
duties of keeping the peace, maintaining the jails and 
servicing the courts. The office of sheriff is the oldest and 
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most important of all county offices, having originated in 
Anglo-Saxon England. Before the office emerged, law 
enforcement, called the King's Peace, depended upon a form of 
mutual security wherein all free-born males belonged to ten-
member units called decennaries. In times of crisis these 
units gathered to form "hundreds." Although not a posse, it 
fell to the decennaries and the hundreds to deal with law 
breakers from among their ranks. 
Under the Anglo-Saxon kings, especially King Edgar, the 
"Peaceable" (959-975), the office of sheriff began to form 
into its recognizable shape. The word sheriff comes from the 
Anglo-Saxon word for "officer," gerefa also called reeve and 
the word scir meaning "county;" scir-gerefa became shire reeve 
and through usage shire reeve became sheriff. An Anglo-Saxon 
sheriff was; the chief peace keeper of his county, the keeper 
of the county jail and its public prisoners, and the chief 
executive officer of the courts. Colonial American sheriffs 
retained these same duties, working closely with local 
justices of the peace to maintain law and order, collect 
taxes, see to it that court procedures were properly carried 
out, and that elections were conducted according to law. The 
sheriff's office came along basically unchanged when Iowa 
opened to settlement.^ 
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lowans have always found the sheriff's office useful, but 
they have exhibited ambivalence about how it should be filled. 
Under the 1836 organic act establishing the Wisconsin 
Territory, of which Iowa was a part, the territorial governor 
made appointments to all judicial offices including that of 
sheriff. When the Iowa and Wisconsin Territories separated in 
1838, Iowa retained its sheriffs and set them the task of 
taking the first regional census for representation purposes. 
They also legally codified the office of sheriff, spelling out 
its duties and powers. Congress took control of the office of 
sheriff away from the governor the following year, 
transferring it to the hands of county electors. As had the 
Saxon sheriffs, Iowa's sheriffs continued to hold the power of 
posse comitatus, the summoning to his aid of all able-bodied 
men. The sheriff likewise retained the three-fold job of old: 
guarding the peace, caring for prisoners, and servicing the 
courts. lowans have used four selection methods to fill the 
office: gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, 
judicial appointment, and popular election.% 
Very few election prerequisites existed for men wishing 
to be sheriffs. Any qualified elector could be nominated; 
lack of citizenship did not even exclude an aspirant so long 
as he attained U.S. citizenship prior to being sworn in. The 
direct primary produced nominations in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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If no candidate garnered 35 percent of the votes cast in the 
primary, the choice fell to the county convention where a 
simple majority sufficed to insure nomination.^ No other 
qualifications existed. It was a purely political selection 
process. 
There were, however, a series of unofficial requirements. 
Rural sheriff aspirants had to meet several informal election 
requirements. The two most important of these were lifelong 
residence in the county and some type of local renown, usually 
based on business, sports, or politics. Fred Hess of Iowa 
County, for example, authored several farm stock directories 
as a locally acclaimed stock expert before becoming sheriff in 
1922. His deputy, Fred Schumann, a native son, decorated 
World War combat veteran, and active American Legionnaire, 
also met the criteria well. A contemporary U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons survey highlights the eclectic backgrounds of Iowa's 
sheriffs. In the survey incumbents were asked to report their 
occupations before becoming sheriffs. There were ten farmers, 
eleven businessmen, and other occupations including mechanic, 
painter, salesman, highway employee, dairyman, barber, 
newspaperman, and game warden.* 
In 1924 Fred Hess sought a second two-year term as 
sheriff. The paper announced his candidacy by calling him 
Iowa County's "shooting sheriff," despite his not having fired 
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his revolver in the line of duty. Sheriff Hess struck upon a 
clever campaign ploy in pursuing the Democratic Party's 
nomination. Hess released figures showing him to be an 
economical administrator. His predecessor, Hess claimed, had 
spent $4,576.46 in running the office while Hess did the same 
job for $3,931.60, a savings of $644.86 for the county's 
taxpayers. Better yet, Hess' arrests had brought Iowa County 
coffers about $1,500.00 in fees and fines, so the county 
actually had to contribute only around $300.00 to pay Hess his 
$1,800.00 annual salary. Reelecting him, Hess said, would 
guarantee this law enforcement bargain. Sheriff Hess easily 
won his party's renomination for a second term at the June 
primary. The tactic of presenting himself as an economic 
bargain worked splendidly among farmers who saw themselves as 
overtaxed. It worked again in 1926 when Hess campaigned for a 
third term. One week before Election Day Hess released 
another report showing he had collected $23,000.00 in fines as 
sheriff, doubling his predecessor's work. At the polls Hess 
swept sixteen of the county's twenty-two precincts, winning 
his third term handily.^ 
In 1928 the gambit grew stale. Both the Republicans and 
Hess's own Democratic party fielded nominees in 1928 to 
challenge his grab for a fourth term. From the small farming 
community of Williamsburg, Charles A. Seemuth announced his 
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candidacy for the Republican nomination. Seemuth owned his 
own butcher shop, took great pride in his high school diploma, 
and had the distinction of being a talented semi-pro baseball 
player. L. C. Dietze, Dayton Township Constable and Director 
of the Marengo School District, trumpeted his candidacy for 
the Republican nomination to compete for Hess' job from the 
farm that his family had owned since the Civil War. Another 
"hometown boy," Cal Ryerson, owner of Marengo's cigar store 
and First Deputy of the local vigilantes, drew upon his two-
year stint as a deputy sheriff in 1917-1919 in announcing his 
candidacy for the Republican nomination. Sheriff Fred Hess 
decided to take a job in Eugene, Washington, with the Pioneer 
Service Company rather than seek his party's renomination 
again. Presumably he endorsed the Democrats' nominee, Milo F. 
Cafferty of Marengo, who defeated his Republican challengers 
without great effort. In the primary they split their votes 
so completely that none of them garnered the necessary 35 
percent majority. The Democrats united behind Cafferty who 
then easily won the election.® 
Adair County Sheriff W. F. Sachau parlayed an acclaimed 
capture of an infamous chicken thief into another term of 
office in 1930, defeating rival Republican nominee W. W. 
Stucker, the city marshall of Fontanelle. Sachau did not, 
however, linger in office. On June 20, 1931, he disappeared. 
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A Missouri sheriff reported seeing him pass through the state 
five days later in the company of a young woman. Sachau's 
wife continued preparing meals for his county prisoners until 
the board of supervisors replaced her wandering lothario with 
a 49-year-old county truck driver named Mart Lydon (who did 
not much want the job) in early July. Sachau never again 
returned to Adair County.? 
Iowa County's Milo Cafferty did not linger in office 
either. After a single term, J. F. Voelkel, a rival 
Republican nominee, defeated Cafferty and went on to beat the 
Democratic candidate as well. Voelkel spent $39.90, about 
equally divided between gasoline for his car and advertising 
handbills. Cafferty seems to have taken his defeat equitably, 
volunteering to act as Voelkel's deputy during the period of 
transition between administrations.® 
Although Ringgold County's voters seemed apathetic to the 
state and national elections of 1930, the sheriff's office 
election generated real enthusiasm. The Democratic incumbent, 
Marion Stephens, faced a field of five Republican nominees 
including a former state Bureau of Criminal Investigation 
special agent who was also a former sheriff and Stephen's own 
deputy. The former sheriff, H. W. Terrell of Mount Ayr, beat 
his rival Republican hopefuls in the June primary but failed 
to receive the necessary 35-percent majority to capture the 
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nomination by 1 percent. Sixty-five Republican delegates met 
June 28 at Mount Ayr to pick a candidate for the sheriff's 
office. On the first ballot Terrell got forty-one convention 
votes or 63 percent. Victor Skinner, Sheriff Stephens' 
deputy, received only seven votes, possibly a rebuke for 
running against his boss. Terrell beat Stephens at the 
November polls by a narrow 230 votes. Deputy Skinner, 
learning that Sheriff-elect Terrell had appointed A. H. Lewis, 
the county farm's steward, to be his deputy, resigned and 
returned to cutting hair at his Mount Ayr barber shop. As the 
next election approached Sheriff Terrell lost his party's 
nomination to Leslie E. Thompson. Furious, Terrell launched a 
third party campaign to retain the sheriff's office. When the 
Republicans rejected their own incumbent, Marion Stephens, saw 
a promising opportunity to make a reelection bid of his own. 
All that summer and fall the three candidates waged a campaign 
noteworthy for its scrupulous avoidance of mud slinging. 
Republican Thompson surprised everyone by winning the election 
in November. Marion Stephens made a poor second place showing 
and the incumbent. Sheriff Terrell, came in last place.' 
It seemed that 1932 was a one-term year for rural 
sheriffs. In Allamakee County half a dozen men sought the 
job. The Democratic incumbent, Ben Davis, anticipated no 
trouble in getting reelected. In 1922 he had unseated a 
108 
popular incumbent, Iowa's only woman sheriff, Gunda 
Martindale, who had beaten more than thirty male applicants to 
finish her husband's term after he died in office. Not 
everyone in Allamakee County was comfortable with a woman 
sheriff, Davis knew, and she had twice suffered the 
embarrassment of losing prisoners from her jail. When it 
became clear that Earl Throst, the man who had murdered the 
country school teacher would be hanged, Davis capitalized on 
the voters' hesitation to have a woman act as executioner. 
Having taken the sheriff's office away from her, Davis 
achieved fame of a sort by being Earl Throst's executioner.^" 
Ten years later he doubtless felt a bit put-out when his 
deputy. Jack King, announced his candidacy for the Republican 
nomination. But Davis felt secure, he had already been 
returned to office four times. He was an old hand at county 
politicking. Others thought they could politic just as well 
as the sheriff could. A Union City township constable and 
thirty-six-year veteran farmer named Horace M. Isham entered 
the race with a splashy endorsement aimed at the county's 
religious folks. The Rev. A. H. Stanley, a local Methodist 
minister, offered a testimonial assuring Allamakee County's 
voters that they would "never . . . regret voting" Isham into 
the sheriff's office. Bill Ryan, also born and reared in the 
county, and a World War veteran, added his name to the list of 
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Republican hopefuls. Waukon businessman Edgar Morstad 
proclaimed his candidacy by telling the voters his twenty 
years' business experience and his Valder Business School 
diploma from Decorah well suited him for the sheriff's 
office. 
The candidates did not spend much money in their quest 
for their party's nominations. The Republican candidates 
outspent their Democratic contenders. The incumbent's deputy, 
John King, spent the most at $66.00. Bill Ryan came next at 
$40.70. The Democrats' incumbent Sheriff Ben Davis spent 
$36.05, but it did not help. His party dumped him at the June 
primary, choosing instead James Baxter, a World War veteran 
and lifelong area farmer. James Baxter beat Jack King at the 
polls, winning the election by 177 votes. At the next 
election the two men reversed roles when Sheriff Baxter lost 
by a similarly narrow margin to Jack King. Baxter demanded a 
recount, obliging County Auditor C. Palmer to tally the votes 
again. On December 22, 1934, John King was confirmed as the 
winner, unseating Baxter after a single term as sheriff. With 
the exception of James Baxter's bad grace in forcing a ballot 
recount, all of the elections reflected a surprising degree of 
good faith and felicity. 
The elections were simple popularity contests. Rural 
sheriffs' electioneering was marked by a lack of issues. 
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direct personal appeals by the candidates, little more than 
country school education among the aspirants, and no law-
enforcement preparation. Victory at the polls depended 
heavily on pre-election celebrity in some field other than law 
enforcement, long-time local residence, military service 
during the First World War, and an ability to entice fellow 
ruralites to vote. Party identification seemed unusually 
unimportant; nominees could switch party affiliations without 
detriment. Victor Skinner of Ringgold County switched from 
Democrat to Republican to challenge his boss, and Allamakee 
County's deputy Jack King did the same thing to challenge his 
sheriff. 
Getting elected, of course, was only the beginning. 
Whether or not they voted for a particular candidate for 
sheriff, the people of his county expected him to keep busy on 
their behalf. Serious crime erupted only rarely in a county's 
midst, so what did Iowa's rural sheriffs do? They involved 
themselves with maintaining the peace and running their jails. 
Elected sheriffs developed a casual rural enforcement strategy 
that saw the wisdom in knowing and complying with the 
enforcement tastes of their constituency. 
Gypsies proved to be a constant vexation for rural Iowa's 
sheriffs. Headquartering in Chicago and St. Joseph, Missouri, 
during the winter months, small family bands left the cities 
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to criss-cross the rural heartland peripatetically in 
automobiles (wagon days had passed even for gypsies) from 
early spring until late fall. Iowa's sheriffs considered them 
to be a bane, an annual pestilence, and a threat to the peace. 
When a sheriff could, he would do as Marengo City Marshal Dan 
Dwyer did when he saw his first gypsies of the spring; he 
forcibly escorted them out of town. 
The sheriffs' animosity often was well founded. Adair 
County's Sheriff Sachau, for example, caught two gypsy men 
with a stolen side of beef only minutes after receiving a 
report of the theft. The gypsies had the beef concealed in 
their Pierce-Arrow touring car; Sachau removed the beef from 
the car and escorted the thieves to the county line. After 
Iowa County farmer Fred Wetjam stopped his truck to enjoy a 
few minutes' conversation with a beautiful young "dusky 
skinned nomad," he discovered that his pocket had been picked. 
In Adair County a gullible 28-year-old visited a gypsy fortune 
teller at the county fair and left her tent inexplicably 
missing the $550 in cash he had received that morning from the 
sale of his crop. When pressed for details of how he came to 
lose his crop money, the young man said the gypsy had not 
forced him to give her his money. He believed he had been 
hypnotized.^ 
112 
Ringgold County Judge Homer A. Fuller shared the 
sheriffs' attitudes. He thought he knew how to deal with 
gypsies. He sentenced three young gypsy women appearing 
before him on a charge of grand larceny, Lena Mitchell and 
Belle and Annie Young, to five years each in the Women's 
Prison at Rockwell City. His was a singular opportunity to 
mete out punishment to gypsies because judges almost never met 
them in court. Rural sheriffs were loathe to arrest the 
nomads, feeling it was more efficacious to banish gypsies than 
to apprehend them. Arrest meant housing the malefactor in the 
county jail, and that meant hosting the arrestee's gypsy band 
for a protracted period of time in the county. The thought of 
having gypsies legitimately lingering in their communities was 
unbearable to the sheriffs. It was better to repair the 
gypsies' damage as quickly as possible and then to rid the 
county of them pronto. Locking up gypsies was a sheriff's 
last resort. 
The jails answered rural sheriffs' needs poorly in ways 
other than as places to hold gypsies. Acting as the keeper of 
the jail was one of a sheriff's cardinal tasks and a most 
unpleasant one. Very little is known about interwar county 
jails. No statewide survey of jails occurred until the U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons inaugurated one in 1941. The state 
exercised no control of any kind over local jails. There is 
113 
some indication, however, that Iowa's rural jails were 
deplorable. When the University of Iowa's Professor of 
Sociology Forest C. Ensign conducted a series of jail 
inspections between 1904 and 1912 he was shocked at what he 
found. The twenty-two jails he saw were uniformly bad; 
poorly ventilated, lacking sunshine and sanitation in equal 
measure, and lodging their inmates in a jumble without regard 
to age or offense. Professor Ensign wrote scholarly papers 
condemning what he had found, but they were ignored by the 
twenty-two counties he had visited.'® 
A decade later the Reverend Charles Parsons took an 
interest in Iowa's rural jails but failed to improve them. 
Parsons was superintendent of the unaffiliated Iowa Society 
for the Friendless, an association working with recently 
discharged state felons. From 1921 to 1938 he made county 
jail surveys on his own. He found jail conditions no better 
than those that Professor Ensign had observed. Like those of 
the professor, the minister's reports went unheeded. 
Jail inspections fell to local grand juries and their 
annual tours. Invariably, they found, as did the Allamakee 
and Iowa County jurors, that their jails were "splendid" or in 
"first class condition." U.S. Bureau of Prisons Inspector J. 
H. Strief found nothing to prohibit Adair County's jail from 
holding federal prisoners during his 1931 inspection. He did. 
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however, suggest that the sheriff switch from using his 
present canvass hammocks to steel cots for the inmates to 
sleep on. County road gangs frequently took inmates from the 
jail during daylight hours, so meeting their needs for 
creature comforts had a low priority among rural 
authorities. 
Inmate comfort may have been unimportant to the sheriffs, 
but it was important to keep them in custody. Despite being 
dirty, airless, and primitive places, for some enterprising 
inmates, rural jails at least were not too confining. 
Allamakee County Sheriff Gunda Martindale, appointed to fill 
the vacancy left by her husband Ben's death the year before, 
was furious when Harry Ramsdall escaped from her unattended 
jail while she was seeing the circus in 1922. When she 
learned of the escape she acted fast, borrowing a local 
farmer's bloodhound hunting dogs and forming a fifty-man posse 
from among her fellow circus goers to retrieve Ramsdell. The 
bloodhounds led Sheriff Martindale from the jail, out of town 
and out to where her escapee was hiding in a nearby woods. 
Two months later she again lost prisoners when two car thieves 
sawed through their cell bars and the jail's exterior window 
bars with a hack saw that had been passed to them by someone 
Sheriff Martindale assumed to be a third member of their 
gang. 
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Inmates favored hack saws when escaping from rural jails. 
Paul Pickenpaugh, an Iowa county prisoner serving a six-month 
sentence for illegal transportation of liquor, used a hack saw 
slipped to him by his family during jail visitation in 1926. 
After sawing his way out of the jail he climbed down a rope 
made from his bedding. Sheriff Fred Hess, attracted by the 
sound of his rappeling the jail house wall, caught him on the 
grounds. Then, seeing Paul's family waiting for him in the 
family car parked at the curb, Hess arrested them for aiding a 
jail break. 
Adair County escapee John Clark also used a hack saw to 
flee his jail cell only to be spotted in nearby Ottumwa. In 
what must be a speed record, Clark was seen, arrested, 
sentenced, and deposited at the Fort Madison Men's Prison to 
serve his twenty-one-year-jail-break within twelve hours of 
his apprehension. Ringgold County Sheriff H. W. Terrell 
foiled a planned jail break in 1931 when he unearthed a hack 
saw in a cell of his jail in 1931. Joe Minnis, alias 
Thompson, wishing to avoid a meeting with his Kansas parole 
officer, for whom Iowa County was holding him, used a hack saw 
to escape jail after first having broken the lock on his 
cell's inner grille door. Oddly, the authorities did not seem 
to learn from their errors; three months later another felon 
escaped, again using a hack saw.^° 
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Marengo's Night Marshal, Roy Beilstein, was lucky on the 
mid-March night in 1932 when he saw a shadowy figure crouched 
before an empty automobile parked in front of the downtown 
River-to-River Hotel. As Beilstein approached the figure, he 
could see that it was a man busily removing the car's license 
plate. Gun in hand, the marshal ordered the crouched man to 
remain as he was and to explain why he was taking license 
plates from a car at 4:00 a.m. in the dark. When the man 
offered no reply Beilstein searched him, found a .32 calibre 
Colt revolver, and arrested him. At the jail Marshal 
Beilstein's suspect identified himself as Ray Castelline of 
2956 Shawnee Street in Des Moines. Sheriff J. F. Voelkel 
lodged Castelline for theft of license plates and carrying a 
concealed weapon. A model inmate, Castelline made a friend of 
his cell mate, a chicken thief named Carl Rothenbucker. In 
mid-May their cell's toilet broke, and the plumber who 
repaired it left a hack saw behind. Castelline and 
Rothenbucker found they could pry their cell bars loose, then 
used the plumber's hack saw to cut the padlock securing the 
tier's grille door. They hack sawed their second floor's 
outer window bars next and dropped to the parking lot fifteen 
feet below. 
Once free the pair stole Sheriff Voelkel's Ford Sedan and 
drove away. At the Marshalltown train depot the couple 
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separated. Rothenbucker went to Council Bluffs where he was 
almost immediately arrested by a deputy sheriff who knew him 
and who held an outstanding forgery mittimus against him. 
Castelline took the train to Des Moines where he stole a car, 
went to Minneapolis, stole another car there, and returned in 
it to Des Moines. Once there he was once again arrested for 
car theft, this time for a car belonging to the Des Moines 
Police Department. Both escapees served long prison terms for 
breaking out of jail." 
Not every escapee used a hack saw to escape from of jail. 
Some prisoners literally broke their way out. Clarence 
"Cobby" Murphy, a Greenfield ne'er-do-well had just recently 
returned from a year's stay at the Men's Penitentiary at 
Anamosa for drunken driving in June 1929 when Sheriff Sachau 
incarcerated him for the illegal possession of 2.5 pints of 
whisky. Murphy pled guilty to a charge of illegal possession 
of liquor and received a six-month sentence at the Adair 
County Jail. Sitting in the adjoining cell Murphy found 
Claude Ridout of Creston who had been there since April, also 
on an illegal possession of liquor charge. During the 
following three months the two prisoners became friends, such 
good friends that Ridout agreed to help Murphy break out of 
jail. 
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Murphy had discovered that his cell door's dead bolt lock 
often failed to catch. He decided that when next that 
happened he would use his steel cot to batter a hole in the 
exterior jail house wall and make good his escape. Murphy 
calculated that the wall was decrepit enough to make fast work 
of the job. What worried him was the noise he would 
inevitably make while battering the wall. His friend Claude 
offered a solution. He would play his "fiddle" loudly to 
cover his friend's battering. Ridout's idea worked. While he 
furiously bowed his fiddle Murhpy battered a two by three foot 
hole in the jail's wall. Once through it he dropped to the 
lawn below and made his way to Ridout's house in Creston as 
arranged. Three months passed before Sheriff Sachau thought 
to ask the Creston police to look for his escaped prisoner at 
Ridout's house. When they did they found him. Clarence 
Murphy received a light one year's punishment at the Men's 
Prison at Fort Madison for his Adair County jail break. 
His friend Claude Ridout also was lucky: Sheriff Sachau 
chose not to prosecute him for his part in the affair. Sachau 
knew Ridout already faced another six-month term for illegal 
possession of liquor awaiting him at the Union County Jail 
when his Adair County sentence expired. Claude Ridout's 
liquor habit brought him briefly to the limelight once again 
in 1933 when an altercation with Prohibition Agents Harry 
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Elliott and A. A. Murphy five miles west of Oskaloosa on 
Highway 2 resulted in the death of Agent Elliott." 
Oral Miller of Mount Ayr was another who escaped without 
using a haçk saw. Miller wriggled through the Ringgold County 
Jail's skylight, getting a helpful boost up to the ceiling 
from his cell mate Boyd Hunt. 
Enforcing automobile safety laws increasingly occupied 
rural Iowa sheriffs in the 1920s. Driving automobiles was new 
to rural lowans and it was fun. In the early 1920s, rural 
sheriffs were primarily concerned with automobiles in terms of 
their traditional role as tax collectors. At least one 
sheriff began seizing cars whose license plates that 
represented their taxes were delinquent and selling the cars 
at a sheriff's auction to collect the back taxes that were 
owed. Equipment regulations also worried some sheriffs. For 
example, Adair County Sheriff Sprague ran a newspaper notice 
warning residents that he would begin enforcing the state laws 
requiring all automobiles to have properly functioning 
mufflers and tail lights. One sheriff grew so alarmed about 
automobile equipment that he prevailed upon three area garages 
to provide headlight adjustments free of charge to interested 
drivers. 
In the early 1930s the sheriffs tended to refocus their 
attention regarding automobiles from cars to their operators. 
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This was at least partly a result of state-mandated activity 
such as issuing operators' licenses. Both Ringgold and Adair 
County sheriffs were forced to hire special office deputies to 
issue the state's licenses. In each case more than 10,000 
people became licensed drivers, and each of them had the same 
renewal date. Sheriff Terrell was obliged to add $10 each 
month from his own pocket to the county's authorized $40 just 
to attract anyone to take on the disagreeable job. 
In 1934 Allamakee County Sheriff James Baxter launched a 
traffic safety program. He swore in ten ex-servicemen as 
special deputies with instructions to make the county's 
drivers more safety conscious. Each of the special deputies 
were authorized to issue red "emergency" and white "minor" 
violation citations. These were legally binding citations and 
did, albeit temporarily, reduce the number of injuries from 
automobile collisions in his county. But the sheriffs were in 
a quandary. They soon discovered that their citizens deeply 
resented being told they were bad drivers, and each of them 
was a voter. Eventually the sheriffs followed the traditional 
enforcement practice of intruding as little as possible on 
their constituents' fun.^^ 
They could not pursue the same casual attitude regarding 
prohibition, however, which was their chief law enforcement 
aggravation. Alcohol created the greatest enforcement 
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predicament facing Iowa's rural sheriffs. Prohibiting liquor, 
banning the saloon, stopping-up the great American bottle was 
a rural cause; indeed it was a rural crusade. On Friday 
January 16, 1920, they won the fight with the 18th Amendment 
to the Constitution which stated that, "the manufacture, sale, 
or transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . for beverage 
purposes, is hereby prohibited."^® At the midnight hour of 
empowerment, in effusive and radiant optimism, dry crusaders 
gathered in churches across the nation to celebrate what San 
Francisco W.C.T.U. leader Christine Tilling called, "God's 
present to the nation." At the nation's capital Josephus 
Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, followed the great agrarian 
spokesman, thrice Democratic presidential challenger and 
ardent prohibitionist, William Jennings Bryan, to the pulpit 
of Washington's First Congregational Church to declare in 
jubilation, "The Saloon is as dead as slavery!" The country's 
last triumph over the city was at hand.^^ 
For years rural lowans, along with many other rural 
people throughout the country, had felt urban America threaten 
them with a loss of status. City life somehow became the 
standard of good living while country living, lacking the 
electricity, plumbing, and entertainment of city living, 
suffered by comparison. A dichotomy grew; city life seemed 
socially and economically superior to country life, yet the 
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rural schema held the city to be almost ineluctably evil. 
Prohibition became the hammer with which rural Americans tried 
to refashion urban life by eradicating liquor, its greatest 
symbol of evil. The sheriffs' problem in all of this can be 
spotted in a quip of rural America's greatest humorist. Will 
Rogers. Farmers, he said, could be counted on to vote dry as 
long as they could stagger to the polls on election day. 
Beneath the rural crusade's rhetoric lay antipathy for the 
city, not necessarily of liquor itself. It was not drinking, 
but urban drinking that caused rural roars of protest .  
Iowa's rural sheriffs found themselves squarely between 
the vocal few with their law and the mute many with their 
stills. It was an uneven contest. Prohibition and Hard Times 
arrived at the same time in Iowa, and rural lowans had an 
abundance of corn. The solution to the agricultural 
depression for 2nd Infantry Division war hero and Adair County 
farmer Roy Trout lay in his corn. He got caught when Sheriff 
Sprague arrested Trout in early spring, 1921, for possessing a 
still and eight quarts of corn whiskey on his farm. He was 
forced to pay a $400 fine. In revenge Roy Trout found and 
beat up Sheriff Sprague's informer that fall. As Trout was 
armed at the time he received a two-year sentence at the 
Anamosa Men's Reformatory on a weapon's charge. At that point 
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the Internal Revenue Service noticed Roy and assessed him 
$1,839.74 in back taxes on his illicit bootlegging profits. 
Roy Trout was hardly alone in making the decision to turn 
nearly worthless corn into highly profitable whiskey. Trout's 
still was only one of three that Sheriff Sprague uncovered 
that spring. Acting on an anonymous tip in June, Sheriff 
Sprague arrested M. A. Peckham, Charles Armstrong, and 
Clarence Barrows, all Fontanelle area farmers, at Peckham's 
farm. There he found a fifteen-gallon still brimming with 
corn mash in the back seat of one of the farmer's cars. The 
three men had pooled their resources, their customer lists, 
and their detection risk by taking turns hiding the still on 
their farms. As with Roy Trout, the I.R.S. assessed the 
Fontanelle farmers with $1,166 each in back taxes on their 
moonshine operation's profits.3% 
Now fully aware of the degree of the problem in his 
county. Sheriff W. A. Sprague launched an anti-bootlegging 
campaign that lasted as long as he remained sheriff. In early 
September Sprague raided three "liquor oases," accompanied by 
a federal agent from Des Moines. At the Varley family's farm 
he found a nine gallon still; at the old McDonald farm south 
of Adair the sheriff confiscated a three-gallon jug of "home 
brew." At C. Santle's carpenter shop in town he found a 2.5-
gallon jug of bootleg liquor hidden under the shop's floor 
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boards. Sheriff Sprague pressed on, finding his biggest still 
at the county fairgrounds hidden in the Baby Health Building. 
The site must have seemed ideal to the bootlegger. The 
fairgrounds were abandoned eleven months of the year and the 
Baby Health Building, sitting at the back of the fairgrounds, 
was well hidden from casual view. In the Baby Building 
Sprague found a huge still, percolating fifty gallons of corn 
mash. It elicited the indignation of the local W.C.T.U.'s 
leader who said, "To think that a man would stoop so low as to 
use a building dedicated to better babies for the use of 
making the vile stuff. I wish we could get our hands on that 
inhuman fiend!" 
Another McDonald, a tenant farmer named Jack, working the 
Irvin farm, thought he had outwitted Sprague. The year 
before, armed with a search warrant, Sprague had failed to 
find McDonald's still. He thought it was such a good joke 
that he could not help bragging to his friends about his 
clever hiding place. One of them turned him in to the sheriff 
who, aided by Guthrie County Sheriff Kennedy, found his still 
buried under the floor boards of his hen house. Stuart 
resident D. W. Paullin was arrested by the city marshal after 
he found three quarts of moonshine in the house while 
executing a search warrant. Tenant farmer Earl Schilling, who 
lived seven miles northwest of Fontanelle, was the last 
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bootlegger Sheriff Sprague nabbed. In the fall of 1922 armed 
with a search warrant based on an anonymous telephone tip, 
Sprague found a still under Schilling's farm house stairs. 
At a loss as to how to deal with Adair County's rebellion 
against prohibition, the county's four largest churches. 
Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Church of Christ, 
contacted the Iowa Anti-Saloon League for help. The League 
sent several speakers to Greenfield in October, 1922, to 
coordinate a program to foster prohibition compliance. The 
churches offered several special programs, including one-act 
plays, sermons, and mock debates. 
The League and churches' efforts had a negligible effect; 
the number of bootlegging arrests continued unabated. That 
spring F. DeMaranville, a well-known 55-year-old Sioux City 
stock buyer, bought bootleg liquor as well as stock from at 
least one Adair County farmer. DeMaranville died in his hotel 
room, a jug of poison moonshine beside him. George Mowell 
turned his corn into bootleg whiskey to help raise the money 
he needed for his wife's operation. The day Mowell was 
arrested for bootlegging he found out that his wife had died 
on her surgeon's table in Des Moines. Mowell pled guilty to 
manufacturing liquor but had his $200 fine suspended by Judge 
Vander Ploeg who told Mowell his five young children needed 
the money more than did the court. 
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Bootleggers M. V. Lalley and Harry Lovell of Adair did 
not receive a similar leniency from the court. Lalley and 
Lovell were notorious moonshiners whom Sheriff Clark and his 
predecessors had long tried to arrest. In September, 1923, 
the sheriff, his deputy, and the Greenfield Marshal, Ed 
Sachau, raided the Lalley and Lovell still at the stockyards 
east of Adair. The grand jury indicted the pair who, in 
separate trials, were convicted of manufacturing liquor. In 
sentencing the couple to an unusually harsh $800 fine plus a 
255-day sentence each. Judge W. S. Cooper said, "You have been 
engaged in a business that should make you ashamed to look an 
honest man in the face." Following an unsuccessful appeal to 
the state supreme court the duo began serving out their stern 
punishment at the Adair County Jail on July 16, 19 24.^^ 
Lalley and Lovell were the last of Adair County's large-
scale bootleg operators to be apprehended. A succession of 
sheriffs continued to make a large number of arrests for minor 
liquor violations, to be sure, but the heady days of 1921 to 
1923 had ended. While the number of bootlegging arrests 
continued at high levels during the 1920s an attitude change 
about prohibition occurred. When two half-pint bottles of 
moonshine were found by workers renovating Greenfield's Murdy 
and Dorsey Drug Store, the newspaper treated the story 
humorously. No indignant howl arose over the "inhuman fiend" 
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who dared to use a drug store for illegal liquor purposes as 
there had been in the 1921 discovery of a still at the county 
fairgrounds' Baby Health Building. The paper reported instead 
that, 
It is said that the liquor was in an excellent state of 
preservation, although it had mysteriously disappeared 
when a . . . reporter asked to sample it. Several 
thirsty Greenfield men were seen sharpening up their 
shovels that same evening. No liquid treasure has been 
unearthed so far, but the excavators are hopeful.^ 
Adair County was not unique in its prohibition 
enforcement experience: initial intensity accompanied by 
arrests of large-scale farmer-bootleggers, followed within two 
or three years by a sort of enforcement ennui, which continued 
to apprehend many small-time violators. An Allamakee County 
posse, responding to citizens' complaints, raided two farms in 
the summer of 1921. They found ninety gallons of bootleg corn 
whisky at one and seventy-seven gallons at the other. The 
following spring another posse raided twenty-five different 
bootleggers (mostly farmers) during a two-day period, 
confiscating similar amounts of moonshine. In January the 
enforcement ferment ended when a Waukon jury acquitted Hugh 
Quinn of bootlegging after seven minutes' deliberation in the 
face of indubitable evidence. Ringgold County jurors 
acquitted Marion Milligan of an equally solid bootlegging 
charge within thirty minutes of their sequestering. Rural 
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lowans voted dry but drank; and they were willing to pay as 
much as $.50 per glass for the privilege.^ 
The quality not the quantity of enforcement activity had 
changed. The reason for the sheriffs' behavior change is 
reflected in one anonymous east coast rhymester's verse; 
Mother's in the Kitchen 
Washing out the jugs; 
Sister's in the pantry 
Bottling the Suds; 
Father's in the cellar 
Mixing up the hops; 
Johnny's on the front porch 
Watching for the cops. ** 
Seemingly, everyone violated the prohibition laws wholesale. 
Moreover, when caught, lowans punished themselves with an 
average of seventy-four-day jail terms, only half that of the 
national average. Rural lowans joined with ruralites across 
the country to resist urban cultural hegemony to produce the 
18th Amendment. That did not mean, however, that rural lowans 
intended to stop their own drinking, nor did they. The advent 
of rural modernity, hastened as it was by the incursion of 
rural free delivery, automobiles, radio and movies, quickly 
cooled rural lowans' ardor for prohibition enforcement, even 
though their rhetoric remained unchanged.^ 
Long before Franklin Roosevelt ended the thirteen-year, 
ten-month and eighteen-day "noble experiment" by signing the 
repeal proclamation at 7:00 p.m. December 5, 1933, Iowa's 
rural sheriffs had accommodated themselves to rural 
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realities.4° The sheriffs recognized their constituents' 
competing emotions about prohibition and responded 
harmoniously. They switched their enforcement strategies from 
the determined and aggressive pursuit of large-scale farmer 
bootleggers to producing a regular supply of small scale 
violators; the quantity of prohibition enforcement remained 
high while the quality of enforcement unobtrusively faded 
away. In this, as with their treatment of gypsies, operation 
of jails, and enforcement of automobile safety, Iowa's rural 
sheriffs emulated the enforcement practices of their 
forbearers. They recognized the wisdom of knowing and 
complying with the enforcement tastes of their constituencies. 
Because the linchpin of the sheriff's office was popular 
election, successful sheriffs quickly learned to be responsive 
to their residents mores and expectations about how to do 
their job. This was not a difficult task since election 
depended on both local renown and lifelong county residence. 
Properly interpreting local sentiments could prove to be 
decisive, as when Allamakee County Sheriff Gunda Martindale 
was unseated by Ben Davis in 1922. Davis had correctly 
understood the hesitation of many of the county's voters to 
return a woman sheriff to office when she would be required to 
act as an executioner. 
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Sensitivity to local mores was no less important to 
sheriffs when they were handling their more prosaic duties. 
This can be seen in the sheriffs' response to the new duties 
of traffic and prohibition enforcement. In each case the 
sheriffs returned to their traditional posture of intruding 
into their people's lives as little as possible as they tried 
to maintain the balance between the law's demands and local 
expectations. 
In handling the job they were elected to do the sheriffs 
were professional. They did not realize it, however, because 
their traditional rural model of policing did not match the 
urban model of gangbusting that J. Edgar Hoover, the press, 
and the movies held out as being "real" professionalization. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION 
Police professionalization was a stage of development 
that American police underwent during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Some of it was inevitable because of new technology, media 
influence, and an increase in investigative knowledge that 
evolved at the time. In rural Iowa some of it emerged from 
the sheriffs' own self-doubts about their traditional model of 
policing. The result of the multi-faceted professionalization 
efforts was an amalgam of the urban gangbusters model and the 
continuation of the common practices done more consciously. 
Iowa's sheriffs reacted to the newspaper-inspired 
perception that the nation was in the throes of a "crime wave" 
by banding together in pursuit of police professionalization 
in order to join with the nation's other lawmen in a "war 
against crime." Like their urban counterparts, Iowa's rural 
police accepted the leadership of the New Deal's chief 
detective, J. Edgar Hoover. They used education and new 
technology in weapons and communications to transform 
themselves into full partners in the nation's crime crusade.^ 
Rural law enforcement took on a new and different form 
during the interwar years. Driven by a mass-media campaign 
that made them reorient their fundamental self-image, rural 
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police joined their urban comrades in rapidly recasting 
themselves from almost casual peace keepers into a kind of 
frontline shock troops locked in a deadly "war against crime." 
This change was first apparent in the 1920s in Iowa's capital 
city when the state's largest newspaper, the Des Moines 
Register, began highlighting crime stories to boost 
circulation. Register reporter Bill Millhaen explained the 
reason for the change. 
The real battle in those days was in street sales. 
That's where the news department could help most. We 
manufactured headlines that would sell papers on the 
street. If we didn't have a good story, we were expected 
to make one, magnify, or expand one. The final edition 
. . . had to have headlines that the newsboys could 
merchandise. We built up feature stories as well as 
crimes of violence and tales of misfortune. If you could 
tie into a big headline, the paper would sell.^ 
The Des Moines police, like police across the nation, began 
searching out "real" criminals such as burglars and robbers 
and, as a consequence, largely ignoring public drunks and 
other such minor offenders. National law enforcement 
developments also influenced Des Moines. The twin concepts of 
a "crime wave" and police professionalization gained wide 
acceptance in the 1920s. Crime commissions materialized all 
across the country to conduct crime surveys or otherwise 
assist the police. A new branch of sociology called 
criminology emerged from the studies of Robert Parks and 
others at the University of Chicago.^ By the end of the 
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decade the federal government had created two crime 
commissions. In 1925 President Calvin Coolidge established 
the National Crime Commission; four years later President 
Herbert Hoover set up the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, widely remembered as the 
Wickersham Commission. Mark 0. Prentiss, a journalist who 
later served on the Wickersham Commission, popularized the 
expression "war against crime" when he wrote an article 
entitled "War On the Growing Menace of Crime" in which he 
explained the work of the commission. 
The movement gained new momentum in the 1930s from 
Washington, D.C. President Franklin Roosevelt's attorney 
general. Homer Cummings, sponsored a conference on crime, 
marking a federal policy switch from encouraging to actually 
leading the war against crime in December, 1934. Throughout 
the 1930s Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation hammered home the theme of a war against crime 
in dozens of public speeches, news interviews, and articles 
for both the popular press and the newly emerging police 
journals. The new awareness of law enforcement and its 
emphasis on combatting crime with increasingly professional 
police changed the fundamental paradigm of American policing. 
Police everywhere embraced increased minimum employment 
standards, inaugurated continuing education programs. 
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developed modern management techniques, and adopted new and 
improved technology in firearms, transportation and electronic 
communication. 
Iowa's hinterland, too, began reading about a rural war 
against crime. Wallaces' Farmer, the most widely read 
agricultural newspaper in the state, started focusing its 
readers' attention on rural incidents of crime in the 1920s. 
Publisher Henry A. Wallace at least partly shared his urban 
colleagues' motivation of increasing his paper's circulation. 
Wallace's police readership was more diverse than the 
Register's, however, spread among the state's 99 county 
sheriffs.4 
Although rural and urban lawmen shared the same impetus 
for professionalization, rural conditions and history 
determined a unique course for country developments. 
Municipal police appealed to their city administrators and 
politicians for the necessary funds and facilities to 
inaugurate their changes in education, management and 
technology. Rural police units lacked a similar 
infrastructure upon which to build. They were small in size, 
few in number, and geographically diffused. They were 
administered not by a city council but by dozens of autonomous 
county supervisors' boards. The sole unifying structure that 
existed for rural law enforcement officers was a loose 
139 
confederation of like-minded rural sheriffs that called itself 
the Iowa State Sheriffs' Association. The Association first 
arose in the 1880s in response to an outbreak of criminal 
activity in the state's northwest corner. A well-organized 
and highly successful gang of rustlers known as the "Crooked 
Creek Gang" after their coppice hide-out's creek, raided both 
sides of the Missouri River, using it to transport their 
stolen cattle and horses as far south as New Orleans. In 1882 
Civil War veteran and newly-elected Mitchell County Sheriff 
Robert T. St. John concluded that it was time to capture the 
Crooked Creek Gang. Sheriff St. John called together a 
meeting of northwest Iowa's twenty sheriffs and deputies. 
Once organized, the sheriffs' group quickly apprehended the 
rustlers and continued to work together to rid its part of the 
state of several notorious highwaymen. Even after the law 
enforcement drive ended, the men continued to meet regularly 
as a voluntary fraternal club.^ 
The Sheriffs' Association continued to foster annual 
sheriffs' conventions into the early twentieth century. While 
it remained an essentially social group, its existence gave 
sheriffs interested in professionalization a base upon which 
to build. The first step, these sheriffs believed, was 
education. In 1924 they thought their goal was at hand when 
the Attorney General of Iowa recommended to the General 
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Assembly that it allocate state funds to open and to operate a 
sheriffs' law enforcement school. The legislature promptly 
disabused the lawmen's thoughts of easy success by rejecting 
the suggestion out of hand both in 1924 and again in 1926.* 
Seeing that the state lawmakers opposed their efforts, the 
sheriffs decided to host their own meetings. Before they 
could begin, however, many of them found that their own county 
supervisors resented both their sheriff's travel expenses and 
the time they were away from the county attending meetings. 
To circumvent the objections at home the sheriffs' association 
leaders asked Governor John Haramill, acting as chief 
executive, to order them to attend a meeting because neither 
they nor their supervisors could legally ignore such a 
summons.^ The sheriffs' knew that using the ploy of 
gubernatorial summons would not work for long and that the 
friction it caused back home made it prohibitively costly in 
terms of local political harmony. To ease these tensions the 
association's leadership turned to the University of Iowa for 
help. The leaders felt, they later said, that 
each year our state universities offer courses in 
agriculture to teach us to better farm our land. There 
are courses held annually to teach our firemen how to 
fight fires. Even the lowly meter reader has a short 
course devoted to his particular line or [sic] work. The 
one profession . . . for which our great state has made 
no educational provision is that of law enforcement.® 
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University authorities did not share the sheriffs' educational 
vision and flatly refused to help. 
Frustrated but determined, men such as Association leader 
Story County Sheriff R. W. Nebergall continued organizing 
annual schools of instruction under gubernatorial order and 
ISSA auspices. Nebergall found an ally in Attorney General 
John Fletcher. He issued an opinion in 1927 holding that 
Iowa's sheriffs were entitled to the time and travel expense 
monies to attend the ISSA's schools because they had been 
mandated by the state's chief executive officer. Throughout 
the remainder of the 1920s the ISSA doggedly pressed its 
educational agenda, holding annual schools of instruction by 
gubernatorial edict but under the ISSA's sponsorship. The 
process steadily grew easier as local county boards grew 
accustomed to the practice, reducing their complaints and the 
friction at home while persistent persuasion from the state 
and nation's press continued to stress the twin themes of a 
war against crime and the necessity of police 
professionalization to wage it successfully. J. Edgar 
Hoover's constant barnstorming as the federal government's 
chief crime war advocate included stops in Iowa, which helped 
the sheriffs surmount opposition as well. The 1930s saw the 
ISSA solve its funding problems as it man-aged to attract a 
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new cadre of guest speakers including faculty members of the 
University of Iowa.' 
Even as the sheriffs used the gubernatorial ploy to 
gather for their Annual School of Instruction in December 1929 
the ISSA was nurturing the beginnings of its 
professionalization. Held as always under the governor's 
suiranons at the State House, the Fifth Annual School of 
Instruction had progressed beyond its social and fraternal 
origins. Among the subjects discussed were; "Psychology As 
Applied to Criminal Investigation," a demonstration by 
University of Iowa professor Dr. John A. Larson of the "lie 
detector," and "The Defense Pleads Insanity," by Winifred 
Overholse, M.D., Director of the Massachusetts Department of 
Mental Diseases. That December school also hosted pistol and 
revolver shooting practice in the state house's basement range 
as well as exhibit shooting by World Pistol Shot Champion Bob 
Limbert. Funds for guest speakers came from the profits of 
selling advertising space in the ISSA's magazine, the Iowa 
Sheriff. Another boost came from the 44th General Assembly 
which authorized any sheriff individually or corporately in 
1931 to host schools of instruction for the benefit of 
themselves or their vigilantes. This act gave the ISSA's 
members legal sanction for their schools.'® 
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Rural sheriffs leapt at the chance to host their own 
schools of instruction. Adair County acted first, holding a 
local school at the courthouse within weeks of the 
authorization act. R. W. Nebergall, now an agent with the 
state's Bureau of Criminal Investigation, taught the county's 
deputyies, constables, and county attorney how to take 
fingerprints. The local Iowa Bankers' Association 
representative, J. E. Howe, lectured on the newest tactics to 
combat rural bank robberies. The object of the school, said 
Nebergall, was to increase cooperation among Adair County's 
law enforcement officers. Iowa County Sheriff J. F. Voelkel 
hosted a school for thirty area officers that March, again 
with Agent Nebergall's help. ISSA representative G. W. 
Johnson also appeared in Marengo to explain the Association's 
goals, and the local Iowa Bankers' Association spokesman, R. 
R. Schroeder, repeated his Adair County counterpart's anti-
bank robbery speech. Allamakee County Sheriff Leonard J. 
Bulman conducted his school of instruction that fall, again 
with Nebergall's assistance. That year eighty-five of the 
state's ninety-nine sheriffs hosted similar schools. With the 
new authorization act, sheriffs could hold a school, something 
especially important to his untrained constables and 
vigilantes, without fear of repercussion in the event a 
participant was injured. More importantly, the schools also 
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afforded sheriffs an opportunity to assert local superiority 
as their county's chief law officer over local marshals, 
constables and vigilantes in their jurisdictions. The state 
level schools, too, enjoyed great success. As the ISSA's 
activities and local officers' events multiplied, the rural 
sheriffs began to develop a new self-concept, a new image of 
themselves and of their job. 
From Washington came encouragement from J. Edgar Hoover, 
who told the sheriffs that they were civilization's saviors 
and guarantors. With its monthly magazine and its annual 
schools drawing hundreds of grassroots participants, the ISSA 
presented a golden opportunity to the New Deal's architects. 
Homer Cummings, Roosevelt's attorney general, shared his 
fellow cabinet members' goal of using New Deal programs to 
revive national solidarity behind Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
The Attorney General's task was enviably easy. Unlike the 
other New Deal chiefs who fought amorphous enemies like farm 
failures or unemployment, Cummings had a thrilling show with 
real gun battles for the folks to see. The NRA, CCC, and AAA 
had worthy, if uninspiring, depression adversaries while 
Cummings' FBI combatted a vicariously stirring villain; the 
public enemy. 
Fully aware that the true nationalization of police was 
constitutionally and fiscally impossible. Homer Cummings used 
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the FBI's Hoover to achieve the next best thing: federal 
leadership of what had begun as a grassroots anti-crime 
movement. In this way the New Deal's FBI could provide 
technical aid to local police, thereby attaining the lion's 
share of publicity value from sensational cases without 
running the risk of investigative responsibility. Hoover's 
appearance at places like the ISSA's annual schools during the 
1930s, in fact, was the administration's "war on crime." 
For Cummings, Hoover was the ideal shill. He was an 
ambitious young fanatic whose apotheosis had emerged unbidden 
but quickly exploited from Hollywood. It began with the movie 
industry's self-imposed censorship which in 1934 forbade the 
making of any more of the highly popular gangster pictures. 
Circumventing the code was easily solved by switching the role 
of hero from the gangster to the police. In "Let Em Have It," 
"Show Them No Mercy," and more than sixty other "G-Men" films, 
Hoover and his FBI appeared as modern crime fighting 
scientists who always "got their men." Although the FBI's 
crime busting effectiveness can be seriously doubted, their 
significant contribution to generating public enthusiasm for 
F.D.R. and his entire New Deal is indubitable.'^ 
Iowa's sheriffs rushed to embrace the New Deal's 
redefinition of their role. The Iowa Sheriff faithfully 
reproduced verbatim every Hoover speech they received from the 
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FBI for publication. After 1935 Hoover began talking tough 
about crime in speeches before a nearly endless cycle of 
business, government, or patriotic groups. The Director spoke 
in broad gushing torrents of verbosity, but he made only two 
points: first, America was threatened with imminent collapse 
because of epidemic lawlessness and, second, America's 
salvation depended on its police, led by himself, of course.^ 
To the American Legion he said, "The time is at hand when 
every citizen . . . must choose . . . whether the orderly 
forces of government or the forces of lawlessness shall 
dominate our civilization." Later, he added, "Crime ... is 
not merely a battle. It is a ceaseless warfare." Hoover 
scolded those who "looked upon [fingerprinting] with prejudice 
and repulsion as being exclusively a police measure" in an 
article released specifically for magazine like the Iowa 
Sheriff. In a general press release he said, "The greatest 
threat confronting the people of this Nation today is not 
hunger, communism or the fear of foreign invasion. 
[L]awlessness [was] the basic cause leading to the decline of 
all civilization in the past." He told the Economic Club of 
Detroit; "Lawlessness [is] a national menace." The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police heard him say, 
"There have been few times, if any, in our history when law 
enforcement faced a more serious ordeal than today." Hoover 
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used a live radio broadcast from Washington to tell Drake 
University's commencement audience in Des Moines that "the 
future well being of our Nation, our communities, our homes, 
and ourselves ... is threatened by the insidious forces of 
lawlessness." Of the police Hoover said, "I want to see 
groups of highly-trained, enthusiastic men of law enforcement, 
properly supported by equipment, appropriation, and freedom 
from paralyzing influence." Because of the power of popular 
opinion the nation did not get Hoover's vision of professional 
law enforcement. It got instead a national law enforcement 
policy and a coordinated national drive against crime, the 
myth of the G-Man. 
R. W. Nebergall, editor of the Iowa Sheriff and state 
agent, warmly endorsed the G-Man myth and its totem. Director 
Hoover. In commending one of Hoover's reprinted speeches he 
declared, "the officers on the firing line in the battle 
against crime . . . know that Hoover is right and stand ready 
to back him up." He summed up the new perception. Iowa's 
rural sheriffs were soldiers at war. Preparing themselves 
became the mission of the ISSA's Annual Schools of 
Instruction. 
The ISSA knew that it was unique. No other state's rural 
officers had anything to compare with their organization. Of 
themselves they said. 
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We were the first to get together, call in the highest 
type of experts in the scientific criminal laboratories, 
to discuss our own problems and attempt to make it tough 
for denizens of the underworld. 
By mid-decade the ISSA began assisting rural lawmen in other 
parts of the United States to establish schools of instruction 
of their own. In 1936 the sheriffs finally received the 
support they had sought twelve years earlier from the 
University of Iowa. A new administration at Iowa City, led by 
President Gilmore, encouraged by Mayor Tom Martin who also 
headed the Iowa League of Municipalities, and nurtured by a 
volunteer from the Law College, Professor Rollin M. Perkins, 
agreed to help the ISSA operate professional schools. The 
sheriffs happily accepted. In the 1930s they reached their 
goals. Motivated by the new mission J. Edgar Hoover had given 
them, funded by their own magazine, encouraged and officially 
authorized by their legislature, and instructed by university 
faculty, the sheriffs readied themselves to adopt the precepts 
of professionalization.i* 
What, then, did Iowa's sheriffs study when they came 
together at their Annual Schools of Instruction? As rural 
men and as devotees of police professionalization, the 
sheriffs adhered to the cult of what historian Lewis Atherton 
calls, "the immediately useful and the practical."^ 
Psychology and philosophy held no allure for the sheriffs. 
Not one of the 207 lecturers who participated in the Schools 
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during the 1930s was a sociologist or a criminologist. The 
sheriffs used advance questionnaires to be sure they got the 
lectures they wanted. They did not want "eggheads;" above all 
else they wanted technical instruction and information to 
improve their daily job performance.^" 
The ISSA presented 200 separate class sessions at its 
Annual Schools of Instruction between 1930 and 1940. As Table 
11 shows, crime scene technology topped the list at 26 percent 
of the total. The sheriffs knew that being full crime-busting 
partners with J. Edgar Hoover meant knowing how to use 
fingerprints or cast reproductions of footprints and tire 
tracks. Even if they would never actually do such things, 
they believed that knowing how was the important thing. This 
focus on crime scene technology, in light of the very low 
incidence of rural crime in their jurisdictions, was as far as 
the sheriffs deviated from the immediately useful and the 
practical. 
Routine activities such as testifying in court, using the 
police radio, serving civil process (non-criminal court 
documents), and learning how to write an understandable police 
report constitute the second most frequent lecture topics, as 
Table 11 shows. There were pragmatic men and their daily 
routine held the imperative of learning the "immediately 
useful and the practical." They were also strongly drawn to 
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enforcement law topics.The rules of evidence and the 
complicated elements of search and seizure principles were 
each presented ten times during the decade. Traffic laws and 
the laws of arrest also received special emphasis. 
TABLE 11 
POLICE TECHNOLOGY CLASSES TAUGHT 
Technology Number Percent 
Fingerprints 13 
Toxicology (poisons) 7 
Crime Scene Science 26 
the Polygraph (lie detector) 6 
52 26 
TABLE 12 
ROUTINE POLICE ACTIVITIES TAUGHT 
Topic Number Percent 
Report Writing 4 
Civil Process 9 
Testifying 12 
First Aid 5 
Police Radio 9 
Interrogation 5 
Search/seizure 10 
Rules of Evidence 10 
Traffic 10 
Liquor Laws 2 
Counterfeiting 5 
Arrest laws 7 
Total 88 
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The officers also concerned themselves with how to stay 
alive while pursuing their enforcement tasks. As Table 13 
shows, firearms, especially practice firing them, occupied 14 
percent of the School's time slots. Target practice was more 
than entertainment for these rural sheriffs. They knew how 
to shoot straight. What they sought was the reassurance that 
the firing range gave them that they could survive police 
combat. Oddly enough, they appeared to hold unarmed combat in 
low regard, contenting themselves with just four ju jitsu 
demonstrations during the decade. It may be that the number 
of World War I veterans was large enough among them that 
training in "hand to hand" combat was deemed superfluous. 
TABLE 13 
COMBAT TRAINING CLASSES TAUGHT 
Street Survival Number Percent 
Tactics (Combat) 2 
Combat (unarmed) 4 
Firearms 28 
Total 34 17 
Reflecting the New Deal's war against crime, the sheriffs 
showed a great deal of curiosity about other law enforcement 
agencies, especially about the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. As Table 14 shows, class sessions devoted 
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strictly to explaining the mission and operations of the FBI 
appeared eight times during the decade while those of the 
state's Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) were held six 
times. 
TABLE 14 
STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES EXPLAINED 
Other Agency Number Percent 
BCI 6 
US Secret Service 2 
FBI 8 
Iowa Highway Patrol 4 
Total 20 10 
Least interesting of all to the sheriffs was their own 
agenda. Only 4 percent of the Schools' sessions discussed the 
Iowa State Sheriffs' Association's goals or impending 
legislation affecting law enforcement in Iowa. 
TABLE 15 
ISSA'S OWN AGENDA EXPLAINED 
Number Percent 
3 
4 
7 
ISSA 
Impending Legislation 
ISSA 
Total 
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Being practical men, the sheriffs were choosey about who 
they would accept as instructors. They only invited law 
enforcement practitioners to teach. With the exception of Dr. 
W. I. Teets, a University of Iowa chemistry professor, who 
spoke in seven of the ten years on toxicology, and two 
University of Iowa law professors, no academicians appeared 
before the sheriffs. Neither did they invite to their Schools 
a criminologist, social worker, or member of a parole board. 
The sheriffs showed no interest in the cause of crime, only in 
apprehending criminals. The percentage of University of Iowa 
faculty, which appears in Table 16 at 25 percent, is 
deceptively high because the repeated appearance of a handful 
of faculty members inflates the university's participation. 
The sheriffs' interest in enforcement law and in firearms 
brought professors Rollin Perkins and Mason Ladd to the Annual 
Schools each year. Colonel G. F. N. Dailey and Major J. F. 
Butler of the University's Military Science Department 
likewise appeared often to supervise the firearms and tactics 
sessions. In each of these cases the men, although academic 
professionals, were also practicing criminal defence attorneys 
and active duty soldiers. 
The practical bent held for all of the sheriffs' 
instruction. When crime scene photography was the topic, the 
Eastman Kodak Company's crime expert Edward Burke or Chicago 
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Police laboratory technician Fred E. Iitibau conducted the 
sessions. For a class on liquor enforcement the ISSA brought 
in Chief (Iowa) Liquor Control Officer and former Des Moines 
Police Chief W. W. Akers. Fingerprinting, which appeared at 
every School, was taught by state BCI Agent Nebergall. It was 
he who got Arthur H. Bishop, a Scotland Yard Detective 
Inspector, to come from a Chicago court proceeding where he 
was testifying to describe his famous law enforcement agency 
to the sheriffs. Pursuing the New Deal Justice Department's 
ambition to lead the 1930s "war against crime" brought 
thirty-nine FBI agents, or 19 percent of the total speakers to 
the Annual Schools. As Table 16 shows, only the University of 
Iowa and the ISSA sent more instructors then did the FBI." 
TABLE 16 
HOST ORGANIZATION OF INSTRUCTORS 
Host Organization Number 
State Narcotics Dept. 
US Secret Service 
Iowa Judges 
Agent Nebergall 
Police Departments 
Iowa Highway Patrol 
BCI 
ISSA 
FBI 
University of Iowa 
4 
7 
5 
14 
13 
23 
24 
27 
39 
51 
Total 207 
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The technological emphasis at the Annual Schools stemmed 
in part from the postwar availability of military equipment 
that adapted easily to civilian police uses. Federal 
Laboratories, Incorporated, a private purveyor of police 
equipment, issued a "basic rural equipment list" that the ISSA 
endorsed. According to this list, each officer should have: 
Machine gun 
Bullet Proof Shield 
Bullet Proof Vest 
Tear Gas Gun 
Tear Gas Shells and Grenades 
Gas Mask 
Sound Detector (electronic eavesdropping device) 
Squad Camera 
Fingerprint Kit 
Moulage Kit (for taking plaster paris imprints)^ 
More than half of the list's items were either invented or 
perfected during the Great War. 
One item not included on the Federal Laboratories' list 
(because they did not manufacture or sell it), and the one 
thing the sheriffs' wanted most was radio. They knew that 
nothing would reduce their isolation and the speed of crime 
reporting as much as radio. Rural police radio broadcasts 
began in the 1920s because of the efforts of the Iowa Bankers' 
Association. A series of dramatic rural bank robberies 
frightened the bankers in 1924 into pressuring the management 
of radio station WHO, Des Moines' first commercial radio 
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station, into broadcasting robbery information in hope of 
raising the hue and cry. Although WHO'S transmitter was too 
weak to be received clearly beyond the city's limits, it 
demonstrated radio's police potential. Both the Iowa Bankers' 
Association and the Iowa State Sheriffs' Association 
ceaselessly agitated for the legislature to establish a state­
wide police radio network." 
In 1931 Iowa's General Assembly authorized the Attorney 
General to operate such a system from his Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation office in Des Moines. So anxious were the 
bankers that they agreed to split the cost of paying Chief 
(and sole) Operator E. F. "Gene" Brown's state salary to help 
get the system broadcasting. They also paid for a 400-watt 
low-frequency transmitter under station call letters KGHO to 
broadcast on a frequency reserved for police use since 1927 by 
the Federal Radio Commission. Among the first to "hook up" 
his car and office with the new state radio system was Iowa 
County Sheriff J. F. Voelkel. He convinced his county 
supervisors to pay half the installation costs, and the local 
Iowa Bankers' Association affiliate paid the other half. Two 
years passed before a permanent state police radio antenna was 
installed atop the Liberty Building in downtown Des Moines. 
The ISSA blamed the delay on the legislature's niggardly 
appropriations and on the reluctance of too many supervisors' 
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boards to connect with the system. On May 15, 1933, the 
system began transmitting regular continuous police broadcasts 
with the Liberty Building's antenna. The ISSA profusely 
thanked the state's bankers for their assistance in the June 
issue of its magazine.^® 
Four years later the state was operating four satellite 
"booster" stations in each corner of Iowa, yet the sheriffs 
were not satisfied. At the Annual School and Convention in 
1935 the ISSA demanded that the state start round-the-clock 
broadcasts. The sheriffs felt frustrated. They saw the value 
to themselves of a police radio network in incidents such as 
Winneshiek County Sheriff Graff's arrest of Hermann 
Spieklemeyer for passing a bad check at an Allamakee County 
gas station and fleeing before Sheriff John P. King could 
arrest him. Sheriff King contacted the state police radio, 
making it possible for Sheriff Graff to locate and catch 
Spieklemeyer twenty-five miles away in Decorah. Arrests 
stemming from radio broadcasts grew increasingly common. For 
example Ray Wiggins, a notorious forger wanted in Minnesota, 
was caught by Kossuth County Sheriff Casey Loss and Iowa 
Highway Patrolman West during an Algona traffic accident 
investigation. When the organic agreement binding the Iowa 
Bankers' Association to the state's radio network expired in 
1936, the bankers did not renew their support. Although 
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unhappy about the increased expense, the Iowa legislature 
continued operating the radio network, even extending its 
hours of operation to 1:00 a.m, or for seventeen of twenty-
four hours each day. The General Assembly also ordered the 
radio transmitter to be moved from the BCI office to a small 
building at the state fairgrounds in Des Moines." 
The sheriffs delighted in the radio system. They 
thrilled to news of arrests such as those of Charles Kinman 
and Bob Cass, two Beatrice, Nebraska, teenagers who drove off 
without paying from a Jasper County (Newton) gas station. 
Poweshiek County Sheriff Milford Engelbart apprehended them at 
Grinnell, more than 120 miles removed, after hearing a state 
radio broadcast about the pair. The sheriffs' enthusiasm 
increased with each successful use of the technology. In 1937 
they had a large radio system including satellite stations at 
Waterloo, Storm Lake, Atlantic, and Fairfield, each linked to 
the Des Moines headquarters serving ninety-nine sheriffs, 
seventy police departments, 128 highway patrolmen, and twenty 
BCI cars. The number of broadcast items expanded rapidly from 
1,825 in 1935 to 3,670 in 1936 and 5,608 in 1937. In 1938 
Iowa crowned its radio technology feat by becoming the first 
state in the union to introduce a mobile radio transmitter 
using dry cell batteries for power and a panel truck to convey 
the equipment and operator. It would, said the ISSA, 
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. . . do much to promote cooperation of the police, 
sheriffs, and all local enforcement organizations with 
the [state] Department of Justice.^® 
Technology's emphasis at the Annual Schools combined with 
radio's benefits triggered an intense scramble for new 
technology among Iowa's rural lawmen. After radio, the most 
desired new technology among rural sheriffs was the U.S. 
Army's model "28 AC" Thompson sub-machine gun. This desire 
illustrates the power of Hollywood's silver screen heroes to 
influence not only popular culture but local law enforcement 
policies as well. Both newsreels and feature films such as 
1935's "G-Men" portrayed hero-police prominently using the 
Thompson guns. The FBI had Thompsons, John Dillinger and 
Bonnie and Clyde used them, and Iowa's rural officers wanted 
them, too. Firing 600 rounds of .45 calibre ammunition per 
minute from a circular drum affixed to the bottom of the 
stock, these guns represented the most efficient and rapid 
firing weapon then obtainable. But it was a fad. Designed 
for military use, its suitability for police work, including 
the need for extreme accuracy and simplicity of use and 
maintenance, was highly problematic. The Thompson satisfied 
no police-use requirements. It was too heavy, too large, and 
too complicated to be carried in an automobile. Its intended 
use was enfilading fire—to "hose" approaching enemy columns 
or massed assaults. Such use is antithetical to the typical 
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police combat of a single round, exchanged at extremely close 
range. No matter, the sheriffs wanted Thompsons and having 
one became a status symbol. 
The ISSA's monthly magazine congratulated each county 
sheriff who got a Thompson. Johnson County was the first in 
1934; more than half the other county sheriffs' offices got 
them by 1936. When Sioux Falls and Mason City suffered bank 
robberies in the spring of 1934 Fort Dodge Mayor George 
Burnett claimed his city's banks were excluded by robbers 
because; "at both [cities] scouts for the bandits spent 
several days in a survey of the scene before the actual jobs 
were pulled. They . . . learned that the police in both 
cities lacked [Thompsons] and acted accordingly."" As 
counties across Iowa such as tiny Franklin (population 
16,328), Emmett (population 12,856), and Monroe (population 
15,010) rushed to buy machine guns, the Iowa Sheriff's editor, 
R. W. Nebergall, told his readers, "a few years ago we would 
have scoffed that necessity for such a weapon should ever 
arise in a community the size of Albia [Monroe County], but 
those days are past. The entire country is the range of 
gangsters who once worked only in cities. 
The counties did not need Thompson submachine guns but 
their sheriffs thought that they did. Only one rural sheriff 
ever fired his machine gun at a criminal during the interwar 
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years. And by the end of 1939, they were already remembering 
the period nostalgically in articles such as the one titled 
"Hectic Bank Robbery Days are Recalled," in the Iowa 
Sheriff. 
Rural officers armed themselves with one other piece of 
postwar military apparatus in the 1930s: gas. The ISSA began 
urging its members to stockpile chloracetophenone tear gas in 
1933. The 18-month period preceding the Iowa Sheriff's tear 
gas admonition witnessed an unprecedented period of rural 
civil disorder. Three separate violent episodes attracted the 
national media's limelight: (1) the so-called Cow War of 
September 1931 where farmers in extreme east central Iowa 
refused compulsory bovine tuberculosis testing, (2) highway 
picketing by farmers in August 1932 to prevent produce from 
reaching market, and (3) the attempted lynching in the spring 
of 1933 of a District Court judge near LeMars. Violent rural 
mobs perpetrated each of the three incidents. The Iowa 
Sheriff s editor believed none of them would have grown 
violent if the local sheriff had used tear gas to subdue the 
mobs involved. Saying the "... rebellious farmer feels 
that he is getting some-where with his protest when ... he 
finds the State sending in . . . Guardsmen to restore order[,] 
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which suggests fontiidability of a movement of revolt out of 
all proportion to its menace. 
Several technical articles in succeeding months described 
how to use tear gas. When Crawford County Sheriff Art Greene 
used tear gas to clear his courthouse of a mob of protesting 
farmers the Iowa Sheriff lauded him extravagantly saying he, 
could have . . . admitted defeat as officers in other 
states have done, . . . [or] mobilized a posse ... at 
the expense of broken heads . . . [or] used firearms. 
. . . Instead, [he] used . . . the most modern technique 
indicated . . . with dispatch . . . and without 
endangering the lives or health of those who duty forced 
[him] to operate against. 
Like the Thompson sub-machine gun, tear gas was popular with 
the rural sheriffs but it, too, was used only once during the 
decade. The importance of military paraphernalia lies in the 
psychological and emotional ties to the broader New Deal's 
FBI-led war against crime. Possessing, even if not using, 
army weapons became the sine qua non of rural law enforcement 
professionalization. 
The final proof of professionalism sought by Iowa's rural 
sheriffs was fingerprinting expertise. Using fingerprints as 
a tool of criminal identification was an old idea by the 
1920s. What was new was the sheriffs' urgent sense of needing 
to know to do it themselves. The discovery of fingerprints 
and of their unique value in criminal identification developed 
simultaneously and independently from two Europeans living in 
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Asia in the 1880s. William Herschel, a British bureaucrat 
working in Hooghly Province, India, and Henry Faulds, a 
Scottish physician teaching anatomy at Tokyo's Tsukiji 
Hospital, each reported in the 1880s the uniqueness of each 
person's finger tip's papillary lines. Another European, 
Francis Galton of London, invented a classification system and 
popularized its use for identification with his book 
Fingerprints in 1892. Police around the globe were using 
Galton's system by the turn of the century. 
In 1921 the Iowa Bankers' Association lobbied 
successfully in the General Assembly for a fingerprint bureau 
to be added to the state's Bureau of Criminal Investigation. 
Iowa thus became only the fourth state in the union to have 
such a unit. As with the promotion of a state police radio 
network, a rash of rural bank robberies precipitated the 
association's agitation.As early as 1924 Adair County's 
Sheriff Clark tried lifting fingerprints from fourteen 
beehives in an unsuccessful attempt to identify the thief of 
140 pounds of honey from a local farmer. Sheriff J. F. 
Voelkel called in one of the state fingerprint experts to aid 
him in a jewelry store burglary investigation in Marengo in 
1931. Despite the growing use of fingerprints in rural 
investigations, they were only very rarely instrumental in 
identifying rural perpetrators. 
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When successful, however, the system worked with absolute 
certainty. In another Marengo case, James O'Malley alias 
Burley, severely beat his dairy plant supervisor for refusing 
him permission to "spike" his near beer with moonshine during 
his lunch break one spring day in 1932. The sheriff arrested 
O'Malley for assault and battery and, as was his custom, sent 
a copy of his fingerprints to the FBI in Washington. The FBI 
notified the sheriff that his prisoner was an Illinois parole 
violator with an outstanding armed robbery warrant against him 
since October of 1925. Iowa BCI Chief and Iowa Sheriff editor 
Nebergall warmly endorsed another sheriff's use of 
fingerprints when Grundy County Sheriff M. G. Mamminga got his 
local merchants to ask for a thumb print from any stranger 
writing a check to pay for his purchases. At decade's end a 
large enough number of sheriffs were using fingerprints to 
justify a new column on the subject in the I.S.S.A's Iowa 
Sheriff.M 
Following the New Deal's FBI example in technology, many 
rural Iowa sheriffs also adopted two more pieces of equipment; 
cameras and electronic microphones. As early as 1936 the Iowa 
Sheriff urged its readers to buy simple cameras. New Jersey 
State Police Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf received ISSA 
endorsement for a motion picture camera he invented for 
filming criminals. More practical, however, was a new 
165 
light-weight battery-powered remote-controlled "Squad Camera" 
by Kodak that the Association championed in 1937. Iowa 
County's sheriff's office proudly announced its purchase in 
1939 of a "Model 21 Squad Camera" made by the Federal 
Laboratories of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The camera had a 
flash attachment and was capable of taking photographs of 
criminals as well as latent fingerprints at a crime scene. 
The Association also extolled a new type of electronic 
microphone in 1937. Newly available, it was the same type of 
microphone that movie studios used and it required no electric 
cords to snoop. When Allamakee County Sheriff John P. King 
used such a microphone to eavesdrop on the conversation of two 
liquor store robbers in his jail he overheard one of the men 
confess to the crime. Sheriff King used the confession to win 
a conviction in court and a full page Iowa Sheriff article 
praising him as a true member of the country's team making war 
on crime. 
By the time Cerro Gordo County Sheriff Tim Phalen became 
Iowa's first uniformed sheriff's office (wearing bright red 
uniforms patterned after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) 
Iowa's rural sheriffs had achieved professionalization. 
Lacking their urban comrades' political and economic 
infrastructure, the sheriffs could not use the national 
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progressive trend of forming "blue ribbon" commissions to 
solve their problems. They chose instead to rely on an older 
American tradition: the voluntary cooperative.^® 
Theirs was not an urban route to professionalization. It 
could not be. Still, by decade's end they had drawn together 
into an influential and complex organization boasting its own 
full-time attorney and a full-time business manager.^' More 
importantly, Iowa's rural sheriffs pursued exactly the same 
goals and for the same reasons as did urban officers. They 
adhered to the twin themes of professionalism and a war on 
crime. They accepted the leadership of the New Deal's Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. They clasped new technology such as 
the radio, the machine gun and tear gas with an ardor 
resembling concupiscence as they prepared themselves at their 
Annual Schools of Instruction to join the crime crusade. 
Achieving the outward signs of the urban-model of 
professionalization did not greatly affect the sheriffs' 
internal enforcement attitude. The most successful sheriffs 
were those who learned to cope with the new model of 
professionalization while retaining the traditional or what 
might be called the "folksy" skills that fit them for service 
in their local communities. And many of these skills often 
had changed little from those first used by sheriffs in Anglo-
Saxon times. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STATE INVOLVEMENT 
The power of the crime wave myth was such that rural 
police professionalization segued into the rise of state 
involvement with rural law enforcement. The advent of state 
police, in the guise of detectives and uniformed patrolmen, 
was an unfortunate development because it was unnecessary. 
There was no rural crime wave, but the belief in one led 
the sheriffs to the mistaken conclusion that they required 
outside help. The sheriffs were performing their tasks 
adequately and professionally but emphasis on an urban model 
of professionalization caused them to seek the scientific 
expertise of the state's detectives while they called for the 
formation of a highway patrol to handle the myriad problems 
facing them as the automobile age came to the hinterland. 
State involvement with rural law enforcement represented 
a great public relations coup. lowans traditionally rejected 
the idea of placing police power in the state's hands; what 
little power it did have was diffused among more than a half-
dozen departments. 
Some of the concern lowans felt about investing police 
power in the state's hands resulted from the frequent use of 
state police and militia in other states to quell labor 
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disturbances. lowans, no less than other Americans, were 
aware of infamous classes between strikers and police and 
milita units such as the violetn suppression of a miner's 
strike at Ludlow, Colorado, in 1913, and the use of 8,000 
militiamen at Andrew Carnegie's Homestead, Pennsylvania, steel 
mill in 1892. State troops and police units had been used, in 
fact, on more than 500 occasions across the nation between 
1875 and 1910. Although Iowa was an agricultural and not an 
industrial state, the freguuent use of state police and 
militia in such activities did nothing to encourage the public 
to give police power to state agents in Iowa.^ 
Louisiana provided a contemporary example of the 
inappropriate uses to which a highway patrol could be used for 
lowans skeptical about creating such a force in the state. 
Louisiana Governor Huey "Kingfish" Long surrounded himself 
with a large retinue of highway patrolmen. Among Long's 
favorite troopers was Joe Messina, a world War "shell shock" 
victim. When once asked what his duties for the governor were 
he replied, "Antying that he may ask me to do, that comes to 
hand that he wants done. " ^ What Huey Long seems to have most 
often asked Messina to do was to, as historian T. Harry 
Williams describes, "slug with joyful passion any man who 
seemeda bout to threaten Huey.^ Among the Louisiana Highway 
Patrol's other duties under Governor Long was delivering 
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copies of his weekly newspaper, the Louisiana Progress, and 
his innumerable political circulars from the trunks of their 
police cars. 
It is not surprising in light of such unsavory examples 
that many lowans felt a real antipathy toward giving the state 
increased police powers. Several factors helped encourage 
lowans to increase the state's policing role. The findings of 
an attorney general's investigation of police incompetence and 
graft scandalized the public; then came a spate of rural bank 
robberies and a dramatic increase in the number of deaths from 
automobile collisions on the state's highways. 
Those who favored a more active policing role for the 
state would have remained stymied but for the efforts of three 
state leaders. Attorney Generals George Cosson and Ben Gibson 
parlayed local police scandals, the World War's xenophobia, 
and rural bank robberies into a justification for the creation 
of a powerful new unit of state police detectives. Ola 
Babcock Miller, Iowa's New Deal Secretary of State, 
brilliantly exploited her matronly appearance to create for 
her uniformed troopers a public perception as "gentlemen of 
the road" rather than as hard-boiled policemen. 
At the turn of the century Iowa's law enforcement legacy 
had created a chaos of autonomy. Legislators had reactively 
created enforcement units whenever frontier exigencies 
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required, and the result was a hodgepodge of divided 
authority. For counties that meant dependency on a succession 
of popularly elected sheriffs, coroners and county attorneys. 
Townships also elected their constables, but the cities' 
marshals and police officers owed their jobs to appointments 
by mayors or city councilmen. The state enforcement power was 
likewise scattered among the offices of governor, attorney 
general and secretary of state, the departments of justice, 
fire marshal, health and agriculture, and the commissions of 
railroads and highways. Attorney General Howard W. Byers' 
1907 investigation of law enforcement practices revealed a 
laxity among the state's local peace officers that shocked 
many lowans into calling for greater enforcement efficiency 
and coordination. Particularly exasperating was the casual, 
even criminal, attitude toward the state's liquor laws. Graft 
was common, Byers' reported, with local officials often taking 
bootleggers' bribes.^ 
To facilitate malfeasance and impeachment proceedings, 
the General Assembly passed the Cosson Removal Act of 1909. 
In contrast to the previous statutes, it eased the burden of 
proof necessary to remove law enforcement officials. The 
Cosson Law's "teeth" resided in the provision that permitted 
the attorney general to enter any locality to investigate 
allegations of official wrongdoing. For the first time local 
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rural jurisdictions became answerable to state officers. 
Senator George Cosson of Audubon, the bill's author, knew his 
law's powers were illusory so long as the state had no 
investigators. Consequently, in 1911 Cosson joined the 
attorney general's office as an assistant. Once installed he 
agitated ceaselessly for the creation of a state detective 
force. So effectively did Cosson lobby that he made himself 
prominent in Iowa politics. First as an assistant, then as 
Attorney General from 1911 to 1916, Cosson generated public 
enthusiasm for his plan by using the governor's police agents 
to investigate sensational crimes even as he continued to 
lobby his former legislative colleagues to create a state 
detective service.^ 
George Cosson achieved his goal in 1915 when the Special 
Agents Act created a force of a dozen state detectives serving 
under his direction. His success probably stemmed as much 
from the First World War's rising anti-German xenophobia as 
from his assignment of agents to dramatic criminal 
investigations. State leaders were undoubtedly as interested 
in Cosson's police as agents provocateurs as much as for their 
investigative expertise. Having neither the time nor the 
facilities to train police, Cosson appointed his agents 
exclusively from the ranks of the state's sheriffs' offices 
and police departments. Under the act the governor retained 
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the power to appoint the agents and to fix their salaries even 
though they worked at the attorney general's direction. 
From the very beginning the agents produced an impressive 
number of criminal convictions. By 1916 they had handled 
cases that resulted in forty felony convictions, 100 gambling, 
and 400 bootlegging convictions. Significantly, the agents 
disregarded their ostensible assignment of suppressing un-
American activities in favor of repressing vice. They did so 
in large part because there simply were no significant 
un-American groups to suppress in Iowa at the time. Cosson 
disliked the law's limiting his control over his detectives by 
leaving the appointment power with the governor. He began 
campaigning with civil groups across the state to get the law 
amended in his favor. Cosson did not remain in office long 
enough to win this victory because Horace M. Havner of Iowa 
County defeated his 1916 reelection bid. Havner's four-year 
tenure produced no significant changes in the agents' 
operations; they continued to stress vice investigations over 
other types of criminal activity.® 
A spate of rural bank robberies in 1920 permanently 
altered the mission of Iowa's police agents. As a part of the 
same anti-bank-robbery drive that saw the origin of a state 
police radio network, Iowa bankers also advocated the type of 
state detectives George Cosson had envisioned. The Iowa 
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Bankers' Association (IBA) lobbied the legislature for a state 
unit of professional detectives to investigate bank robberies 
and burglaries. Because the attorney general already had some 
detectives in his office, the General Assembly authorized him 
to create a permanent Bureau of Criminal Investigation and to 
appoint a bureau chief answerable only to himself. The 
attorney general that year was Ben J. Gibson who had defeated 
Havner in the 1920 general election. He appointed Oscar 0. 
Rock of Logan, one of George Cosson's original men, to be the 
new BCI's first chief.? 
Ben Gibson assumed power with gusto. His army service 
under General "Black Jack" Pershing both during the 1916-1917 
Mexican border troubles and in France during the World War had 
given him a flamboyance that suited him well for what he 
thought of as being the chief state policeman's job. Lame 
duck Governor William L. Harding bitterly criticized Gibson's 
attitude and the legislature's decision to place the new 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation in the Attorney General's 
office instead of his own. In his biennial address he said, 
"The 'lawyer' for the state has been converted into a 
detective, and at great expense to the taxpayers [resulting 
in] chaos and failure."® 
The legislators ignored Governor Harding, reconfirming in 
their extra session of 1923 the attorney general's power of 
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appointment for his Bureau of Criminal Investigation. They 
did, however, leave the governor four state agents of his own 
as a political sop. Gibson inaugurated a dual policy for his 
BCI that continued throughout the interwar period. First, 
local officers received credit for successful BCI work 
including press releases. Second, BCI agents helped local 
sheriffs only when one of them presented a written request.* 
The BCI enjoyed a period of stable leadership between 
1926-1933 under Attorney General John Fletcher. He doubled 
the number of agents to twenty-four and directed each of his 
chiefs, James E. Risden, who had replaced Oscar Rock upon his 
death in 1924, and Glen Schmidt to continue Gibson's dual 
policy. The policy was a great public relations success. 
Crediting local sheriffs assured the BCI of reciprocal acclaim 
and continuing requests for help. Between 1926 and 1928, 
ninety-two of the state's ninety-nine sheriffs and eighty-four 
of the ninety-nine county attorneys sought BCI help. The 
agents conducted 2,249 investigations that produced 461 
arrests and 453 court convictions. They located forty-nine 
stills and 17,750 gallons of corn mash, destroyed 4,356 
gallons of illicit moonshine, and recovered 1,761 stolen 
automobiles. The BCI developed five operational areas which 
served rural officers. The areas were: field investigations, 
criminal identification, criminal records, state radio, and 
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teaching sheriffs at the Iowa State Sheriffs' Association's 
Annual Schools of Instruction.^® 
Field investigations, the most dramatic of these tasks, 
occurred least frequently and appeared least important to 
the sheriffs. Their greatest value to rural law enforcement 
lay in the Bureau's Records division which acted as the 
state's central clearing house for information on stolen 
automobiles, liquor violators, fugitives from justice, and 
discharged prison inmates. The state's sheriffs used the 
BCI's services and they appreciated them, but they were not 
enough. The sheriffs' demanded more from the state. While 
they lauded the BCI's state police radio, it spurred them to 
look to Des Moines for greater state involvement in local law 
enforcement. 
The sheriffs wanted muscle in the form of a state highway 
patrol, but it proved impossible to achieve that goal. When 
Attorney General Cosson tried to get authorization for a 
Public Safety Department in 1915, its sponsoring bill, House 
File 602, was withdrawn from the legislative calendar without 
debate. A few years later one rural editor, noting that the 
Illinois legislature was debating the establishment of a 
highway patrol on its side of the Mississippi River said, "the 
next Iowa legislature will be compelled to create ... a 
mounted police system and . . . there will be no 
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opposition."12 He was wrong. No such proposal surfaced at 
the General Assembly and none would have succeeded if it had 
appeared. 
Among the great many lowans who opposed creating a 
highway patrol was the state's chief rural spokesman, Henry 
Agard Wallace, publisher of the Wallaces' Farmer, one of the 
Midwest's largest rural newspapers. Like many rural 
Americans, Wallace considered a state patrol's suitability in 
the 1920s. He editorially rejected the idea stoutly in 19 23 
as being too costly and, like patrols in many states, likely 
to grapple with industrial troubles rather than perform for 
rural policing. The sheriffs could not hope to overcome the 
resistance of men as influential as Wallace. Although the 
advocates of a patrol could not then see it, in a few years' 
time a technologically fostered social revolution would, when 
wedded to a successful public relations triumph, sweep aside 
all opposition." 
Along with the rest of the nation, Iowa endured an 
automobile mania in the 1920s and 1930s. The Lynds found 
during their famous "Middletown" investigation that 60 of 123 
working-class families in this most typical of American towns 
owned automobiles. Of these 60 with cars, 21 were without 
bathtubs, demonstrating that automobiles came before tubs for 
the average American of the 1920s. By 1930 there were more 
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than 26 million cars in America, the manufacture of which 
commanded 90 percent of the nation's petroleum, 80 percent of 
its rubber, and 75 percent of its glass. The effect on both 
urban and rural America was immediate and dramatic. The most 
serious problem at the 1918 Iowa State Fair was parking. 
"Approximately forty-five thousand machines passed through the 
gates this year," said one state fair official, "every foot of 
available parking space was occupied early each day. The 
overflow filled the woods and the camp grounds." This was not 
surprising considering a 1920 report of Iowa farmers that 
showed there were 171,575 automobiles on the state's farms. 
To accommodate the rural tidal wave of automobiles, 
lowans engaged in a massive road-building frenzy. They 
completed an astonishing 102,658 road miles before the 
interwar years ended, of which 8,318 were so-called primary or 
paved highways. Every town with a population greater than 400 
was connected to at least one of these primary highways before 
decade's end. Between 1910 and 1930 the number of lowans 
licensed to operate automobiles increased from 18,870 to a 
staggering 790,231. There was one automobile in Iowa for 
every three lowans, man, woman and child, and by 1930 the 
state had the nation's third highest per capita automobile 
rate. Trucks too, experienced a phenomenal growth, rising to 
81,937 in number by the mid-1930s. This plethora of motor 
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vehicles over-whelmed rural sheriffs. There were too many new 
laws regulating motor vehicles and too many drivers—including 
bad drivers—for them to manage. 
So many thousands of drivers on so many thousands of 
roads inevitably led to an increasing death toll. Between 
1921 and 1925, 241 lowans died in automobile collisions. In 
1926 that number increased to 312; in 1930 there were 645 Iowa 
deaths from automobiles. To reduce the carnage the General 
Assembly turned to the Secretary of State's Department of 
Motor Vehicles' tax-collecting "inspectors." On April 3, 
1925, these inspectors were given police power over certain 
specific traffic laws. The inspectors, ever mindful of the 
sheriffs' sensibilities, unerringly sent advance warning of 
their intended arrival in a county. When inspector John 
Taylor of Marion came to Iowa County two months after the new 
law took effect, the local paper announced his coining, his 
mission, and his authority. Iowa had very few John Taylors, 
only fourteen in all, and they were too few to have much 
influence. A fresh attempt in 1927 to establish a state 
highway patrol failed to get so much as serious attention in 
the legislature, however.^® 
When Iowa's highway death toll reached its interwar peak 
of 645 in 1930, the state's largest newspaper decried the lack 
of effective highway control. The editor of the Des Moines 
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Register said the sheriffs were "utterly incapable" of 
managing and that "the logical unit seems to be the state." 
The Iowa State Sheriffs' Association (ISSA) agreed with the 
Register, printing a two-page guest article entitled, "Thirty-
One States Have Highway Police" by J. S. Baker of the National 
Safety Council praising the work of state highway patrolmen in 
other states. 
Baker's article marks the beginning of the ISSA's drive 
for a state highway patrol in Iowa. A serious attempt to 
create a highway patrol emerged during the 1931 legislative 
session. On January 28 identical bills appeared before both 
houses. The twin bills proposed authorizing thirty-five 
patrolmen to rove the state's primary highways under the 
Highway Commission's supervision. The Senate passed the 
measure? the House, with a twenty-nine to seventeen vote, 
worried about the political implications of farmer opposition, 
left the bill in committee and let it expire.^ 
Growing frustrated, the ISSA continued pressuring the 
state for a highway patrol in its magazine, the Iowa Sheriff. 
The magazine began by advancing economic arguments in favor of 
a patrol saying the depression had made it easy to pay the 
proposed officers very little money and that the 
reorganization that would surely follow the patrol would save 
the state money. The sheriffs noted the approach of another 
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legislative session in 1933, crediting "agitation by the Iowa 
Motor Clubs as to the establishment of a highway patrol . . ." 
with getting another authorization bill before the state's 
lawmakers. Already twice disappointed, the ISSA went on to 
blame political featherbedding for the previous bills' 
defeats. 
Without any doubt, there will be wide discussion of the 
bill when it is placed before the legislature. [We 
expect] that strong opposition will come from those who 
will lose their power of appointment and those who see 
their pleasant inspectorships on the way out.^° 
The sheriffs were only partly correct in blaming politics 
for their repeated failure. It was not featherbedding or the 
fear of losing patronage jobs that primarily worried the 
politicians. Their quandary came from not knowing in whose 
hands to put the unprecedented power a highway patrol 
represented. Three possible governmental berths had their 
champions: the governor, the Highway Commission, and an 
independent agency. Since any of the three threatened to open 
a political Pandora's box, the legislators quibbled and 
frittered, hoping that the question would just go away of its 
own accord. But House File 286 introduced yet another highway 
patrol origination bill in 1933. This time the proposal 
called for placing the patrol in the governor's hands. The 
state's farm and labor leaders opposed the bill. Men such as 
Bert Nevill, leader of Ringgold County's Farmers' Holiday 
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Association and the president of the county's Taxpayers' 
League, drafted antagonistic resolutions for both groups and 
rushed them to the statehouse. Two factors also doubtless 
sapped the legislators' highway patrol enthusiasm. Farmers' 
had recently picketed to prevent produce from reaching market 
and a rural District Court judge had been manhandled and 
nearly lynched near LeMars. No one could forecast how highway 
patrolmen might react to such events, but the evidence of 
other states did not seem promising. Lawmakers again let the 
bills die in committee.^ 
Seeing that the legislature was deaf to their economic 
reasoning, the sheriffs tried to capitalize on the farmers' 
protests. Citing the disorders in Plymouth and Crawford 
counties, the ISSA called again for a highway patrol. Sending 
such a unit to trouble spots, the sheriffs said, would be 
quicker and cheaper than mobilizing the state militia. A 
highway patrol would also be more effective in quelling such 
disturbances, they said, adding that "a trained-disciplined 
force which does not have to answer to any politician or group 
will command the respect of lowans."^^ This was precisely the 
wrong approach for the sheriffs to use. The image of 
uniformed state officers facing angry mobs of Iowa farmers and 
laborers horrified and haunted the state's lawmakers. 
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They needed a gentler argument, one like the ISSA tried 
after a hit-and-run driver struck and killed two rural Calhoun 
County children as they walked home from school in June 1933. 
The sheriffs insisted that the children died because, "we 
. , . have turned [the] speedways over without regulation or 
supervision, to anyone, whether he be moron, imbecile, fiend 
or whatnot."" They repeated their safety theme when a school 
bus full of children tragically collided with a railroad train 
near Shenandoah that fall. If the state had a highway patrol, 
the accident would not have happened because, "all drivers 
would be made to learn to never cross a railroad track without 
slowing down and looking both ways before going onto the 
tracks. Highway safety was the right tactic. 
Although the sheriffs did not fully appreciate it, one 
state leader did share their concerns and would parlay the 
issue into a successful legislative bid for the creation of a 
highway patrol. Ola Babcock Miller, known always as Mrs. Alex 
Miller, was that leader. The widow of a crusading rural 
newspaper editor from Washington, Iowa, Mrs. Miller achieved 
the goal of getting a highway patrol for Iowa. On the surface 
she appeared to lack every ingredient for success. Except for 
campaigning for her husband during his unsuccessful 1926 run 
for the governor's office, she had no prior political 
experience. Her name appeared on the Democratic ballot 
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secretary of state's office in 1932 only after party leaders 
forgot to name anyone else to the spot. She came to power on 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's coattails, narrowly defeating 
Republican incumbent G. C. Greenwalt. She arrived at the 
statehouse in Des Moines elated by her victory but with 
scarcely any idea of what she planned to do. 
That quickly changed when she discovered that she 
controlled the state's Motor Vehicle Department. The large 
number of Iowa's highway fatalities troubled Mrs. Miller. 
Finding the department's fifteen motor vehicle "inspectors" at 
her disposal provoked her concern and gave her a project, a 
cause that she had previously lacked. During her first week 
in office she called together her fifteen underlings and told 
them that they were no longer the state's automobile tax 
collectors. She informed them of her planned highway safety 
campaign and that they were going to provide its brawn. She 
ordered them to forget their former tax collection role; from 
now on they would be her highway cops. Secretary Miller 
dismissed the men saying, "from now on, save lives first, 
money afterward. 
While her inspectors worked the highways, Mrs. Miller 
worked the crowds. She appeared before dozens of civic, 
fraternal, patriotic, and church groups throughout 1933, 
calling the highways a "slaughterhouse" where even "the most 
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competent and courteous driver takes his life in his hands 
when he ventures upon it." She simultaneously published a 
series of highway safety booklets including, "The Four 
Horsemen of the Highway" (road hogs, speeders, drunken 
drivers, and operators of unsafe automobiles).^ 
Mrs. Miller knew her campaign was risky. Using her 
inspectors to enforce highway safety laws in the face of the 
legislature's deep ambivalence about having a highway safety 
patrol could very well have serious political repercussions 
for herself and her Democratic Party. Aware that general 
acceptance of her safety efforts would wither in the face of 
stern police practices, she set about presenting herself and 
her inspectors in as domestic a role as possible. She cast 
herself as the "mother" of the highway in every public format. 
Not once did she refer to the farmers' rebellions or to any 
other distressing public event. Her sole concern was saving 
lives, she said, and her inspectors, whom she constantly 
called her "boys," were trying to help her make Iowa's roads 
safer places to use. Mrs. Miller's "motherhood" ploy worked. 
No public aversion against her plan developed. Instead she 
began receiving the plaudits of the state's press and national 
women's magazines. 
Secretary Miller got a boost in 1934 when she reported 
that her efforts had resulted in 69 fewer highway deaths and 
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3/731 fewer injuries than during 1933. She made sure that 
lowans knew their state had recorded a 15 percent decrease in 
the number of highway collisions that year even while the 
country as a whole recorded a seventeen percent increase. She 
carefully avoided mentioning that thirty-one states had 
highway safety patrols, claiming instead that the credit for 
the decrease was entirely due to her and to her "boys. 
Iowa's sheriffs, meanwhile, continued pressing for a 
highway patrol. Number eight of their twelve point "Aims and 
Policies" published in May 1934 was "to encourage the state 
patrol of our paved state highways," despite the fact that 
Iowa had no such unit.^° The state's tardiness in 
establishing a patrol forced sheriffs to start the unsavory 
practice of passing out postage-paid complaint cards for 
citizens to use to report on one another's bad driving habits. 
How much better it would be to have a highway patrol like the 
one in Pennsylvania. There, as a former Webster City man 
writing to the Iowa Sheriff that spring reported, "every law 
abiding citizen, who is a taxpayer and a square shooter, feels 
kind[ly] toward the . . . state police."^ 
An academic symposia in favor of highway patrols hosted 
by University of Iowa political scientists and the Iowa Bar 
Association called for a highway patrol, and each obtained 
prominent attention in the July, 1934, issue of the sheriffs' 
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magazine. So did a quote from the Traer, Iowa, Star-Clipper 
that stated that, "the adoption of a state highway patrol is 
merely meeting modern crime conditions with modern weapons."^® 
The ISSA joyously praised State Senator Paul Schmidt's 
announcement that he intended to resubmit his highway patrol 
bill, adding that Iowa's "unpreparedness policy" regarding 
crime must stop. The ISSA also praised state highway engineer 
Fred R. White that summer for his forthright support of a 
highway patrol and for his belief that it was "political 
infighting" that had so long stymied their efforts to get a 
patrol for Iowa. They happily noted the Shenandoah Sentinel's 
call for "two hundred good officers" to patrol Iowa's 
highways. They also announced their plan to invite an east 
coast state police chief to their next Annual School "to give 
us a working picture of such an organization."^^ 
Despite all their efforts the sheriffs never succeeded in 
forcing the legislation they wanted for a highway patrol. 
They did, however, significantly contribute to Secretary 
Miller's efforts by helping to keep the issue before the 
public. They failed because they split their arguments 
between the safety tactic, which lowans supported, and an 
enforcement tactic, which they did not. Mrs. Miller did not 
divide her focus. While the sheriffs continued to push, the 
Secretary of State pressed her highway safety campaign. So 
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quietly did she join those calling for a highway patrol that 
no one at first seemed to notice. 
In late 1934 Mrs. Miller began observing that her "boys" 
needed some help. They were doing great things, she said, but 
so much more waited to be done because no highway patrol 
existed in Iowa. When a highway patrol proposal again 
surfaced during the 1935 legislative session, she showed her 
political acumen by serenely chaperoning it through both 
houses of the legislature. When an amendment to the bill 
threatened her by suggesting that her "boys" join the patrol 
under the Attorney General's BCI, she silently killed it by 
telling the Des Moines Register that, "the safety patrol and 
the [BCI] should not be combined. If we cannot have both 
. . . should we not establish the one for which the greater 
need exists? 
Her maneuvering was a masterpiece of political 
engineering. At no time did she mention the threat to herself 
that the amendment represented. She commented only on her 
"motherly" concern that blending the two forces was an 
unnecessary duplication that could only dilute her "boys'" 
success. Between February and April, 1935, the legislature 
deliberated what type of highway patrol it wanted. When the 
old dilemma arose about which government department should 
supervise the patrol, Mrs. Miller was already there running a 
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safety patrol and looking more like the middle-aged mother she 
was than a hard-bitten police overseer. The impasse dissolved 
as the law-makers hastened to offer the new highway patrolmen 
to Mrs. Miller. Designated House File 67, the bill placed the 
patrol under Mrs. Miller's Motor Vehicle Department, 
authorized the raising of a company of fifty-three uniformed 
troopers with full police power, and ordered a training school 
for them at the Camp Dodge National Guard grounds near the Des 
Moines suburb of Johnston. On May 7, 1935, Governor Clyde L. 
Herring signed the Highway Safety Patrol Act of 1935 into 
law.33 
Secretary of State Miller had her highway patrol, but she 
knew that great animosity still persisted in the state, 
especially in the rural districts. The success and 
effectiveness of her "boys'" jobs depended, she realized, on 
developing a broad-based, grassroots approval of them and of 
her. The way to mollify suspicion and to foster public 
goodwill was to continue emphasizing the patrol's highway 
safety mission while downplaying its police status. She 
designed the patrol's policy to be one of courteous educations 
traffic summonses were issued as official correctives to 
errant citizens, not as criminal complaints to law violators. 
Mrs. Miller created a policy marvel which involved strict 
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enforcement that nevertheless did not look or feel like law 
enforcement. 
Window dressing became the watchword, and the patrol made 
every effort to avoid a martial appearance. Department of 
Motor Vehicle Commissioner Lew E. Wallace conformed to Mrs. 
Miller's wishes from the start, saying in his first public 
statement that his new highway patrol would be free of 
political influence peddling. "We are going to select the 
best . . . men we can find," he promised, "and then see how 
the political qualifications work themselves out. 
In choosing a Highway Patrol Chief, Mrs. Miller once 
again displayed her political deftness by selecting a man to 
whom virtually no one could object. Knowing that her 
opponents feared she would appoint a political hack over a 
veteran lawman, instead she chose John Hattery, the Republican 
party sheriff of Story County. It was a shrewd choice. 
Hattery's solid Republican credentials silenced the 
accusations about the patrol becoming a patronage playground, 
and his long years' service as sheriff stilled fears of a 
novice being put in charge of the troopers. The ISSA, already 
pleased to see that the state had at last established a 
highway patrol, announced a day of jubilation when it learned 
that one of the organization's most popular members was the 
new chief. Hattery's announcement of his choices for 
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assistant chiefs made their ecstasy complete. One was E. A. 
Conley, one of Mrs. Miller's original "boys" and a national 
guard major. The other was Harry Nestle, the son of a Carroll 
County Sheriff who had heroically killed his bandit-murderer 
before dying of a gunshot wound several years before.^ 
Chief Hattery and Mrs. Miller had more than 3,000 
applicants from which to choose to fill their 53 slots. With 
good public relations as a primary determinant, aspirants with 
college educations or college athletic reputation like Russ 
Fisher, the 1934 University of Iowa's star football team 
captain, and Oran "Nanny" Pape, a celebrity fullback in the 
University of Iowa's 1928-1929 season, had an advantage over 
their rivals. In selecting the first group of highway 
patrolmen, everyone, including Mrs. Miller, scrupulously 
avoided asking anyone about political party affiliations. By 
the time the chief and the secretary had finished making their 
candidate selections, the Camp Dodge facility was ready. 
Lacking any experience in running a highway safety patrol 
school, state authorities hired outside help in the person of 
Maryland State Police Sergeant David R. Petersen and several 
of his fellow Maryland troopers. National Guardsmen served 
the trainee troopers as guards, drivers and cooks. Ever 
mindful of Mrs. Miller's preoccupation with public relations. 
Chief Hattery invited R. W. Nebergall, editor of the Iowa 
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Sheriff and BCI agent, to visit the patrol's school. This 
gambit paid off handsomely in positive publicity for the 
patrol. Nebergall reported to his readers that the school was 
superb. He called the trainees "splendid" men and lavished 
accolades on Sgt. Petersen and his fellow instructors from 
Maryland.When the trainees graduated and began their 
assignments in July 1935, the Iowa Sheriff applauded the new 
troopers and promised that they would find they already had 
the "ideal spirit of reciprocity" between themselves and the 
state's 99 sheriffs. 
Only briefly did the specter of encroachment appear. In 
late 1935 the ISSA learned of discord arising between the 
Illinois State Sheriffs' Association and the proponents of an 
Illinois state highway patrol. So thoroughly had Mrs. 
Miller's public relations policy appeased the Iowa sheriffs, 
however, that the ISSA refused to feel threatened by their 
state's highway patrolmen. The Iowa Sheriff assured its 
readers that "we are for state police in its proper place 
[because] state police can never, by its very nature, ever 
take the place of . . . sheriffs."^® The ISSA felt confident 
that the intimacy sheriffs enjoyed with their constituencies 
was so superior to anything a trooper could have that no 
strife was possible between the two law enforcement units. 
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Public relations remained a high priority of the highway 
patrol. By the end of their second year of operation the 
patrol's fifty troopers had delivered 439 talks in ninety-one 
counties to audiences averaging 100 persons on topics such as 
highway safety, first aid, and the mission of the highway 
patrol." Relations with the state's sheriffs remained 
amicable throughout the 1930s. The ISSA did all that it could 
to keep relations that way including the publication of 
articles like the one written by Nebergall in 1936 relating 
his experience of being stopped by a trooper late one summer's 
Sunday night. 
We found Patrolman [blank] to be first of all a 
gentleman, courteous and fair, with a desire and a will 
to be helpful. He explained the minor infraction of 
driving rules we had made and pointed out similar 
infractions which we were not aware were violations -
that's where the profitable part came in. Not as a 
hardboiled policemen do they function - except, of 
course, in the case of hardboiled offenders for whom that 
is the only successful treatment - but rather as 
friendly, well informed, helpful public assistants who 
are earnestly striving through education to make driving 
on Iowa highways safer for all of us.*° 
All Mrs. Miller lacked after a virtual love letter such 
as this was a martyr, someone to cement her public relations 
exploit in the public's mind. On September 28, 1936, she got 
one when Oran "Nanny" Pape, college gridiron hero, and new 
State Trooper, stopped a 1935 Chevrolet north of Muscatine 
that he thought might be stolen. Inside the Chevrolet a 23-
year-old Davenport parolee named Roscoe Barton grabbed a .45 
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calibre army automatic and pointed it at Pape ordering him 
into the Chevrolet. As Barton, who was driving, started to 
change gears at the bottom of a hill. Pape grappled with him 
over the gun. Barton shot Pape, the slug entering his right 
groin, travelling through his lower abdomen and lodging in his 
left hip. Barton tossed Pape from the car where he hailed a 
passing car which took him to a nearby gas station. At the 
station another, faster car, transported the patrolman to 
Muscatine's Hershey Hospital where he died soon after surgery. 
Mrs. Miller buried Pape with all the panoply befitting a 
fallen champion. She herself led the procession and ordered 
that black mourning arm bands be worn by all of her "boys." 
She had Nanny's badge, number 40, retired from service as a 
memorial to him.^^ 
That same summer the ISSA donated a page of its monthly 
magazine to the troopers, calling the section the "Iowa 
Highway Safety Patrol." Written by Assistant Chief J. H. 
Nestle, it was a pure public relations sheet given over 
entirely to Nestle's gushingly repeated promises to refrain 
from all but traffic duty unless specifically invited by a 
local sheriff to help in a criminal case. Nestle also used 
the "Iowa Highway Safety Patrol" as a format to charm the 
sheriffs with the patrol's humility, lack of political taint. 
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and genuine desire to be of service to rural people and to 
rural sheriffs. 
By the time Mrs. Alex Miller died of pneumonia on January 
27, 1937, the sheriffs of Iowa had the highway patrol that 
they had wanted in the early 1920s. Mrs. Miller's "boys" were 
few in number, eternally courteous to the public and carefully 
obsequious toward the sheriffs as they enforced the traffic 
laws that the sheriffs had never wanted to enforce in the 
first place. As with the BCI, the highway patrol developed 
through the political savvy of a state cabinet member who paid 
meticulous attention to the sensibilities of the rural 
sheriffs as they provided services to them that they could not 
or did not want to provide for themselves. 
The sheriffs did not need the help. It was the 
perception that a crime wave was upon them that led them to 
the conclusion that they did. The state help that was 
available, the highway patrolmen and state detectives, were 
too few in number to allow the sheriffs to feel adequately 
prepared to deal with the crime wave crisis they believed they 
faced. To augment their ranks the sheriffs agreed to deputize 
vigilantes from among the citizens presented to them by the 
state bankers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VIGILANTISM 
Those who believed in the crime wave myth believed that 
the problem was manpower. Neither the county sheriffs nor the 
state authorities could afford to field a large enough 
constabulary to resist the crime wave. Vigilantism became the 
solution to the manpower shortage once the state's bankers 
offered to bear its maintenance expense and the sheriffs 
offered to deputize its membership. 
A series of daylight rural bank robberies, though hitting 
only one-half of one percent of Iowa's banking towns, seemed 
to validate the myth of a general hinterland crime wave in the 
1920s and 1930s. Two state institutions, the Iowa Bankers' 
Association (IDA) and the Wallaces' Farmer newspaper, believed 
the myth. They acted on their belief by inaugurating 
vigilante organizations of their own devising to halt crime in 
the countryside. 
Having the infrastructure and the political and financial 
clout that their Association provided, the state's bankers 
created the first and the more carefully administered of the 
two vigilante groups. Whereas the IBA was concerned solely 
with bank robberies and enlisted the aid of the state, 
Wallaces' Farmer was concerned with all aspects of rural 
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crime, especially chicken theft, and chose to avoid the state 
government altogether. It relied instead on voluntary 
citizen-cooperatives under the paper's tutelage to combat the 
perceived rural crime wave. 
The ISA's vigilantes, sanctioned by the state, equipped 
by bankers, and deputized by their local sheriffs, believed 
the enemies they faced in the 19 30s were syndicated criminal 
gangs. It was an appealing corollary to the myth of rural 
crime of the period, but it, too, was without substance. By 
the time Bonnie and Clyde, perhaps the era's most infamous 
criminal team, died in 1934, Iowa's vigilante organizations 
were on the wane. The IBA especially believed it had won the 
victory over bank robbers, ironically citing 1937's bank 
robbery incidence rate of half of one percent as proof that 
vigilantism was no longer needed in Iowa. 
The myth of a general hinterland crime wave seemed to 
receive validation when the number of bank robberies suddenly 
increased following the First World War and again during the 
Great Depression. Believing themselves to be facing a homeric 
struggle, the two state institutions resurrected the frontier 
Iowa practice of raising local vigilantes.^ 
The appearance of rural bank robbers unnerved lame duck 
Iowa Bankers' Association (IBA) president J. H. McCorn. 
Between June 1920 and June 1921 IBA member banks suffered five 
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holdups and twenty-five burglaries. McCorn and president­
elect L. A. Anderson sensed their members' growing panic as 
reports of an additional eight unsuccessful holdup attempts 
and twenty-three unsuccessful burglary attempts spread. Rural 
Iowa banks, the IBA maintained, were under criminal attack and 
something had to be done to stop it.^ 
The bankers overreacted. One thousand Iowa towns hosted 
banks, and a holdup success rate of half of one percent did 
not betoken a crisis. The bankers nevertheless believed they 
were in crisis. The combined pressures of the failed 
attempts, which brought the incidence rate total to 6 percent, 
the previous decade's lack of robberies and the year's 
accumulated losses of $228,973.84 prodded the ISA's leaders to 
take unprecedented actionTo meet the robbers' threat and 
to curtail their losses, the IBA instigated a three-part 
effort; they coerced state authorities to assign a detective 
to full time bank robbery investigations, they instituted a 
police radio system, and they raised the largest vigilante 
force in the state's history. 
Organizing and administering their vigilantes was 
relatively easy. The IBA's own network of interlacing county 
affiliates provided a ready-made foundation. The potential 
of legal hurdles disappeared when local sheriffs, doubtless 
seeing the political benefits of such a force, happily 
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deputized the bankers' men. Joining a local vigilante group 
became the vogue as the units began to thrive under the 
harmonizing influence of the sheriff's aegis, the local 
banker's prestige and the bank building's meeting and storage 
space. Allamakee County Sheriff Gunda Martindale formed the 
first vigilante company because, she said, "the crime wave has 
been spreading over rural communities. " She accepted the 
IDA'S offer of free army surplus weapons for the men she 
deputized. Within eighteen months all ninety-nine Iowa 
counties followed her example, allowing the IDA to boast of 
3,791 "hand picked, brave, stalwart, law-abiding citizens" 
operating in 768 of Iowa's 1,000 bank towns, "constituting a 
'state constabulary' practically the equivalent of the Iowa 
National Guard," at a cost of $48,383.23 for arms and badges.^ 
Krag rifles and carbines and Colt pistols and revolvers 
came from the Rock Island Arsenal under special U.S. War 
Department purchase permits. Later the American Legion and 
the National Rifle Association added sawed-off shotguns to the 
vigilantes' arsenals. Colonel Stodter, the War Department's 
Director of Civilian Marksmanship, and the National Rifle 
Association's Brigadier General, Fred H. Phillips, mutually 
hosted state-wide shooting competitions and safety instruction 
classes for the ISA's men.® 
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The vigilante groups operated casually. They may have 
been "brave stalwart and law-abiding," but they were not 
zealots. Very quickly the groups assumed the air of social 
clubs. The men enjoyed the camaraderie and their sheriffs' 
and bankers' flattering attention. They also thrilled at the 
prospect of acquiring free guns and of participating in 
shooting contests. Indeed, a primary motive was having fun 
with guns. Of the 883 vigilantes for whom records exist, 70 
percent took the ISA's free guns. Drawn almost exclusively 
from the farm population, the vigilantes doubtless had 
firearms before joining up. What excited them was the 
prospect of getting new types of guns. Particular favorites 
were sawed-off shotguns (29%), rifles (24%) and handguns 
(17%). Members from smaller towns and more rural communities 
(those containing fewer than 100 inhabitants) favored shotguns 
while those from larger towns fancied handguns. The men knew 
the likelihood that they would ever face a robber band was 
remote, but the IBA's standing reward of $1,000 for the 
capture of one helped keep the members interested in serving 
should an emergency arise.^ 
The IBA's brand of vigilantism, known as the "Iowa 
Vigilance Committee Plan," soon attracted interest beyond the 
state's borders. National insurance companies began offering 
ISA banks with vigilante protection a 10 percent rate 
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reduction on their theft insurance policies. Other state 
banking associations began copying the IBA even to the point 
of buying the lowans' forms. In 1923 the National Bankers' 
Association urged all its affiliates to adopt the "Iowa Plan." 
Interest became international when the bankers of Paris, 
France, wrote to the IBA to inquire about the feasibility of 
adopting the Iowa plan for their use.® The state's sheriffs' 
magazine added a vigilantes' column before the decade's end 
noting that, "very few sheriffs are adequately equipped in 
firearms, fast automobiles or personnel to cope with [bank 
robbers]." ® 
The vigilantes relished their success. After eighteen 
months of activity the IBA reported that their vigilantes had 
captured seventy-nine bank robbers and shot dead six more. Of 
the seventy-nine men captured, fifty-three, or 67 percent, 
received prison terms of a definite number of years. When 
only one bank robbery occurred in 1924 the IBA attributed that 
fact to their vigilantes.^® 
The rest of the 1920s remained quiet as well. In each of 
the years from 1924 to 1927 only one bank robbery occurred. 
The IBA continued its massive support of its vigilantes, 
convinced that they were holding back a crime wave. They 
continued handing out guns and badges freely until the IBA's 
cost for the decade totalled $81,774.11. At least eighty Iowa 
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counties hosted nearly 3,000 local vigilantes, and 6,9 80 
telephone operators belonged to their notification network. 
Proud of their 1920s record of 137 apprehended robbers, 
nine of whom died from wounds during holdups, the vigilantes 
rested on their laurels. The decade's forty bank robberies 
yielded 118 convicts, 37 of whom received life imprisonment. 
Having accomplished so much, the vigilantes slipped into 
ennui. More than half of the groups quietly disbanded until, 
by 1930, only thirty-one counties with 1,338 vigilantes 
remained. Economic depression also contributed to their 
decline. By 1932 the number of towns with banks to protect 
had dropped from 1,000 to 706; all the other banks had failed 
or closed. 
Iowa's bankers were not the only state institution to 
form vigilance committees in reaction to the perceived rural 
crime wave. It was not bank robbery per se that worried Henry 
Agard Wallace. He believed the hinterland was under a general 
criminal attack. He ran pictures in his paper of "Chicken" 
Wilson and "Whitey" Lime, two farm thieves. Next to them on 
the page was a photograph of their captor, Woodbury County 
Sheriff Paul T. Beardsley. Beardsley thus received the 
acclaim of the Wallaces' Farmer for clever detective work in 
his "clean-up" of farm thieves in his county. The normally 
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conservative farm paper was beginning to read like a detective 
novel. Subscribers were regaled with stories about crime. 
These were not distant urban crimes, however, but chicken 
theft, fraud, and burglaries in their own communities. 
Wallaces' Farmer was conducting a crusade. 
The crusade arose from a combination of pragmatic 
business considerations and rural circumstances new to the 
1920s. As businessmen, the editors of Wallaces' Farmer knew 
expanded circulation meant higher profits. If they could 
identify and provide a unique service to their subscribers, 
the farm journal's circulation and profits would increase. 
The rural prosperity and good roads that developed between 
1910 and 1920 generated an identifiable service the paper 
could provide. Prosperity meant that the farmers had money, 
but many of them were financially naive. The good roads that 
provided easy access to market likewise provided an 
unprecedented host of bunko artists with easy access to the 
farmer's door and mail box. 
Wallace's crusade both reflected and capitalized on the 
state's and the nation's growing perception that the country 
was in the throes of a "crime wave" and focused his reader's 
attention on rural incidents. By so doing Wallace combined 
those elements of calculated self-interest and genuine 
altruism typical of the American crusade. Whereas others 
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followed the national progressive trend of forming "blue 
ribbon" crime commissions to study the problem, Wallace chose 
instead to rely on an older American tradition of forming 
voluntary citizen-cooperatives to solve problems. He twice 
considered and twice dismissed a proposal that smacked of 
progressivism; establishing a state police. When he did 
agitate for state involvement it was for legislation, not 
patrolmen. 
Wallace's crusade unfolded incrementally. Between 1921 
and 1927 it passed through successive stages of awareness 
(1921), reporting and encouragement (1923-1925), solution-
discovery (1925-1926), and, finally, direct participation 
(1926-1927). His awareness of the rural crime predicament 
began shortly after Henry Agard Wallace assumed the journal's 
editorship on March 4, 1921. He did not have to look far to 
find an example of what unique service his paper could 
provide. 
For three years the Prairie Farmer, an Illinois farm 
journal, taking its cue from the Rural New Yorker and the 
Chicago-based Orange Judd Farmer had been warning subscribers 
of stock frauds and giving financial advice. The Orange Judd 
Farmer had run a column entitled "Our Service Bureau" since 
1913. Henry Cantwell Wallace, Henry Agard's father, probably 
aware of the Orange Judd Farmer column, had earlier considered 
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but then rejected inaugurating a similar column in Wallaces' 
Parmer in 1912.^^ 
H. A. Wallace revived the idea. On June 3, 1921, he 
announced the formation of a new department in his farm 
journal. Named the Service Bureau, this department acted as a 
consumer advocate and as an intermediary between companies 
that advertised in Wallaces' Farmer and its subscribers. The 
service was not free. 
For a minimum three-year subscription each member of the 
service bureau received a membership certificate and a sign. 
"This sign," claimed Wallace, "will protect you from fake 
agents." The sign was also free advertising for the farm 
journal. Henry Wallace's awareness of the growing crime 
problem sharpened at this time. The state's largest daily 
newspaper, the Pes Moines Register, had been routinely 
publishing front-page crime stories since the spring of 1919. 
Several states and two presidents established crime 
commissions during these years. What evidence was available 
seemed to indicate that an increase in crime was occurring in 
the 1920s. The state's total rate of convictions increased 
from 3.81 per 1,000 population to 5.57 between 1920 and 1925. 
More important, the conviction rate per 1,000 population in 
Iowa's twenty-one most rural counties nearly doubled from 2.29 
to 4.50 during the same period. Moreover, the dramatic events 
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surrounding the 1920s rural bank robberies could not have 
escaped Wallace's attention. 
In 1923 Wallace believed that a serious rural crime 
problem existed and he began reporting rural developments and 
encouraging rural lowans to take action. Rural lawmen were 
easy targets of Wallace's indignation. He maintained that 
these officers were "admittedly failing to cope with the 
situation." So bad had conditions become that Wallace went 
on to suggest that the answer might be to form local 
committees of shotgun-equipped farmer-vigilantes to protect 
their farms. While exploring alternatives Wallace tentatively 
proposed establishing a state police. In so doing, however, 
the editor was trying to prod into action the state's existing 
law enforcement officials rather than seriously proposing the 
formation of a state-wide program. He noted in an editorial 
the "increasing amount of thievery" in rural districts and a 
"renewed interest in the subject of a state police." 
Wallace's ambivalence regarding state police was plain. The 
expense to the state worried him, as did the use of such 
police in other states in grappling with industrial troubles 
rather than rural enforcement work. Still, he wrote, 
"conditions must be changed." 
This editorial is revealing for two reasons. Wallace was 
not advocating a state police for Iowa; his two reservations 
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regarding their expense and potential misuse make that clear. 
Neither did he strongly support vigilantism. Wallace's real 
audience seems to have been the state's local, rural law of­
ficers. The alternatives suggested seem to be a goad, a means 
of getting local lawmen to pursue farm thievery cases more 
vigorously. 
A better solution appeared in 1924 because it involved 
the volunteerism and local autonomy that Wallace cherished. 
It also promised an effective means of battling the rural 
"crime wave" his journal had identified. Vigilantism became 
the solution-of-choice for Wallaces' Farmer. Wallace wrote on 
May 9, 1924, that the service bureau was aware of the 
existence of protective associations and would like to learn 
more about them. "If your protective association has been 
making a good record in checking thievery, we wish you would 
write in and tell us how it was done." 
Wallace vigorously threw himself into his anti-crime 
campaign. The front page of the December 5, 19 24, edition 
carried the banner headline; "Getting Rid of the Sneak Thief; 
How the Vigilantes of Pioneer Days Put Down Horse Thieves and 
Bandits." An article summary placed within a box reads, "Stop 
Thief I" He wanted no one to miss this story. Wallace had no 
doubt about the cause of the sudden increase in farm thefts, 
writing that, "since the day of hard roads and the motor truck 
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has come, farmers have suffered greatly from organized 
thievery." Equally certain of the solution, Wallace said, 
"how can these depredations be stopped? There is an answer in 
the early history of the vigilante associations of the 
middlewest . . . And in the work of the local protective 
associations." The entire front page and most of the 
eleventh in the December 15 issue contained a detailed 
description of the formation and operation of past Iowa 
vigilante groups. 
H. A. Wallace knew of the Iowa Bankers' Association's 
vigilantes. At one point he wrote, "The bankers of Iowa have 
organized their vigilance committees . . . merchants of Iowa 
have hired detectives . . . now comes the farmer." The 
article carefully portrayed a positive image of extra­
jurisdictional law enforcement, giving highest praise to the 
Anti-Horse Thief Association (AHTA). It was described as 
being more law-abiding than the vigilante associations and "a 
valuable aid to the officers of the law." Wallaces' Farmer 
had reached its first conclusion in the fight against farm 
thievery: crime-fighting worked best when it was a voluntary 
community-service activity. During the winter of 1924-1925, 
Wallace continued urging lowans to establish protective 
associations of their own. Wallace blamed the inadequacies of 
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Iowa's rural law enforcement officers for the need of 
protective associations. 
He wrote, "maybe it's politics and maybe it isn't, but 
many farm communities found a complaint about a dozen [stolen] 
chickens. . . . Was a good joke to law officers." " 
Increased efforts were needed. Near Iowa Falls a considerable 
number of farmers reported poultry thefts. Farmers near Alta 
had hogs stolen. Kossuth county reported a "crime wave" in 
the vicinity. 
The principal elements of the Wallaces' Farmer crime-
fighting program was in place by 1925. The organization was 
voluntary. Many of the officers of the protective 
associations were farmers who already had leadership 
experience in their local Farm Bureau organizations. Pains 
were taken to prevent thefts by warning off potential thieves. 
Finally, local lawmen were becoming more aware of the 
seriousness of the farm theft problem. 
Wallace began to help localities form protective 
associations. He announced in January, 1927, the creation of 
another Iowa protective association which owed its origin to 
the direct participation of Wallaces' Farmer. To aid those 
who wished to begin a protective association, the paper sent 
its employees out into the country to canvass farmers and to 
get them interested and enrolled into the new association. 
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Wrote Wallace, "their meeting was a fine example of what 
farmers can do to protect themselves and enjoy a good time 
thru [sic] association." 
Having passed through the stages of awareness, reporting, 
encouragement, and solution-discovery, Wallaces' Farmer moved 
into the final phase of its crime crusade in the summer of 
1926. On June 25, Wallaces' Farmer announced its direct 
participation in the anti-crime crusade. "Stop farm thievery! 
Capture a thief and get a reward 1" read the paper's 
headline.No longer content to report developments or to 
encourage others to form protective associations, the paper 
was participating in events. Wallaces' Farmer had become its 
own protective association. The paper began a new policy 
directed at rural lawmen that winter. It stopped chastising 
them and began instead to praise them. Sheriff Paul T. 
Beardsley, who had captured "Chicken" Wilson and "Whitey" Lime 
in Woodbury County, was the first to receive the editors' 
applause. 
Sheriff Beardsley warranted so much attention from 
Wallace not only because he subscribed to the paper's program, 
but also because he had created an innovation that Wallace 
wanted to share. Beardsley seems to have been among the first 
of Iowa's sheriffs to see the enforcement potential that 
telephones represented. Rather than personally respond to a 
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complaint of farm theft, the sheriff used the telephone to 
contact his closest association member. The Woodbury county 
sheriff, Wallace said, "has a man on the job practically as 
soon as the case is reported, and in this manner has been able 
to catch the thieves in every case." 
Putting the sheriff's photograph in the paper was a 
strong message; one no Iowa sheriff (an elected official) 
could miss. Undreamed of free publicity was available to 
sheriffs who pleased Wallaces' Farmer. Others who supported 
the newspaper's program received praise. Audubon county 
authorities caught cattle rustlers. Ex-sheriff William 
Northrup of Ross, Iowa, received Wallace's applause and a $25 
reward for capturing rustlers who had stolen from a Service 
Bureau member and for his observation that "this thievery 
campaign of Wallaces' Farmer is a move in the right 
direction." The character of the journal's anti-crime 
program had become complete by the end of 19 27, and it 
continued to be a significant activity in succeeding decades. 
The farm paper had rapidly progressed between 19 21 and 
19 27 through successive stages of awareness, reporting and 
encouragement, solution-discovery, and finally, direct 
participation. The solution H. A. Wallace and W. E. Drips 
pursued was rooted in the state's traditions and consisted of 
voluntary, local community-oriented vigilantism. The paper 
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was able to encourage local lawmen and state politicians to 
support their approach by rewarding them with free publicity. 
Wallaces' Farmer continued to pursue its anti-farm theft 
campaign until after World War II. Whether it was as 
successful as the editors believed is uncertain. Through this 
program the editors surely increased public awareness of the 
farm thievery problem. Furthermore, perhaps because of the 
reward and publicity potential, some rural sheriffs were 
demonstrably more responsive to farm theft cases at the end 
than at the beginning of the decade. The rate of reported 
misdemeanor convictions declined in the state after 1927. It 
is, of course, impossible to determine whether that reduction 
is directly attributable to the paper's anti-farm thievery 
activities. What is certain is that farm thievery was a 
problem in Iowa during the 1920s and that Wallaces' Farmer 
actively combatted it. 
Just as the Wallaces' Farmer's crusade became 
established, the IBA's lassitude was shattered. During the 
winter of 1929-1930 three rural banks reported daylight 
holdups; Dean in Appanoose County lost $1,667.30 on December 
5, Quimby in Cherokee County lost $7,808.62 on January 3, and 
Garnavillo (population 846) lost $488.33. The combined losses 
totalled nearly $10,000 and everyone expected more holdups. 
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Citing the "extensive outbreak of bank holdups" the bankers 
association pressured Governor John Hammill for state help.^° 
He told the bankers that the key to suppressing the rash of 
holdups lay with their own vigilance committees if only they 
could be reorganized and energized. He added that the state 
had no money for such a project but that he was personally 
willing to do what he could. 
The bankers responded with a request for a state 
detective's badge. They promised to pay for a new man to lead 
a vigilante task force if the governor would provide official 
sanction. Hammill obliged the bankers by asking for a 
recommendation as to whom he should appoint. Aware that the 
job required someone who could smoothly and effectively deal 
with the thirty-one county sheriffs who still had resident IBA 
vigilantes, the bankers chose R. W. Nebergall, Story County's 
popular sheriff, editor of the Iowa Sheriff, and a leader in 
the sheriffs' professionalization efforts. 
Agent Nebergall worked quickly to reorganize and 
reanimate the vigilantes from his offices at the IBA's 
headquarters in Des Moines. A clever man, he knew that using 
a war against crime or a patriotic appeal would fail to excite 
depression-weary Iowa farmers. Instead he set up a large 
display of the guns, ammunition, bullet-proof vests, tear gas 
grenades, and, inevitably, the Thompson submachine guns that 
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were newly available to the IBA's men. The guns were no 
longer offered free of charge because depression exigencies 
had affected the bankers', too, but Nebergall promised to sell 
them at the IBA's cost. 
Governor Hammill reneged somewhat on his decision to 
spend no state money on Nebergall's undertaking following the 
dual robberies on March 7 of the bank at Winterset in Madison 
County and at Goodell in Hancock County. The governor 
assigned three ECI agents to full-time bank robbery 
investigations. These agents had instructions from Hammill to 
"cooperate directly with the Officers of the Iowa Bankers' 
Association." For their part, the bankers assigned their 
association lawyers, at IBA expense, to help local county 
attorneys, most of whom had little trial experience, to 
prosecute bank robbers. In eight of the fifteen prosecutions 
that year, the county attorneys gratefully accepted the help. 
Nebergall took to the road once his gun display was in place. 
His priority was to reactivate lapsed Vigilance Committees as 
he did during his visit to the Ringgold County courthouse in 
Mount Ayr that October. Before a large audience that included 
thirty-four area bankers, Nebergall displayed the IBA's new 
guns, enrolled thirty-seven local farmers, and observed the 
sheriff deputize them before leaving.^" 
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The state agent had reason to press his efforts because 
the robbery rate increased from fourteen in 1930 to sixteen in 
1931. His IBA bosses were getting anxious for results. 
Although they were climbing, the bank holdups hit only 2 
percent of the state's 820 remaining banking towns. No 
one seemed to notice, however, that Iowa was 98 percent free 
of bank robberies. They noticed instead events such as the 
one in which two well-dressed men entered the Benton County 
State Bank at Blairstown one Saturday afternoon. They robbed 
teller R. D. Kiiran of $1,382 before locking him in the bank's 
vault and fleeing in a stolen car. The Blairstown holdup was 
only one of the year's sixteen "bank jobs," the total losses 
from which amounted to $31,816 according to IBA president 
I. O. Hasbrock.^" 
Nebergall believed that a new type of foe, the so-called 
"syndicated gang" had appeared in the 1930s'. He believed that 
the sheriffs and vigilantes no longer faced the independent 
small-town youths of the 1920s but an older, more vicious 
class of criminals. These new criminals were highly 
specialized professionals equipped with machine guns, tear gas 
and powerful automobiles fitted with smoke screen devices. 
Big city people, these criminals lived in the Midwest's 
largest cities where they benefitted from the protection of 
political and police graft and where they enjoyed the services 
222 
of the big city lawyers they retained in the event of their 
capture. 
As with the "crime wave," the syndicated gang of the 
1930s was a myth. Of the era's six most famous bank robbers: 
John Dillinger, Charles Arthur "Pretty Boy" Floyd, Lester 
Gillis, a.k.a. "Baby Face Nelson," Arizona Clark "Ma" Barker, 
Clyde Barrow and Bonnie Parker, only "Baby Face" had an urban 
childhood. John Dillinger grew up near Mooresville, Indiana, 
on his father's farm. "Pretty Boy" Floyd spent his earlier 
days as a fanner's son and as a farmer in Oklahoma. "Ma" 
Barker came from an Ozarks mountain farm. Clyde Barrow and 
Bonnie Parker shared rural origins. He was a farmer's son, 
she a small town country girl, both of whom came from the 
Texas panhandle near a tiny town called Denton. None of the 
six ever operated anything like a criminal "syndicate." Only 
"Baby Face" Nelson had any connection with organized crime, 
having briefly served Al Capone as an "enforcer" until his 
psychopathic love of killing made even Capone shun him. As 
with their more attention-getting comrades, Iowa's bank 
robbery gangs consisted of rural, often local, people. 
Typical of Iowa's rural bank robbers was the McDonald 
Gang of Iowa County. Led by 26-year-old Mrs. William J. 
McDonald, Jr., of Victor, the gang included her husband and 
two friends from the McDonald's country school days, Richard 
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D. Ringler and Louis Burry. On June 16, 1938, Mrs. McDonald 
drove the men to the North English Savings Bank where she 
waited inside the getaway car while they robbed the bank. On 
September 1st, the gang repeated its success by robbing the 
bank at Hedrick. After the Hedrick holdup the gang separated. 
The McDonalds were apprehended in Chicago where they had gone 
to spend their share of the loot. Ringler and Burry were 
arrested on the highway near Grinnell while trying to find a 
safe hideout. Ringler led officers to his farm near Victor 
where he handed over to them a buried fruit jar containing 
$229 of the stolen money. All four of the gang members pled 
guilty to bank robbery charges at their hearings. William J. 
McDonald, Jr. and his wife each received 25-year sentences.^® 
Despite the ballyhoo, the number of Iowa bank robberies 
remained small throughout the 1930s. In 1933 there were only 
six holdups affecting not quite 1 percent of the state's 628 
remaining banking towns. Iowa's bankers continued to 
concentrate on the robberies despite their low incidence rate 
as the New Deal Federal Bureau of Investigation's anti-bank 
robbery efforts made some of the robbery gangs famous. 
None of the gangs coming to Iowa gained more notoriety 
than Bonnie and Clyde. Before they arrived in Iowa in July, 
1933, Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow had been notorious for a 
year largely because of Bonnie's practice of corresponding 
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with local newspapers. As with almost everything else they 
did, their visit to Iowa was unplanned. Joined by Clyde's 
brother Marvin, a.k.a. Buck, and sister-in-law Blanche, the 
pair had been in hiding since an automobile accident left 
Bonnie badly burned that spring. In July the band left their 
tourist camp hiding place near Great Bend, Kansas, when some 
of their cabin neighbors showed too keen an interest in them. 
Meandering without a clear goal, the gang stopped in Fort 
Dodge long enough to rob three filling stations for travel 
money. From Fort Dodge they headed south, stopping to rest at 
a tourist camp at Platte City, Missouri, not far from the Iowa 
border. At the Missouri camp a gun fight erupted on July 17 
between the gang members and local officers. The gang escaped 
capture but not before Buck was grievously wounded and Blanche 
caught flying slivers of windshield glass in her eyes.^* 
For seven days Iowa's sheriffs searched for the Barrows. 
State agents believed they had spotted Bonnie in Mount Ayr the 
day following the Platte City battle and so they concentrated 
their efforts in and around Ringgold County. In fact, they 
were three counties too far south. On the afternoon of July 
23, farmer Henry Penn watched from the cover of the berry 
bushes he had been picking. He saw Blanche Barrow enter a 
small clearing in the Dexfield Park between Dexter and 
Redfield in Dallas county some thirty miles southwest of Des 
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Moines. Henry Penn knew who it was he had seen. He told his 
friend John Love, a Dallas County IBA Vigilante, and Love 
immediately telephoned Dallas County Sheriff C. A. Knee with 
the information.4° 
Knee summoned his vigilantes and led them to the Dexfield 
Park where he positioned them in small groups to ring the park 
and await the promised reinforcements from Des Moines. 
Knowing of Clyde Barrow's reputation for using military 
firearms. Sheriff Knee frantically tried to locate a machine 
gun for himself. He never got one for himself, but at 
midnight men from the Des Moines Police Department, the Polk 
County Sheriff's Office, the Iowa State Sheriffs' Association, 
the National Guard, and the Lewis System, a private security 
company, all arrived carrying Thompson submachine guns. 
Sheriff Knee remained in charge and placed his regular deputy, 
Burger, and a vigilante named Place on a slight hill 
overlooking the park's entrance bridge. The sheriff told his 
posse to try to sleep, there was nothing else to do until 
morning.^ 
At daybreak on the 24th BCI Chief Park Findley appeared 
at the park to take charge. He ordered the officers to arrest 
the Barrow gang. As officers approached what they thought was 
the sleeping gang, they came under machine gun fire. They 
scrambled for cover while other posse members returned the 
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gang's fire from the perimeter. They concentrated on the Ford 
V-8 Clyde was driving, and he ran the car into a tree stump 
when one of the officers' bullets struck his arm, making him 
lose control of the steering wheel. The Ford's axle broke as 
a result of the impact of the collision; and Clyde ran from it 
to the gang's other car, the one stolen the day before in 
Dexter. It would not run, having been literally shot to 
pieces by the officers' Thompsons. Clyde returned to the 
first car and pulled Bonnie from the seat. Together they ran 
into the woods. Buck and Blanche crawled a few hundred feet 
and lay behind a fallen tree still within sight of their 
night's camp. Deputy Burger and Vigilante E. A. Place heard 
the explosion of gunfire from their hillside perch overlooking 
the park's entrance bridge. When they saw Bonnie and Clyde 
approach, both officers fired their handguns at the pair, 
driving them off the path and into the creek below the bridge. 
Deputy Burger continued firing, finally hitting Bonnie in the 
back as she clawed her way up the opposite embankment. The 
officers lost sight of Bonnie and Clyde as they entered a 
thicket bordering the park. Afraid to charge blindly after 
them, the officers waited at the bridge hoping to catch the 
other gang members. 
Wounded and on foot Clyde, carrying Bonnie, happened upon 
a fifth gang member, Jack Sherman, who was walking along the 
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road bordering the park. The three followed the road until 
they saw a nearby farm house. Farmer Valley Fellers and his 
family were standing in the farm yard listening to the sounds 
of the nearby gun battle when three bedraggled people carrying 
handguns walked up to them. Clyde ordered the family to stand 
still while Sherman placed Bonnie inside the family's 
Plymouth. Clyde got behind the wheel and drove away without 
saying another word to the surprised family. Clyde drove the 
threesome to a Polk City filling station. He had intended 
only to steal enough gasoline to continue running, but when he 
saw station attendant George Albright's new Chevrolet parked 
next to the office he stole it instead. Officers discovered 
Albright's car abandoned the following day in Broken Bow, 
Nebraska.^ 
Officers continued to search Dexfield Park for the other 
members of the gang. Buck and Blanche remained hidden behind 
the fallen tree during Bonnie and Clyde's escape with Jack 
Sherman. They heard an airplane belonging to the Pes Moines 
Register and carrying Chief Findley looking for them and 
surmised that Bonnie and Clyde must still be free. The 
Barrows remained hidden for two hours before being spotted by 
Des Moines dentist and guardsman H. W. Keller. Walking with 
Keller was Dallas County Vigilante James Young of Dexter, but 
Young did not notice the concealed pair until Keller shot Buck 
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in the head without warning. Officers transported Buck to the 
King's Daughters Hospital in nearby Perry where he died on 
August 1, 1933, of an infection from the head wound the 
dentist had inflicted upon him. Bonnie and Clyde died of 
gunshot wounds nine months later in rural Louisiana on May 24, 
1934. w 
By that time, Iowa's vigilante movement had declined. 
During the nine months that the pair remained free the number 
of Iowa vigilantes plummeted from 1,588 in 26 2 banking towns 
to 885 in 163 banking towns. An occasional bank robbery still 
occurred, as when three men wearing sun glasses robbed the 
Monona State Bank of $2,241 in July of 1935, but holdups were 
becoming rare.'*^ In 1937 holdups befell only two banks, 
leading the IBA to start dismantling its remaining vigilantes. 
It is worth noting that, with 529 remaining banking towns, the 
bank robbery rate of .5 percent in 1937 exactly matched the 
1921 incidence rate. Whereas in 1921 the IBA had taken a .5 
percent incidence rate as proof of a crisis, in 1937 the same 
rate was considered as proof of their victory over crime. In 
fact, the perception of rural crime, not the reality, had 
changed. 
By 1937 the IBA wanted their vigilantes to fade away. 
When Chickasaw County Vigilance Committee leader Joe Menges 
wrote to the state headquarters asking for help to keep his 
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group active, the IBA suggested that it be allowed to "lapse 
for a while" because of "the need for general great economy 
everywhere." Kossuth County Vigilante Chief H. L. Gilmore 
received a similar message when he wrote IBA Secretary Frank 
Warner saying that a social event to "sort of put a little new 
life into the organization" was planned. Warner discouraged 
Gilmore, noting that, the "Iowa Police Radio System" made it 
"less and less . . . necessary to maintain Vigilance 
Committees," and that Gilmore should let his band lapse. 
By the decade's end the IBA's policy of neglect had 
worked. Fewer than 300 vigilantes remained active in forty-
nine banking towns across Iowa. The IBA did not miss them. 
It said that the BCI, the State Police Radio, the sheriffs' 
professionalization, the Iowa Highway Patrol, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and most of all the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation that guaranteed depositors' losses, 
"have replaced the void in law enforcement that precipitated 
the need for IBA Vigilantes." 
Iowa's vigilante experiment, born of the mistaken 
judgment that the state faced a rural crime wave, ended 
quietly through the bankers planned neglect in the late 1930s. 
It is fortunate that it did so. Arming hundreds of 
inadequately prepared citizens was a holdover idea that simply 
was not appropriate in 20th century America. Furthermore, it 
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was not necessary because the anticipated crime wave did not 
come. Worst of all, and most dangerous, the presence of 
vigilantes actually complicated the only major, large-scale 
"criminal" threat to rural Iowa's peace—the Cornbelt 
Rebellion. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUBDUING THE CORNBELT REBELLION 
During the Cornbelt Rebellion, the interwar period's only 
concentrated threat to rural Iowa's peace, each of the 
elements already discussed, police professionalization, the 
advent of state involvement with rural law enforcement, and 
the vigilante movement, came together and each played its part 
in its resolution. 
Between the winter of 1931 and the spring of 1933 some of 
Iowa's sheriffs had their nascent professionalization tested 
to the full as northwestern Iowa farmers participated in the 
Cornbelt Rebellion. At first the sheriffs dithered in 
response to the mass lawlessness that confronted them. Then 
they tried using gentle words and quiet persuasion to quell 
the disturbances. When that approach failed, they tried the 
New Deal's "get tough" attitude which led to reprisals and 
finally to martial law. Finally, they returned to their 
traditional mode of enforcement which depended upon 
familiarity and community consensus to attain the consent of 
the governed necessary for them to keep the peace. 
Some rural Iowa sheriffs found that their enthusiasm for 
being part of the New Deal's war against crime turned sour in 
the face of lawbreaking mobs of embittered neighbors and 
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voters. J. Edgar Hoover's image of a titanic struggle between 
good and evil withered before the reality of a struggle 
between good and good. During the period from August, 1932, 
and April, 1933, northwest Iowa's sheriffs found themselves to 
be utterly unprepared for the mass rebellion of their 
constituents. They were battling friends, not imaginary big 
city gangsters. It was not that rural unrest was unknown; 
civil strife had occasionally disturbed the hinterland. In 
1922, for example, it had required twenty patrolling U.S. 
Marshals to calm Creston residents after a railroad guard had 
shot dead a railroad picketer.^ In the 1930s, however, the 
scale of the violence and the number of local participants 
made the out-break of civil discord unique.% 
Iowa's dispossessed farmers grew increasingly truculent 
as the agricultural depression of the 1920s became the all-
encompassing Great Depression of the 1930s. A spectacular 
expression of rural anger occurred on March 19, 1931, when 
1,500 farmers occupied the statehouse, protesting among other 
things the lawmakers' plans to establish a state highway 
patrol.3 American Farm Federation president Edward A. O'Neal 
III noted the heartland's dangerous atmosphere, warning 
Congress in January, 1932, that, "Unless something is done for 
the American farmer we'll have revolution in the countryside 
in less than twelve months."* 
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One sign O'Neal and others saw of brewing trouble was the 
number of farm foreclosures. Across the nation in 1929, 58 
farms in every 1,000 changed hands, 19 of them through forced 
sales. In 1932 that number rose to the alarming figure of 77 
in every 1,000 farms and worse, 42 of them were subjected to 
forced sales. After a decade of seeing their status slip, 
panicky farmers began observing their friends and neighbors 
ousted from their land. A whole generation watched its work 
come to count for nothing as the number of the dispossessed 
multiplied.5 
In Iowa, as across the Middle West, the call for mutiny 
arose as farmers gathered in their county courthouses to hold 
mass meetings of protest. During the winter of 1931-1932, 
Iowa's angry farmers discovered the power of collective action 
as they saw their efforts halt farm-foreclosing sheriff's 
sales. Iowa's sheriffs walked the uncomfortable tightrope of 
public expectation. Their oath bound them to execute the 
court's order to take away farms from their neighbors; their 
constituents hotly demanded that they help them retain their 
farms. Knowledge that the upcoming elections with the all 
important June primaries were fast approaching exacerbated the 
sheriffs' position. They dawdled, they excused, they paused 
and finally, in the face of overwhelming voter acrimony, they 
stopped conducting sheriff's sales altogether. 
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They could not maintain stasis for long. Economic and 
political pressures continued to build. Spring became summer, 
the primaries passed, and Iowa's farmers found a new voice in 
the Farm Holiday Association. Milo Reno, the "Holidayers'" 
leader, urged a buying, selling, and taxpaying farmers' strike 
to force Congress to provide relief. He called his strike a 
holiday in a bitter parody of the way bankers closed their 
banks to depositors on self-declared "holidays" when they 
could not serve their customers. An anonymous rural wag 
popularized the Association's name with a jingle: 
Let's call a "Farmers' Holiday" 
A Holiday let's hold. 
We'll eat our wheat and ham and eggs 
And let them eat their gold.® 
Reno announced that the Holiday would commence on August 
11, 1932. Iowa's hot spot was Sioux City.? By the 14th more 
than 1,500 farmers had blockaded all five of the city's entry 
points. They stopped trucks carrying produce to town by 
laying thrasher's belts and debris across the highways. 
Pottawattamie and Harrison County pickets did the same thing 
at Council Bluffs to choke off deliveries to Omaha from the 
Iowa side of the Missouri River. Picketers even stopped 
trains on one occasion eighteen miles from Sioux City. 
The sheriffs' first reacted to the strikes with gentle 
words and quiet persuasion. Hundreds of county vigilantes had 
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been organized by the Iowa Bankers' Association as anti-bank 
robbery constabularies, but the sheriffs called up only a 
handful of them to meet the emergency. Pottawattamie County 
Sheriff Percy Lainson is one who pursued the quiet approach. 
When he found more than a hundred picketers congregated at 
Council Bluffs' limits he admonished them softly and left them 
unmolested after extracting from them a promise to avoid 
violence while stopping trucks at their barricade.® 
Harrison County Sheriff C. F. Cross also used a mild 
approach. When the first rumors of the incipient rebellion 
reached him he went to the home of the local county Holiday 
Association president, Clifton Savery. Sheriff Cross reminded 
Savery of his followers' ugly temper and told him that he 
would hold the president personally responsible for any 
violence that occurred. Cross knew that seeing Savery was a 
gamble. Neither he nor Savory could forecast the local 
picketers' response to the threat. But Cross' gamble worked. 
Admitting to the sheriff that his men were beyond restraint 
and that he could not guarantee their good behavior, he 
ordered his membership to halt the strike and go home.' 
While passions cooled in Harrison County, they were 
heating up near Sioux City. Governor Dan Turner's statement 
to the press that the "highways will be kept open and mob rule 
will not be tolerated" helped not at all in quieting the 
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situation. Neither did the broken leg that blockade runner 
Harvey Harrison got when his truck smashed into a timber 
across a road near Washta. Still, the sheriffs' dependence 
upon friendly familiarity with the local picketers worked at 
first. Their tactic began failing when the sides hardened 
beyond familiarity's shadow.^" 
Rancor first appeared between the sheriffs and the 
striking farmers during the second week of strikes. One mile 
south of Council Bluffs, a clash occurred between three of 
Sheriff Lainson's special deputies and a crowd of wildcat 
strikers. The forest of accusation and counter accusation 
makes it impossible to know precisely what happened, but 
officers did use tear gas against the crowd which included 
women and children. Tempers flared following the gas attack. 
Sheriff Lainson deputized an additional fifty men, vowing 
angrily to sweep the highways of picketers. His deputies 
tried to do just that, at one point arresting thirteen 
strikers at the site of the gassing. More than thirteen new 
picketers replaced them within minutes. 
Gentleness and toleration disappeared as violence on the 
highways escalated. Both sides abandoned any pretense of good 
will or calm after the drawing of blood. One of the worst 
episodes involved R. D. Markell, a 67-year-old farmer who 
despised the Holiday Association. He died with a picketers' 
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slug in him while trying to ram his truck past a barricade. 
The court later freed Niles Cochrane, Markell's alleged 
slayer, for lack of evidence. 
As violence begot violence, the sheriffs found themselves 
under attack. On August 29 eleven of Woodbury County Sheriff 
John A. Davenport's special deputies were attacked near 
Cushing while enroute from Moville to Sioux City. Farmer 
William Turner had six loads of hogs ready for market but 
feared confronting the pickets. Several hundred striking 
farmers stopped his convoy near Cushing and then charged the 
trucks, hitting the deputies with clubs and pipes, severely 
injuring many of them and turning the trucks around." 
Some sheriffs resorted to reprisals. The day after the 
attack on the Woodbury County deputies, A. N. Tilton, sheriff 
of bordering Cherokee County, joined in a shotgun attack 
against strikers near the county seat of Cherokee. On August 
30 Sheriff Tilton and eight other masked men in two cars drove 
past a roadblock on Highway 21. They shot down fourteen 
strikers before racing away. Three of the assailants were 
accused of the drive-by shooting: Sheriff Tilton, Harrison 
Steele of Steele's Bank in Cherokee, and Ralph White, a former 
Cherokee police officer. The court freed Sheriff Tilton on a 
directed verdict; the other men never faced criminal 
charges. 
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Back at Sioux City's barricades reprisals continued on 
September 7th and 8th. On the 7th more than 160 special 
deputies clashed with picketers at two different points. At 
the place where Highway 75 enters the city's north side, more 
than 100 Plymouth County deputies exchanged gunfire with 
picketers as they ran the blockade with a convoy of twenty-
seven cattle trucks. At another location sixty deputies armed 
with police billy clubs assaulted thirty-five unarmed 
picketers sending them reeling into the cover of an adjacent 
corn field. In neither incident did the officers attempt to 
make arrests. Their purpose was revenge, not apprehension. 
Grudges began developing between the deputies and the 
picketers. The strike was nearly a month old when the 
reprisals began. It seems that the sheriffs were losing 
control of their deputies. In retaliation for the September 7 
clubbing attack, the picketers arranged the next day for a 
phoney escort. The deputies passed into the city without 
incident but were brutally attacked with clubs on their return 
trip. 
County jails provided the setting for some of the 
strike's worst moments. Sheriff Percy Lainson's Pottawattamie 
County Jail in Sioux City soon filled to overflowing. On 
August 25 more than 2,000 bib-overall clad farmers surrounded 
his jail and shouted for the release of the forty-three 
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strikers he held inside. Lainson had advance warning of the 
mob's arrival and hastily organized a guard of 200 men, 
delighting those who carried the sheriff's new Thompson 
submachine guns. As tensions climbed with each exchanged cat 
call and insult, Sheriff Lainson took creative steps to avoid 
the carnage he believed would come if the mob charged his 
amateur deputies and their machine guns. He had hoped the 
sight of the Thompsons would subdue the mob, but when they 
only incited the crowd he quickly arranged for each prisoner's 
bail and set them free. The narrowly avoided catastrophe 
signalled Sheriff Lainson's return to a gentle and quiet 
strategy. His show of force at the jail produced a result 
opposite of what he intended, so he sent all but a handful of 
his deputies home and withdrew his patrols from the blockaded 
highways. 
Sheriff Lainson may have been influenced to free his 
prisoners by the Clay County sheriff's identical decision the 
day before in Spencer, ninety-five miles distant. There a 
stubborn farmer named L. E. Norman deliberately tried to 
increase local tensions, which were slight. Norman was one of 
several picketers who were in the jail on misdemeanor charges 
of obstructing a public highway. Each of his fellows had 
happily accepted the chance to leave jail under bonds the 
sheriff arranged. Norman refused to go, saying he wanted to 
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be a martyr. When a hundred sympathetic farmers arrived at 
the jail to demand his release, the sheriff secured a bond for 
Norman and bodily threw him from the jail's front door before 
the mob could become unruly. 
At the Clinton County Jail, 275 miles from Sioux City, 
500 farmers appeared at the end of August demanding the 
release of picketers. The Clinton men were less agitated than 
those in northwest Iowa, and the sheriff held onto his 
prisoners by passing out shotguns to his special deputies. 
The shotguns subdued the Clinton crowd which left the jail 
house without further incident. 
The strike was broken by summer's end. The arrests and 
the violence, especially the shooting at Cherokee, shook the 
Holiday Association's leadership. Said one New York Times 
correspondent, "[they] blew up, frightened at the appearance 
of the ugly monster into which its innocent child had so 
unexpectedly grown.On August 26 officers arrested eighty-
seven picketers, robbing the barricades of men in an 
impressive display of force. Milo Reno and other Holiday 
leaders declared September 1 to be the beginning of a 
"temporary truce." At Council Bluffs Pottawattamie County 
Grand jurors briefly considered investigating the farm strike 
but then declined because too many of their neighbors had been 
involved.^® While the strike's violence had ended without 
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resort to outside enforcement assistance, the farmers were 
still without relief, they were still losing their farms, and 
they were still infuriated. 
Rural lowans did not abandon collective action following 
the failed farm strike. As the number of Iowa's farm 
foreclosures peaked at eight for every 100 farms in 1933, 
angry farmers drew upon their frontier past and the Farmers' 
Holiday movement for solutions to the growing farm foreclosure 
emergency. Their efforts to forestall sheriff's farm sales, 
like the farm strike, represented a spontaneous and 
unorganized grassroots phenomenon. Known as penny auctions, 
their first anti-foreclosure attempts closely imitated their 
forbearers' "claim clubs" of a century before. Like the claim 
clubs, penny auctions circumvented the law by complying with 
its letter and violating its spirit. On the appointed day a 
distressed farmer's friends and neighbors appeared to make 
penny bids on his land, livestock, and implements. At the 
proceeding's end, the penny bidders would pay up, thereby 
satisfying the legal specifications, and then return the 
property to the original owner. No doubt bemused, the sheriff 
then reported to the court the result of his foreclosure 
sale.^^ 
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The sheriffs did not initially see the penny auctions for 
the ominous signs of discontentment that they were. By 
drawing upon their frontier heritage for solutions, the 
farmers signalled their belief that they, like their 
ancestors, lacked legal protection. The timing of the penny 
auctions also was a portent of future conflict. They appeared 
just as Iowa's rural sheriffs had embraced J. Edgar Hoover's 
message that they were civilization's best defense against 
anarchy. A polarity emerged between the protectors and many 
of the protected who began to see sheriffs and courts as 
enemies instead of allies. While the sheriffs wrestled with 
some of their farmers' penny auctions they also had to deal 
with other farmers' petitions and demands as well. 
As elsewhere in the state, farmers in Allamakee and 
Ringgold Counties gathered at their county seats to protest 
and to plan a confrontation in the foreclosure crisis in the 
months following the strike. Claiming that Iowa's farmers 
were fast becoming peasants, Jesse Sickles, the local Holiday 
representative, implored county farmers to sustain the 
Association at a mass meeting in the county courthouse. A few 
weeks later an Iowa Farmers' Union representative named Glenn 
Miller spoke for three hours before a throng of picnicking 
Allamakee County farmers. He blamed Presidents Coolidge and 
Hoover for the farmers' plight.Ringgold County farmers 
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gathered in the courthouse that winter to listen to the 
Farmers' Holiday local chairman, Bert Neville, discuss the 
farm mortgage crisis. More than 250 of them signed Neville's 
petition which said, "We, the undersigned, have assembled this 
9th day of January 1933 ... to protest the foreclosures of 
. . . [farm] mortgages. A seven-point resolution followed, 
demanding: 
#1 a reduction of the county engineer's salary to $1,000 
#2 direct election of the local school superintendent 
#3 the county farm's equipment remain on the farm 
#4 county road building halt immediately 
#5 a guaranteed hiring preference for married men on the 
county's highway maintenance crews. 
#6 the resignation of two unpopular members of the 
county board of supervisors 
#7 work on the county roads in lieu of paying the poll 
tax 
A local constable named John Nissen was among those who 
participated in this meeting. He went so far as to second a 
motion that the county disconnect its support from the county 
Farm Bureau office. County Supervisor Dennis R. Shay also 
participated in the meeting, agreeing to keep the meeting's 
minutes during the afternoon session. Two weeks later a 
similar protest meeting occurred, this time attended by 1,500 
area farmers. Protests such as these surfaced across the 
state and marked the second phase of farmer unrest.^'' 
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In the northwest corner of the state such meetings 
presaged the second phase of the state's most famous rural 
rebellion. Chief of the state Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation Park Findley identified four reasons why farmer 
unrest became farmer rebellion in northwest Iowa. These were; 
drought, grasshoppers, depression, and communist propaganda. 
His analysis held some truth, nature did seem to conspire with 
economics that spring. Among the "cornbelt rebellion's" worst 
spots, Plymouth county had suffered all four of the calamities 
Parks identified. Residents and their livestock there both 
gratefully received American Red Cross food parcels that 
spring. Chief Parks erred in his assessment of the communist 
involvement, however. Three Moscow trained communist 
agitators were in the troubled area, but their contribution to 
succeeding developments proved negligible." 
Like the farm strike and the penny auctions, the burst of 
violence in Plymouth, O'Brien, and Crawford counties happened 
unbidden and unanticipated. The spring's grim events began on 
April 18, 1933, at a small tenant farm 3.5 miles from the 
county seat of LeMars. Sheriff R. E. Rippey drove alone to Ed 
Durband's farm that morning. He expected no trouble from the 
usually quiet tenant farmer. The approach to the farm gave no 
clue, the place looked calm and deserted from the road. But 
as Sheriff Rippey approached the farm house with an eviction 
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notice in his hand, a large crowd of angry farmers appeared as 
if from thin air. They accosted the sheriff before he could 
speak/ disarmed him, and took another gun from his car. Two 
in the crowd emptied the sheriff's guns and returned them to 
him. They were not going to break the law, they said. They 
were just not going to allow the sheriff to evict the Durband 
family. As Rippey stood listening to the crowd, one of its 
number moved to his car unnoticed to search his briefcase for 
additional eviction notices and to pour water into his gas 
tank. Rippey left the Durband farm abashed but unharmed. 
Behind him he left a multitude of contented farmers who spent 
the next few days enjoying the contents of their wives' picnic 
baskets as they awaited Sheriff Rippey's return.^ 
It was a wearing wait. As had sheriffs Percy Lainson and 
C. F. Cross of Pottawattamie and Harrison counties before him, 
Rippey chose to pursue a gentle and quiet tactic in answer to 
the farmers' actions. Doubtless guiding Sheriff Rippey was 
the previous summer's violence. If gentle words and quiet 
persuasion failed, then he would try tedium. Eventually, he 
reasoned, the farmers would leave the farm out of boredom 
without his prodding. 
Events proved the sheriff right but with disastrous 
results. After more than a week's wait some of the Durband 
farmers decided to resolve the muddle on their own. Since 
250 
Sheriff Rippey showed no sign of action, they left the farm in 
search of C. E. Becker, Durband's landlord, who lived in 
LeMars. Becker met the farmers with sharp words and a defiant 
refusal to rescind his eviction notice. After trading insults 
with Becker, the farmers left him unharmed. 
If neither the sheriff nor the landlord could give 
satisfaction, the Durband farmers thought perhaps the court 
would, so they moved on to the courthouse. There they met 
several rebelling farmers who had just arrived after a pitched 
battle over a farm foreclosure at the O'Brien county 
courthouse, some fifty miles northeast of Le Mars in Primghar. 
At least two of the newcomers bore bruises from the fight. 
The Plymouth county farmers immediately lost all traces of the 
ennui that Sheriff Rippey had labored to produce. As a 
hundred angry farmers crowded through the courtroom's doors, 
they heard a sharp-toned command, "This is my courtroom! Take 
off your hats and stop smoking cigarets J" The voice demanding 
decorum belonged to District Court Judge Charles C. Bradley. 
With excited cries of, "This is our courtroom, not yours !" and 
"Get him!" the farmers ran to Bradley's side. The judge was 
already disliked for reasons that had nothing to do with the 
Durband family's predicament. County gossips had long ago 
charged the sixty-year-old bachelor with the profligacy of 
living "in sin" with an unmarried Le Mars woman. Hearing a 
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sharp rebuke from someone they considered their moral inferior 
triggered a vehement response from the mob. Repeatedly the 
crowd ordered Bradley to promise to stop all actions 
jeopardizing farmers; repeatedly he refused despite the blows 
he received.^® 
The group then grabbed Bradley, drove him in a farm truck 
one mile out of town, slipped a rope around his neck, and 
affixed the other end to a telephone pole. Fortunately, Judge 
Bradley did not die. Perhaps a bit of the ennui Sheriff 
Rippey had worked to create was still lingering or perhaps the 
pleading of the Le Mars Globe-Post's editor, R. F. Starzl, was 
compelling. The farmers satisfied themselves with humiliating 
the judge by removing his trousers and dousing him with grease 
as he lay abandoned and semiconscious along the roadside.^' 
Sheriff Rippey's tactic of gentle words and quiet 
persuasion would probably have worked if not for the chance 
appearance of the battered O'Brien county men and the presence 
of the discredited Judge Bradley. Had a different judge been 
sitting on the bench the lynching would not have occurred. At 
the landlord's house insults alone satisfied the farmers; 
social mores, not rebellion, motivated the LeMars lynchers. 
Late that night of April 27, Sheriff Rippey cabled Governor 
Clyde Herring: "Situation beyond control of civil 
authorities. Judge . . . assaulted and threatened with 
252 
hanging. Demand militia." Governor Herring mobilized militia 
units but not before blaming Rippey for the need to do so by 
describing the sheriff as a "weak sister [who] hadn't nerve 
enough to uphold the law" without using troops. 
O'Brien County Sheriff Ed Leemkuil presumably suited the 
governor's taste better than did Rippey. The same day that 
Judge Bradley faced a lynch mob, Sheriff Leemkuil faced more 
than 600 infuriated farmers in a wild melee for control of his 
own courthouse in Primghar. John Shaffer's farm had fallen 
prey to a sheriff's sale, and a crowd arrived to protest the 
proceeding. At 10:00 a.m. a deputy appeared on the second 
floor balcony to open the sale by calling for bids. The mob 
rushed the building, trying to stop the deputy. Club-wielding 
deputies met them at the top of the narrow staircase inside. 
The deputies used the cramped landing to advantage and beat 
back the charging farmers. The fray ended when Leemkuil, 
aware that his deputies would lose a sustained battle, agreed 
to a symbolic flag kissing ceremony reminiscent of the state's 
World War patriotism mania. The ceremony mollified the 
Primghar farmers, who quietly dispersed. Several of the 
bruised men left Leemkuil's courthouse for Le Mars, but most 
of them went home. 
One more day of mass violence awaited a rural Iowa 
sheriff. Crawford County Sheriff Hugo B. Willy's heart must 
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have sunk as he neared the J. F. Shields farm three and one-
half miles southwest of Denison on the afternoon of April 
28th. Nervous already because he was executing his first-ever 
sheriff's sale, he also knew that the county generally 
expected brutal resistance to it from local Holiday 
Association members. To meet any eventuality Willy brought 
with him thirty special deputies plus six state agents who 
happened to in the area. 
Willy found more than 400 farmers milling around the 
grounds of the farm. But they were quiet and orderly, so the 
sheriff began to hope that his company of officers was 
unnecessary. By 1:30 p.m. the sale was moving along amicably. 
Two cribs of corn had sold under reasonable bids, no worry 
about a penny auction at least, and Willy began the cry for 
bids on a third crib's corn. As he scanned the crowd for new 
bidders he spied a long convoy of cars and trucks. Inside 
were more than 800 Crawford, Monona, and Shelby county Holiday 
Association farmers. Around him Willy noted that the babble 
of voices had stopped, leaving only an eerie silence. 
As the Holidayers scrambled from their vehicles, the 
state agents formed the special deputies into a circle around 
the sheriff. The officers' plan for meeting just such an 
emergency as this was to form a close circle and to escape the 
scene in cars. Before they could start for their cars, 
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however, State Agent Marion S. Stevens saw a V-shaped wedge of 
more than 200 Holidayers charging toward him. The deputies 
had only enough time to entwine their arms before the wedge 
rammed the circle, instantly fracturing it. The officers 
fought in isolated pockets alone or in pairs. A state agent 
with the foresight to wear bib overalls rather than his usual 
business suit saved himself and several of his companions from 
severe pommeling by telling a group of attacking farmers ; "I 
wouldn't do that fellows, let [them] up. 
The fighting was brief but so intense that two of the 
special deputies fought one another, one of them landing a 
blow across the other's stomach before recognizing him. An 
officer who drew his revolver was upended into a watering 
trough. Outnumbered as they were by more than twenty to one, 
the officers' resistance lasted only a few moments. Each one 
was beaten, several of them severely, before the mob stopped. 
The mob allowed Sheriff Willy and his bedraggled men to leave 
following the first brief skirmish. No longer nervous but 
furious, Sheriff Willy wired Governor Herring, 
It appearing that the power of Crawford county is 
insufficient to . . . execute processes'. . . request is 
hereby made that you call out sufficient military force 
to handle the situation . . . immediately.^3 
The Iowa National Guard arrived in Plymouth and Crawford 
counties the following morning. In Denison a crowd of several 
hundred farmers heard Lieutenant Colonel Folsom Everett read 
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the governor's proclamation of martial law. It had been 
drafted ahead of time by Attorney General Edward L. 0'Conner, 
and it spoke of "a vicious and criminal assault upon a judge 
. . . endangering his life and threatening a complete 
breakdown of all law and order.Feeling expansive only 
moments before, the crowd grew subdued and quiet at hearing 
martial law imposed. Rebellion turned to submission at the 
sight of troops patrolling small town streets with fixed 
bayonets. Roman Catholic leader Monseigneur J. D. Fisch added 
his authority to the militia's when he praised them in sermons 
and demanded that any of his parishioners who were involved 
with the troubles stop and instead support President Roosevelt 
and all other authorities as well." 
The army came to Crawford county because of the Shields' 
farm riot and to Plymouth county because of the Bradley 
lynching. It occupied O'Brien county because of the Primghar 
courthouse battle. Major General Mat A. Tinley, the Iowa 
Guard chief, agreed with Attorney General 0'Conner's 
instructions regarding the Guard's mission to, "restore peace 
and order, arrest the ringleaders of the assault [upon 
Bradley], gather evidence against the men involved, and then 
immediately to withdraw. 
General Tinley knew he could not long sustain military 
operations; the Guard was understaffed and ill equipped to 
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function for long in the field. The general himself had worn 
his uniform so infrequently that when he put it on he found 
that his Sam Browne belt no longer fit. The last time he had 
worn it was along the Rhine eight years earlier. 
Approximately 500 soldiers patrolled the distressed counties 
and they began making arrests immediately. Sheriff Hugh Willy 
helped because he could identify 13 of the 1,200 men at the 
Shields' farm. Sheriff Frank Buehheit of Carroll county, in 
Crawford county to help during the crisis, arrested two 
farmers while having a casual conversation with them. He 
noticed that one of them had a deputy's badge, a souvenir the 
farmer said, of the Shields' farm riot.^ 
The attorney general's investigation was assigned to four 
Guard attorney-officers. They were Captain 0. G. Harris of 
Jefferson, Captain Fred C. Clark of Waterloo, Major L. D. 
Mallonee of Audubon, and Judge Advocate General Frank Hallagan 
of Des Moines. Hallagan alone among the four was deputized as 
an assistant attorney general to facilitate the investigation. 
An important part of their mission was to unearth the presumed 
outside, meaning communist, agitation in the area. State 
leaders could not and would not believe that such an 
unprecedented rebellion would emerge spontaneously amid quiet 
communities of law abiding farmers. State BCI Chief Park 
Findley reported that his investigations had convinced him 
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that communists provoked the disturbances and that Sioux City 
was a "hot bed of communist activity." The state's sheriffs' 
association later concurred saying, "All the [agrarian] 
disturbances . . . have been caused by professional trouble 
makers. 
When the four Guard attorneys arrived in the area under 
martial law, they announced that they had "definite evidence" 
that "professional agitators" had been seen in the vicinity 
several days before the insurrections erupted. They gave 
thanks to Chief Findley and Sheriff Willy for providing the 
Guard with an "agitation list" containing the ringleaders' 
names. Hunting chimerical "reds" proved as frustrating as it 
was fruitless. None of the local sheriffs supported the idea 
that outsiders of any stripe had participated in organizing 
what their own experiences told them was a spontaneous and 
exclusively local happening. The only notable action the four 
Guard lawyers took was to commit an insane man named Joe 
Genesner to the state mental hospital because the private 
courts were closed under martial law.^* 
Those who participated in the violent episodes were 
unequivocally rural lowans. They felt themselves abused and 
tried to regain their lost status and dispossessed farms. 
They were men like Sam T. Mosher, arrested by Guardsmen in 
Plymouth county for taking part in the Judge Bradley lynching. 
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Mosher was an active Holiday Association member who had manned 
the Sioux City barricades the summer before. The Guard and 
the sheriffs arrested 155 men in all in northwest Iowa. 
Plymouth county recorded ninety-two arrests and sixty-three 
more occurred in Crawford county. Having insufficient cell 
space, authorities housed many of the arrestees in barns, 
securing them by posting National Guard machine gun crews 
outside of the barns. The arrestees did not have to tolerate 
such primitive conditions long. On May 11 martial law ended 
and civil authority was restored.4° 
Northwest Iowa judges meted out mild punishment in the 
disrupted counties. The O'Brien county court accepted guilty 
pleas from all the defendants on charges of resisting the 
service of civil process. Each received suspended sentences 
or light fines. Judge Earl Peters of Clarinda presided over 
the Plymouth county trials. Each man involved in the attack 
on Judge Bradley received a minor fine. A 75-year-old 
defendant, A. A. Mitchell pled guilty to the most serious 
charge that arose from the lynching; assault with intent to 
do great bodily injury. He served thirty days in the Le Mars 
jail. Crawford county's bench reopened at 9:00 a.m. on May 11 
under the direction of Mount Ayr Judge Homer A. Fuller. The 
Shields' farm rioters each paid a $50 fine. In concluding his 
sentencing remarks Judge Fuller summed contemporary feeling 
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about the men when he said, "I do not think a single man who 
has stood before me is a bad man or a bad citizen. 
Very few after effects followed the cornbelt rebellion. 
Eleven Holidayers unsuccessfully sued Sheriff Willy for 
wrongfully detaining them after their arrests. A Vail, Iowa, 
farmer likewise failed in his police brutality suit against 
two state agents. Chief Park Findley of the BCI continued 
doggedly to pursue the "reds" he believed had propelled the 
rebellion until his death in June of 1935. The sheriffs knew 
better than he that communists had not fostered the rebellion. 
Northwest Iowa sheriffs alternated between competing law 
enforcement ideologies during the Cornbelt Rebellion. Neither 
of them ultimately proved successful. At the start of each 
phase of the rebellion, local lawmen tried the traditional 
enforcement custom of using familiarity and quiet persuasion 
to obtain legal obedience. When the traditional methods 
failed in the face of the growing tumult, they turned to the 
New Deal's "get tough" war against crime techniques. That 
failed as well and it exacerbated the farmers' hostility and 
escalated the violence as grudges and reprisals threatened the 
sheriffs' ability to control their own deputies. Finally, as 
with Sheriff Percy Lainson's prisoner release, the sheriffs 
reverted to the traditional practice of conforming to 
community expectations. As the degree of mordancy intensified 
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in the spring of 1933, local law enforcement officers 
floundered and called for the state militia. They did not, 
however, surrender themselves completely to the state's power. 
When state authorities initiated a hunt for foreign agitators 
to blame for the rebellion, the sheriffs stymied the effort 
through passive refusal to support the probe. 
The ease with which the sheriffs reasserted their control 
and the rebels' moderate punishment from the courts reflect 
the minority status of the fanner participants. The cornbelt 
rebellion's law enforcement legacy was a realization that, 
while the New Deal's ideology served the sheriffs well as an 
organizing schema for the purpose of professionalization, the 
only way to maintain rule by consent of the governed lay with 
the traditional law enforcement practice of conforming to 
community expectations. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Iowa's rural lawmen marshalled their resources during the 
years between the world wars as they prepared to resist the 
wave of lawlessness that they believed threatened to sweep 
across the hinterland. The "crime wave" never came. 
Contemporary jail records show that crime continued basically 
unchanged from earlier periods, that is to say that it was 
perpetrated by local young men from the bottom rung of their 
society who preferred to target property rather than people. 
The crime wave was a chimera. The idea of it took hold 
in the countryside shortly after appearing in the nation's 
press when newspaper publishers replaced waning war stories 
with thrilling, albeit exaggerated, crime stories in pursuit 
of increased readership and profits. It was a clever strategy 
that worked. 
However much embellished, there was crime in America. It 
was not difficult for people already excited by the war's 
propagandists to embrace the myth of a threatening crime wave. 
Once believed the myth had an abiding power to alter the 
people's and the authorities' perceptions of crime. Incidents 
of rural crime, once seen as unfortunate anomalies, were held 
as proof of the wave. Rural lawbreakers were consequently 
apprehended and punished as quickly as possible to deter the 
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other criminals that were presumed to be haunting the 
hinterland. 
Despite the new rural attitude toward offenders, the pre-
myth pattern of criminality remained essentially unchanged. 
The sheriffs' jail dockets do not reflect a "crime wave." It 
is not a "wave," but a gentle "swell" (to extend the metaphor) 
of steadily rising and falling rates of crime centering on the 
year 1931. Rural crime remained the remarkably minor province 
of "booze and boisterousness." Rural interwar crime was not, 
as Governor William L. Harding believed, the work of 
"organized, cunning, high trained criminals." Crime in the 
countryside was the work of local, laboring-class men in their 
twenties. While serious felony offenses did occur upon rare 
occasion to help nurture the rural crime wave myth for 
contemporaries, historical objectivity allows us to return 
such incidents to their proper perspective. There simply was 
no rural crime wave. 
Given the lack of criminal threat, the sheriffs responded 
both intelligently and inappropriately to the crime wave myth. 
Iowa's sheriffs reacted intelligently to the arrival of 
national prohibition. They found themselves squarely between 
the vocal few with their law and the mute many with their 
stills. Following an initially intense period of stringent 
liquor enforcement, rural law officers accommodated themselves 
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to rural realities. The sheriffs switched their enforcement 
strategies from the determined and aggressive pursuit of 
large-scale farmer moonshiners to apprehending a regular 
supply of small-scale violators. The quantity of prohibition 
enforcement remained high while the quality of that 
enforcement unobtrusively faded away. 
The crime wave myth and its war on crime corollary served 
the sheriffs for both good and ill in many ways. Lacking 
their urban comrades' political and economic infrastructure to 
reach the goal of police professionalization, they relied on 
an old rural tradition: the voluntary cooperative. By 
adhering to the twin themes of professionalism and a war on 
crime under the New Deal's sponsorship, the sheriffs of Iowa 
found an ideology that served them well as an organizing 
schema. They also found, as in the case of the Cornbelt 
Rebellion, that following the new war on crime ideology too 
closely led to massive overkill when it included things like 
tear gas and Thompson submachine guns. The Rebellion helped 
the sheriffs learn to cope with the rhetoric and the 
technology of the new professionalization when it served them 
while retaining their traditional behavior patterns that fit 
them for rural service and which allowed them to maintain the 
balance needed for rule by consent of the governed to work. 
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The power of the crime wave myth was sufficient, when 
combined with the public relations savvy of a clever state 
cabinet member, to overcome the people's traditional hesitancy 
to grant police power to state officials. The sheriffs, 
feeling inadequately prepared to resist the wave of 
lawlessness they expected, turned to state detectives and 
highway patrolmen for the scientific expertise they offered. 
Even so, the state's detectives and patrolmen were too 
few in number to permit the sheriffs to feel secure. To 
further augment their ranks the sheriffs agreed to deputize 
the vigilantes presented to them by the state's bankers. It 
was a particularly unfortunate response to the overblown crime 
wave. Arming hundreds of poorly trained citizens was a 
holdover idea that simply was not appropriate given that the 
anticipated crime wave never materialized. 
The presence of armed vigilantes only served to increase 
the likelihood of violence during the interwar period's only 
concentrated threat to rural Iowa's peace and harmony, the 
Cornbelt Rebellion. The sheriffs' overreaction to the 
Rebellion is evidence of the over-preparation of lawman who 
alternated between competing law enforcement ideologies during 
the crisis. When the traditional methods of quiet words and 
gentle persuasion failed to elicit obedience, the sheriffs 
tried the New Deal's "get tough" war-against-crime approach. 
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The result was increased animosity and they quickly reverted 
to the traditional practice of conforming to community 
expectations. 
The longer term consequences of accepting the crime wave 
myth have been largely deleterious. By embracing the tenets 
of the urban model of professionalization the rural sheriffs 
needlessly neglected the familiarity and community consensus 
that was their chief asset. They replaced their traditions 
with an alien, "G-Man" leadership, state involvement, and the 
trappings of urban policing, including firearms and practices 
unsuited for their rural environment—an unnecessary burden. 
Overall, the experiences of this period have bequeathed to 
rural law officers an unnecessary burden of learning to cope 
with an urban and accordingly foreign definition of 
professionalization that had to be grafted onto an already 
successful and therefore "professional," albeit "folksy," law 
enforcement practice that had changed little from those first 
used by sheriffs in Anglo-Saxon times. 
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APPENDIX 
JAIL DOCKET INFORMATION 
GKOUD I 
Prohibition 
Illegal Possession of Liquor 
Illegal Transportation of Liquor 
Driving While Intoxicated 
Bootlegging 
Misdemeanor Theft 
Obtaining Money Under False Pretenses 
Forgery and Embezzelment by Bailee 
Defrauding an Innkeeper 
Petty Larceny 
Larceny Under $20.00 
Insufficient Fund Check 
Public Nuisance 
Assault and Battery 
Disturbing the Peace 
Carrying a Concealed Weapon 
O K O U P  I I  
Felony Theft 
Burglary 
Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property 
Breaking and Entering 
Possession of Burglary Tools 
Bmbezzelnient 
Arson (Insurance fraud) 
Grand Larceny 
Grand Theft — Automobile 
Kidnapping 
Robbery (armed and unarmed) 
Bank Robbery 
Agricultural Theft 
Poultry Larceny 
Animal Larceny (cattle, sheep, hogs) 
Wool Larceny 
Honey Larceny 
Rape 
Attempted Rape 
Statutory Rape 
Rape 
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Group III 
Criminal Justice 
Arrest warrant 
Bench Warrant 
Perjury Warrant 
investigation 
Holding a suspicious person regardless o£ outcome 
Insane 
Holding awaiting transportation to state mental facility a 
person judged to be legally insane 
Welfare 
Sheltering abandoned, ill, lost and destitute persons 
G r o u p  I V  
Traffic 
Motor Vehicle safety and operations violations 
Liquor Nuisance 
Operating a saloon 
operating a brothel 
Family 
Wife Desertion 
Child Desertion 
Adultery 
Bigamy 
Bastardy 
Fish and Game 
Trapping without a licence or out of season 
Hunting without a licence or out of season 
Fishing without a licence or out of season 
Sex 
Lewdness 
Incest 
Seduction 
Pandering 
Sodomy 
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TABLE A-1 
GROUP I INDIGENCE RATE OF CRIME BY YEAR 
Year Prohibition Misdemeanor Theft Public Nuisance 
1920 02 05 04 
1921 10 09 12 
1922 22 05 01 
1923 15 16 01 
1924 32 23 05 
1925 55 27 12 
1926 35 26 08 
1927 43 18 11 
1928 64 51 16 
1929 65 21 21 
1930 70 50 18 
1931 90 90 32 
1932 54 58 35 
1933 43 44 54 
1934 51 44 56 
1935 51 48 27 
1936 68 55 39 
1937 37 40 22 
1938 43 43 23 
1939 46 43 28 
1940 25 55 31 
1941 40 36 16 
Source: Sheriffs' Jail Dockets, 1920-1941. 
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TABLE A-2 
GROUP II INCIDENCE RATE OF CRIME BY YEAR 
Year Felony Theft Agricultural Theft Rape 
1920 13 00 00 
1921 14 03 01 
1922 06 00 02 
1923 06 00 05 
1924 13 05 01 
1925 11 02 05 
1926 19 06 01 
1927 14 02 04 
1928 23 13 03 
1929 22 07 06 
1930 20 01 06 
1931 31 07 05 
1932 31 02 05 
1933 41 01 04 
1934 37 02 06 
1935 24 07 04 
1936 22 04 02 
1937 13 07 01 
1938 10 03 02 
1939 18 02 02 
1940 17 03 04 
1941 10 10 0 
Source: Sheriffs' Jail Dockets, 1920-1941. 
Year 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
06 
00 
05 
00 
04 
00 
03 
03 
04 
05 
04 
03 
07 
03 
04 
08 
00 
03 
0 0  
0 6  
0 0  
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TABLE A-3 
GROUP III INCIDENCE RATE OF CRIME BY YEAR 
Investigation Welfare C.J. 
00 00 06 
00 00 10 
00 00 11 
00 01 02 
00 00 01 
02 02 06 
06 04 08 
05 02 03 
08 02 04 
07 05 05 
12 06 10 
12 01 19 
01 06 12 
05 06 13 
04 06 05 
06 06 09 
06 06 09 
12 06 13 
08 04 17 
11 09 15 
09 03 22 
01 02 03 
Sheriffs' Jail Dockets, 1920-1941. 
Year 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Sex 
D O  
0 0  
01  
0 2  
0 1  
05 
0 8  
0 2  
0 2  
0 6  
04 
03 
0 0  
0 0  
03 
0 0  
0 0  
0 0  
00 
0 0  
0 1  
0 0  
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TABLE A-4 
GROUP IV INCIDENCE RATE OF CRIME BY YEAR 
Family Liquor Nuisance Traffic F&G 
00 04 00 00 
00 03 02 00 
05 03 00 00 
03 19 00 00 
07 16 01 02 
07 21 01 01 
11 13 03 00 
10 16 05 00 
05 15 04 00 
12 06 06 04 
05 18 05 03 
15 16 05 06 
08 08 05 03 
06 07 06 03 
04 03 05 05 
05 03 21 00 
07 03 16 02 
05 00 21 02 
04 00 19 02 
07 00 19 10 
07 00 34 02 
03 00 19 00 
Sheriffs' Jail Dockets, 1920-1941. 
